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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is composed of three papers (chapters) and derives its motivation 
specifically from financial intermediation and small business financing. Two of the papers are based 
on small businesses and relationship-based lending. The third paper specifically analyzes farm 
households that generate income from farm operations, as a representation of small businesses, and 
focuses on consumption behavior of farm households.  
The two papers on relationship-based lending focus on the changing structure of relationship-
based lending to small businesses. Both of these papers are motivated with the development of the 
Small Business Credit Scoring (SBCS) systems during the mid and late-1990s. With the emergence 
of SBCS, hard-information based lending models became more popular and the need for 
relationships in lending has decreased. The two papers use the Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF) datasets from the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System. Different from the 
previous literature, in both papers, the importance of relationships over different time periods is 
compared in a single regression by using all the available years for the SSBF dataset. The first paper 
analyzes whether the significance of borrower-lender relationships on loan contract terms, in 
particular interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements, declined. The second 
paper focuses on analyzing changes in effects of relationship on credit availability and credit 
amounts granted to small businesses. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that importance of 
borrower-lender relationships when lending to small businesses declined over time.  
The third paper on consumption specifically analyzes farm households that generate income 
from farm operations, as a representation of small businesses, and determines whether the life cycle / 
permanent income hypothesis is consistent with the consumption of farm households. This paper 
uses the most recent farm level data, the Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) data for Illinois 
farms from 1995 to 2009, to reach more accurate conclusions about recent farm household 
consumption behaviors. In the literature, there has also been difficulty finding datasets with micro-
data level household expenditure information. The advantage of using the FBFM data is that it is rich 
in farm household expenditures. The study finds evidence that current income changes are not 
significant in explaining consumption changes of farm households, thus confirming the life cycle / 
permanent income hypothesis for farm households. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation is composed of three papers (chapters) and derives its motivation 
specifically from financial intermediation and small business financing. Two of the papers are based 
on small businesses and relationship-based lending. The third paper specifically analyzes farm 
households that generate income from farm operations, as a representation of small businesses, and 
focuses on consumption behavior of farm households.  
The two papers on relationship-based lending focus on the changing structure of relationship-
based lending to small businesses. Getting a deeper understanding of relationship-based lending is 
important because relationship-based loans are major financing sources for small businesses. These 
small businesses are crucial to the economy of the U.S., accounting for a majority of firms in the 
U.S., contributing to major production, and employing more than half of the work force in the U.S. It 
is only through the funding of these small firms that small businesses can develop into larger firms. 
In addition, unlike larger businesses, small businesses have limited funding sources due to less 
publicly available information, uncertified audited financial statements, and privately kept contracts 
with their customers. Hence, small businesses cannot afford to get standard loans but instead obtain 
most of their funding from relationship-based loans.  
Similarly, relationship-based loans are important financing tools for small banks. Unlike 
large banks, small banks have limited financial capacity to lend to larger firms and instead focus on 
these relationship-based loans to small businesses because small banks' organizational structure 
makes it easier and less costly for small banks to process soft information. Considering the role of 
relationship-based loans and the significance of both small banks and small businesses within the 
U.S. economy, understanding any indications of changes in relationship-based loans is crucial.  
Understanding changing lending structure to small businesses also becomes important with 
the 2008 U.S. financial crisis and the subsequent European financial crisis. Following the 2008 U.S. 
financial crisis and the subsequent European financial crisis, the U.S. economy has weakened and 
unemployment rates have increased. In order to strengthen the economy and deal with the 
consequences of the crises, small businesses can be encouraged to invest and to increase production. 
Thus, it is important to understand changes in small business lending structure because small 
businesses mostly depend on loans to finance their investments. Additionally, understanding the 
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determinants of consumption and its relationship to income are important to better understand the 
impacts of governmental policies on economic growth. Thus, the third paper focuses on the relation 
between income and consumption behavior of farm households. 
The specific question for the two papers on relationship-based lending is “whether 
relationship-based lending has declined over the years”. Both of these papers are motivated with the 
development of the Small Business Credit Scoring (SBCS) systems during the mid and late-1990s. 
The assumption is that with the emergence of SBCS, hard-information based lending models became 
more popular and the need for relationships in lending has decreased. The two papers use the Survey 
of Small Business Finances (SSBF) datasets from the Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System 
and adjust for the survey nature of the data by using weights that are provided in the datasets. 
Different from the previous literature, in both papers, the importance of relationships over different 
time periods is compared in a single regression by using all the available years from the SSBF 
dataset. 
The first paper is provided in chapter 2 and analyzes whether the significance of borrower-
lender relationships on loan contract terms declined.  Merging the 1987, 1993, and 2003 Survey of 
Small Business Finances (SSBF) datasets, this study looks into the effects of relationship variables 
on loan contract terms, in particular interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements, 
for small businesses that have recently received lines of credit. For the analysis, the year 2003, which 
represents a time period when the SBCS system was more widely adopted, is compared to before the 
mid-1990s, a time period when the SBCS system was not yet popular. Results indicate that the 
relationship variables that previously explained interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor 
requirements lost significance in 2003 and none of the relationship variables significantly explain the 
loan contract terms in 2003. In addition to the relationship variables, the study also finds an 
increasing effect for some of the hard-information based variables in 2003.  
Since lenders might be more interested in knowing the effects of changes in relationships on 
credit availability and credit amounts rather than on loan contract terms, the second paper that is 
provided in chapter 3 focuses on analyzing changes in effects of relationship variables on credit 
availability and dollar amounts of lines of credit granted to small businesses. An additional 
contribution of this study to the literature is that principal component analysis is applied to decrease 
the dimensions of borrower-lender relationships. With principal component analysis, the purpose is 
to express borrower-lender relationships with fewer variables rather than multiple relationship 
variables and to capture an overall effect of borrower-lender relationships on credit availability and 
LOC amount granted, rather than understanding varying effects of each relationship variable. The 
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years 1987 and 1993 when SBCS models were not yet popular are individually compared to the year 
2003 when SBCS models were more widely adopted. Two models are applied. The first model is 
based on a regression of percentage of trade credits paid late and the second model is based on a 
regression of the natural logarithm of the ratio of granted LOC to total sales on the relationship 
variables. The findings overall support a decline in the importance of relationships on small business 
credit availability and the dollar amounts of LOCs granted to small businesses in 2003. However, the 
PCA results show that for the SSBF dataset, the nature of relationship variables is such that they are 
independent from each other and hence it is hard to categorize the relationship variables.  
The third paper is provided in chapter 4 and analyzes whether the life cycle / permanent 
income hypothesis is consistent with the consumption of farm households. This paper uses the most 
recent farm level data, the Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) data for Illinois farms from 
1995 to 2009, to reach more accurate conclusions about recent farm household consumption 
behaviors. In the literature, there has also been difficulty finding datasets with micro-data level 
household expenditure information. The advantage of using the FBFM data is that it is rich in farm 
household expenditures. Hence, more accurate conclusions for farm household consumption 
behavior are expected in this paper. The paper applies a model based on the life cycle / permanent 
income hypothesis. By using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation for an unbalanced panel 
dataset, the paper identifies the determinants of farm consumption and the relationship to income. 
The study finds evidence that current income changes are not significant in explaining consumption 
changes of farm households, thus confirming the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis for farm 
households. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
CHANGES IN IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONSHIPS IN SMALL 
BUSINESS LENDING: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON LOAN 
CONTRACT TERMS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Relationship-based lending (relationship lending), which is mostly common among small 
businesses and small banks, results because of informational opacity between borrowers and lenders. 
In order to overcome the informational opacity, the lender engages in repeated interactions with the 
borrower and accumulates private information about the borrower over time. Then, loans are 
provided and terms are adjusted on the basis of private information, which is gathered through a 
previous relationship. This study explicitly answers whether the importance of relationships in small 
business lending has weakened over time. Different than the relationship lending literature, this paper 
directly compares in a single regression the importance of borrower-lender relationship over different 
time periods, and hence uses the most recent data, 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) 
dataset along with 1987 and 1993 SSBF datasets.1 The assumption is that with the emergence of the 
Small Business Credit Scoring systems (SBCS) during the mid and late-1990s, having relationships 
with lenders became less important in determining loan contract terms.  
This study runs a survey regression of loan contract terms such as interest rate premiums and 
collateral and guarantor requirements on relationship variables for small businesses that have 
recently received lines of credit (LOCs), before the mid-1990s, a time period when SBCS was not yet 
popular, and in 2003, a time period when SBCS was more widely adopted. This paper incorporates 
interaction dummies between relationship variables and the year 2003 as explanatory variables in 
order to infer information about the changes in relationship variables over time. By analyzing the 
interaction dummies and running t-tests for the joint significances of the sum of coefficients of 
                                                          
1
 In the U.S., the Small Business Administration (SBA) establishes size standards on an industry-by-industry basis. 
In general, the SBA considers firms with less than 500 employees for manufacturing businesses and less than $7 
million in annual receipts for most non-manufacturing businesses, as small businesses. A size standard that is higher 
or lower than these benchmarks is still supportable. More information based on industry-by-industry is available on 
the SBA website. Any firm that is not in the category of “small business” is considered as a large business.  
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relationship variables and interaction dummies, this study can analyze whether in 2003 borrower-
lender relationship variables became less important in explaining loan contract terms, interest rate 
premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements, of recently received LOCs.  
Studying small businesses is important because small businesses account for a big majority 
of firms in the U.S. and for a considerable share of output, producing 38 percent of gross national 
product and employing half of the work force in the U.S. (Ayyagari et al., 2007; Brown et al., 1990; 
Dennis et al., 1988; and Ellihausen and Wolken, 1990).  Additionally, funding small businesses is 
crucial in the economy since large companies initially start as small businesses (Torre, 2010).  
Small businesses depend on loans as a financing source, especially relationship-based loans. 
Berger and Udell (2002) use the 1993 SSBF to argue that small businesses get 50.37 percent of their 
financing needs from debt.2 One concern for small businesses is that there is more informational 
opacity among small compared to large businesses due to less publicly available information, un-
certified audited financial statements, and privately kept contracts for their customers.3 Thus, 
compared to large businesses, small businesses use more relationship-based loans. For instance, to 
overcome informational opacity, lenders initially charge small businesses higher interest rates and 
ask for various forms of collateral or guarantors to secure loans. As lenders develop relations with 
these small businesses and get to know the firms, they adjust loan contract terms, for example, they 
may lower interest rates, or they may be less likely to ask for collateral and guarantor requirements. 4  
Similarly, relationship-based loans are significant for small banks.5 According to Patti and 
Gobbi (2001), unlike large banks, small banks have limited financial capacity to lend to larger firms 
and instead focus on relationship-based loans to small businesses. Additionally, the organizational 
structure within small banks makes it more convenient to do relationship-based small business 
lending. For instance, unlike large banks, small banks have fewer layers of hierarchy within the bank 
(Berger and Udell, 2002). With fewer layers of hierarchy, it is easier for banks to reconcile 
differences between the bank management and shareholders, and borrowers, and it is less costly to do 
monitoring and relationship lending. Another advantage for smaller banks is that they are located at a 
closer distance to their borrowers compared to larger banks. 
                                                          
2
 18.75 percent of debt financing is from commercial banks as loans. Other common sources of debt are non-
depository financial institutions and trade creditors. 
3 
Small businesses do not have certified audited financial statements (Berger and Frame, 2007). They are also 
unlikely to be monitored by rating agencies or financial press (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).   
4
 Relationship banking has its costs such as “information monopoly” (Boot, 2000).  
5
 Small bank holding companies have assets less than $500 million, are not engaged in any non-banking or 
significant off-balance sheet activities and do not have a  significant amount of outstanding debt (Federal Reserve 
website). Any bank that is not in this definition is recognized as a large bank. 
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One difficulty with relationship lending is that it is very costly; more time is spent on 
underwriting and monitoring each loan. However, since the mid and late-1990s, SBCS gained 
popularity because it is observed that information about the financial condition and history of 
principal owners in addition to information from the financial statements of the business explains a 
significant portion of the variation in a small business (Berger et al., 2005, and Berger and Frame, 
2007).6 With innovations and changes in technology, new SBCS models were developed based on 
different markets, types, and levels of credit (www.fairisaac.com). Due to improvements in 
informational technologies (such as SBCS), large and geographically dispersed banks started lending 
more to small businesses via hard-information based lending methods and the credit markets became 
more competitive (DeYoung et al., 2008). The relationship-lending literature such as Berger et al. 
(2007a), Berger and Black (2011), Petersen and Rajan (1994), and Petersen and Rajan (2002) also 
mentions that more small businesses are getting loans from non-depository financial institutions and 
large banks that are farther in distance from their customers and that focus more on hard-information 
based lending models (loan decisions and contract terms are based on collateral and small business 
credit scores). Hence, there is less personal affiliation between borrowers and lenders.  
  Petersen and Rajan (2002), using a sample of firms with an average distance of 114.7 miles 
from their lender (a median of 4 miles and a 75th percentile of 42 miles), also find that distance 
between lenders and borrowers is growing 3.8 percent each year. Berger et al. (2005) and Berger and 
Frame (2007) assert that a secondary market for small business credit is also expected to develop in 
the future. According to Berger and Udell (2002), government subsidization of a secondary market 
for small business loans can increase the amount of small business loans granted and encourage the 
securitization of relationship loans, which would result in the loss of relationship benefits. Elyasani 
and Goldberg (2004) believe that all these developments in technology and geographic expansion 
will affect relationship lending. Hence, it is possible to see a declining importance of relationship 
lending.   
Considering the significance of small businesses and small community-based banks within 
the U.S. economy and recent changes in the credit markets for small businesses, this research 
contributes to the literature by answering whether the importance of relationships in small business 
lending weakened over time. To make it explicit, the motivation of the paper is to understand the 
changes in lending structure for small businesses but not to verify whether these changes are caused 
                                                          
6 
For SBCS models, information regarding principal owner is obtained from consumer credit bureaus such as 
Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion. Then, information from these consumer credit bureaus and commercial credit 
bureaus (such as Dun & Bradstreet) are combined to predict future performances of small businesses. 
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by improvements in technological information or hard information based models such as SBCS. 
However, the interest for the research question arose from the improvements in the SBCS for small 
business lending after the mid and late-1990s.  
If the study finds that significance of borrower-lender relationships is declining, one 
explanation for this decline might be attributed to technological improvements and use of hard 
information such as SBCS models in small business lending. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was 
also the consolidation of the banking system and larger banks dominated the banking sector. Non-
depository financial institutions and these larger banks that are advantaged in using hard-information 
models started lending to small businesses and the small business lending market has become more 
competitive. Due to the competitiveness of the small business market and the increased use of hard 
information in small business lending, small banks might want to reconsider their lending policies 
and might give more emphasis to hard-information based models to increase their efficiency. That 
way, small banks can better compete with non-depository financial institutions and larger banks. A 
long-run implication is that small banks might not necessarily lose their market share for small 
business lending to larger banks or non-depository financial institutions.   
Meanwhile, small businesses can also benefit from possibly lower costs resulting from more 
favorable loan contract terms. Once the lenders adopt SBCS models, their cost of lending will go 
down because of lower monitoring costs. The lower costs can be reflected back to the small 
businesses through more favorable loan contract terms. Moreover, small businesses who can meet the 
criteria of SBCS models will have a larger pool of lenders and have greater bargaining power when 
borrowing. However, it is important to note that despite developments in small business finance, 
there will still be small businesses who will not be able to meet the criteria of SBCS models and who 
cannot afford to get standard loans. These small businesses will still depend on relationship-based 
lending provided by small banks (Berger et al., 2004; Berger and Frame, 2007; and Meyer, 1998).  
Additionally, following the 2008 U.S. financial crisis and the subsequent European financial 
crisis, the U.S. economy has weakened and unemployment rates have increased. In order to 
strengthen the economy and deal with the consequences of the crises, small businesses can be 
encouraged to invest and increase production. Thus, it is important to understand changes in small 
business lending structure to better comprehend small businesses' financing sources for possible 
investment opportunities. Understanding the changes in small business lending structure will also 
help to improve efficiency in the small business lending system.  
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2.2 Literature Review 
 
This paper derives its motivation from the relationship lending literature, specifically from 
studies that analyze the connection between loan contract terms and borrower-lender relationships. 
The study also integrates into its model variables that have previously been found to be linked to 
relationship lending. Following is an overview of the related literature.  
The relationship literature looks into the impact of relationship lending on loan contract 
terms. Harhoff and Korting (1998) conclude that firms with long lasting relationships and 
concentrated borrowing are better off in the terms of their line of credit (LOC) interest rates, 
collateral requirements, and availability of external funds. A study by Brick and Palia (2007), using 
the 1993 SSBF, recognizes that firms that are required to have collateral pay 200-400 basis points 
more for their loan rates compared to firms that are not required to post any collateral. Berger and 
Udell (1995) use the 1987 SSBF dataset and find that small businesses with longer relationships with 
banks borrow at lower rates and are less likely to need collateral compared to other small businesses. 
Behr et al. (2011), using loan-level data over the time period 2000 to 2006, analyze how bank-
borrower relationships affect access to credit and loan contract terms in microlending in developing 
economies.7 They find that the more intense the relationship is between the bank and the borrower, 
the more likely the borrower will be approved for a loan. Also, the borrower has lower collateral 
requirements for its successive loans, but the interest rate remains relatively stable. A study by Cole 
(1998) shows that the use of different financial services with a lender affects differently the 
likelihood of getting a loan. For example, having a pre-existing savings account and using financial 
management services have larger effects in obtaining credit from the lender. 
Some of the literature specifically focuses on the effects of distance on loan contract terms. 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) note that distance between borrowers and lenders increased due to 
advances in computing, communication, and easy transfer of firm financial information (hard- 
information). However, there are still firms that cannot provide enough information about 
themselves, and these firms still use lenders that are closer in distance to them. Degryse and Ongena 
(2005) find that loan rates decrease as distance between borrowers and lenders increases. Cole et al. 
(2004) observe that distance is not related to the loan approval decision.  
The literature on relationship lending also analyzes the lock-in (also called “hold-up and soft-
budget-constraint”) problem; that is, as banks get into a relationship with the borrower, they acquire 
private information, and then they use this information to extract rents at the refinancing stage. 
                                                          
7
 Microlending refers to lending to micro (very small) enterprises. 
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Greenbaum et al. (1989) verify that banks enjoy monopoly power through relationship lending and 
will charge higher interest rates for a borrower as the relationship gets longer. Thus, the remaining 
duration of the relationship will be shorter because the borrower will realize that he can get lower 
rates elsewhere for his next loan. A study by Smith (2006) shows that allowing banks to own equities 
in small businesses that request loans from them is efficient and can overcome the lock-in problem. 
The banks will have less incentive to extract rents and instead will prefer their borrowers to invest 
those additional rents for engaging in value maximizing projects.  
Some other studies consider the effects of borrowing from multiple banks on loan contract 
terms. However, there are conflicting results in the literature regarding the relationship between loan 
contract terms and the number of banks from which a firm borrows. Carletti (2004) finds that even 
though a small business borrows from two banks and faces lower monitoring from banks, it does not 
necessarily see an increase in its loan rate. Cole et al. (2004) observe that the effects of multiple 
relations on the likelihood of loan approvals are negative. Banks, especially larger banks, prefer to be 
the sole source of financial services. Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the 1987 SSBF dataset and 
conclude that as a borrower gets credit from multiple lenders, the borrower pays higher rates for its 
next loan, and also the availability of future credit gets lower. This study is only interested in firms 
that have recently approved LOCs. In the dataset, these firms have only one source for their LOC; 
hence, this research does not consider multiple bank relationship factors.  
 The relationship literature also focuses on how mergers and entries into the credit market 
affect small business lending. The funding sources for small businesses are expected to deteriorate 
due to mergers and entries. Strahan and Weston (1998), using the June 1993-1996 Bank Call report 
for US commercial banks, find that small business lending per dollar of assets increases with small 
bank mergers whereas other types of mergers have little effect on small business lending. Patti and 
Gobbi (2001) specifically answer how entry in local credit markets and consolidation of the banking 
industry affect the availability of credit for small businesses in Italy. They find that consolidation 
temporarily reduces the credit for all sizes of borrowers whereas entry causes a relatively more 
persistent decline in the credit available for small businesses. Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) state 
that there is mixed evidence in the literature regarding the effects of bank consolidations on 
relationship lending and how relationship lending affects firm value, fund availability and quantity, 
cost of borrowing, and collateral requirements.  
Berger et al. (2007b), Berger and Black (2011), and Torre (2010) conclude that large banks 
are not disadvantaged in lending to small businesses even though they might be in relationship 
lending. Due to advances in the hard-information based technologies, large banks might indeed have 
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an advantage to lend to small businesses. For instance, when there is limited information available 
about the small business, then SBCS may be used to evaluate the overall quality of the firm as long 
as the firm has a good credit score based on the credit history of the owner. Large banks can also use 
lending based on collateral values to lend to the small businesses. Therefore, industry consolidation 
may not necessarily decrease the availability of loans to small businesses. 
Carey et al. (1998) find that non-depository financial institutions are as much of a 
relationship lender as banks are; however, their borrowers have more leverage and are riskier 
compared to those of banks. Berger et al. (2005) observe that with the adoption of SBCS, small 
businesses increased their loan ratios and especially, riskier businesses paid relatively high prices for 
their credit.   
Berger and Udell (1998) state that the three largest sources of financing for small businesses 
are principal owners, commercial banks, and trade credits; these account for almost 70 percent of 
small business financing. Meyer (1998) emphasizes that relationship lending will still be important 
even though technological and institutional changes took place in the banking sector.  
A working paper by Berger and Rice (2010) analyzes the types of banks that small businesses 
use as their main bank and also the strength of the relationship based on the bank type. To answer 
their research question, they use the 2003 SSBF dataset and they find that unlike the conventional 
paradigm, opaque small businesses are not more likely to borrow from small, local, and single-
market banks. However, they find mixed results regarding whether opaque small businesses have 
stronger relationships with their lenders but, they find that relationship strength does not depend on 
the bank type. On the other hand, another paper by DeYoung et al. (2011) looks at the relation 
between distance and credit score information. They find that distance between small businesses and 
lenders increased over time and credit scoring methods explain the increases in the borrower-lender 
distance. Even though these studies demonstrate implications about the changing structure of 
relationship-based small business lending, the relationship literature has not yet directly answered 
whether borrower-lender relationships in small business lending became less important over the 
years. This study directly analyzes the changing effect of borrower-lender relationship on loan 
contract terms. An additional contribution of this paper is that it combines all the available SSBF 
datasets into one dataset to answer the research question. 
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2.3 Model 
 
There are informational differences between buyers and sellers in numerous markets. 
Financial markets are one area where these informational asymmetries are present. One example is 
the borrower and lender situation. Lenders have access to publicly available information but not to 
inside information about borrowers. To overcome this asymmetric information, lenders interact with 
their borrowers regularly. Over time, once lenders get to know their borrowers through the 
relationships they develop, they adjust the terms of the loan contract. For example, they may lower 
loan interest rates, or they may be less likely to ask for collateral and guarantor requirements over 
time. That is why the dynamic nature of the relationship is important to overcome asymmetric issues 
in lending and why relationship lending has been the focus of many studies for a long time.  
If lenders use relationships they have with borrowers as a way to decrease the asymmetric 
information, then interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements should be affected 
by these relationships. Hence, this study applies two models which are based on relationship 
variables as significant determinants of: 1) interest rate premiums; and 2) collateral and guarantor 
requirements. In order to explore whether the importance of relationships in small business lending is 
getting weaker with the improvements in the SBCS, this research examines whether the coefficients 
of relationship variables for interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements have 
declined or lost significance over time.8  
In the first model, the effects of relationship variables on LOC interest rate premiums, and in 
the second model, the effects of relationship variables on LOC collateral and guarantor requirements, 
are analyzed.9 LOC is the only loan type that is determined through relationship lending whereas 
mortgages, equipment, and motor vehicle loans are all transaction driven loans (Berger and Udell, 
1995). That is why the focus for the study is on interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor 
requirements for the recently approved LOCs, either newly received or renewed from a previous 
LOC.10  
                                                          
8
 This study assumes coefficients on relationship variables are unaffected by business cycles. The age variable in the 
regression to some extent captures the effect for different stages of the life cycle for the firm. 
9
 Guarantor and collateral requirements are important restrictions on the LOC borrower. Hence, both the collateral 
and guarantor requirements are considered when defining whether the loan is secured, but compensating balance 
requirements are excluded from the definition because compensating balances can be required only on a small part 
of the loan and the SSBF dataset does not have this information.  
10
 It is possible to argue that sample selection bias occurs because the study only focuses on recent LOCs. However, 
recent LOCs are selected as the sample because LOC is the only loan type determined through relationship-based 
lending and that is the focus of the study. Moreover, the 1987 and 2003 datasets do not provide information 
regarding whether the firm applied or did not apply for the LOC or information regarding whether the firm’s recent 
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For the model based on interest rate premiums, this study only focuses on firms with recent 
LOC loans that are based on variable rates because interest rate premiums for loans with fixed rates 
are not available in the SSBF dataset. Furthermore, since the prime rate is a commonly used index by 
U.S. lending institutions, only variable rate loans that are indexed to prime rates are used for this 
model (Berger and Udell, 1995).11 For the model based on collateral and guarantor requirements, 
data on collateral and guarantor requirements are available for all loans, including fixed and variable 
rate loans. Hence, this model includes firms that have recently received LOCs with either a fixed or a 
variable rate, or that are indexed to prime, London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), or any other 
rates.  
For both models, the 1987, 1993, and 2003 SSBF datasets are pooled but the dataset is not 
panel data because the same firms do not appear over different years. Survey design models that 
account for weights are also used to adjust for the survey nature of the data.12 The first model 
consists of a survey linear regression of LOC interest rate premiums (which are based on a variable 
rate and indexed to a prime rate) on relationship variables. The second model is a survey logit 
regression of LOC collateral and guarantor requirements (the appropriate dummy variable is equal to 
1 if the most recent LOC demands collateral or guarantors) on relationship variables.13 The survey 
logit regression analyzes the effects of relationship factors on the likelihood of being asked for 
collateral or guarantors for the recent LOC.  
This study incorporates interaction dummies between explanatory variables and the year 
2003 to analyze any significant magnitude changes for the explanatory variables. Since the year 2003 
is a time period in which the SBCS models became more widely used, through interaction dummies 
the year 2003 is compared to before the mid-1990s, a time period when SBCS was not yet popular. 
To reemphasize, the purpose of the study is not to verify whether the changes in lending structure is 
caused by SBCS but to evaluate changes in the relationship-based lending to small businesses. 
However, the study is motivated by the emergence of SBCS for small business lending after the mid 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
LOC is accepted or denied and hence, it is not really possible to run a separate regression for applied/ not applied or 
accepted/ denied and check for robustness of the original study results.   
11
 Even if one wants to determine the interest rate premiums for fixed rate loans, it is harder to find a comparable 
market rate. The treasury security rate might be used but the SSBF does not give enough information to evaluate the 
payment schedule of most recent loans, thus it becomes harder to understand what a good comparable market rate is 
for fixed rate loans (Berger and Udell, 1995). Hence, fixed rate loans are eliminated from the interest rate premium 
regressions. 
12
 The regressions are not adjusted for the stratum information available in the dataset because the stratum measures 
differ in each dataset.  
13
 The interest rate premium variable in the SSBF data can only take values between -5 and 10. However, data is not 
censored, that is there are not many observations at the limits of -5 and 10, and an OLS model is preferred over a 
TOBIT model.  
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and late 1990s and that is why relationship lending in the years before the SBCS models emerged are 
compared to relationship lending in the years after the SBCS models became popular.  
The equation for both models is as follows: 
(   )        ∑       
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 ∑        
     
   
 ∑   (   )           
     
   
  
where k refers to the institution that provides the most recent LOC to firm n; n refers to the firm 
identity; β, τ, μ, ρ, λ are the coefficients for explanatory variables, α is the intercept, and e is the error 
term. For model one, the dependent variable, D, is the interest rate premium for firm n for the most 
recent LOC that is based on a variable rate and indexed to a prime rate. For model two, the dependent 
variable, D, is the log of the odds that there are the collateral or guarantor requirements for the recent 
LOC that has either a fixed or a variable rate. R is used for the pre-existing relationship explanatory 
variables, i referring to each relationship variable; C is used for the non-relationship explanatory 
variables such as contract, firm, and market characteristics variables, z referring to each non-
relationship explanatory variable. R*T refers to the variables for the interaction between time and 
relationship variables. A dummy T, which is one if year is 2003 and zero if year is either 1987 or 
1993, is created. C*T refers to the variables for the interaction between time and non-relationship 
explanatory variables. Moreover, Y, the year dummies for 1987, 1993, and 2003, are also included in 
the model and the year 1987 is the reference year in the regression. These year dummies are used to 
control for possible changes in lending processes over the years and these year dummies will also 
allow for different intercepts for different years within the regression. 
After running the survey linear regression and survey logit described in equation (2.1), a t-
test is applied to test the joint significances of the sum of coefficients of explanatory variables and 
time interacted explanatory variables. The joint significances give information about the coefficient 
values and the significance levels for the explanatory variables in 2003. In order to infer a decline in 
the effects of relationship variables on loan contract terms, this study expects to find a decline in the 
magnitude effect of the relationship variables on loan contract terms in 2003 or find that relationship 
variables that previously explained loan contract terms become insignificant in 2003.  
Hence, hypotheses for equation (2.1) which is given below are as follows: 
(    )                
A rejection of the null hypothesis in (H2.1) implies that there is a significant magnitude change in the 
coefficient value of the specified relationship variable over time.  
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(    )                  
(    )                   
A rejection of the null hypothesis in (H2.2) implies that the specified relationship variable 
significantly explains the loan contract terms before the mid-1990s.  A rejection of the null 
hypothesis in (H2.3) indicates that the specified relationship variable significantly explains loan 
contract terms in 2003 but the expectation is not to reject the null hypothesis in (H2.3). Then, the 
significances between the two periods are compared and it is determined whether relationship 
variables that previously explained loan contract terms became insignificant in 2003.  
 
2.4 Variables 
 
 Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3 describe variables under dependent variable, pre-existing 
relationship explanatory variables, and other non-explanatory variables, respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
Berger and Udell (1995) show that 88.8 percent of borrowers have multiple LOCs with only 
one bank and infer that LOCs demonstrate a high degree of loyalty and are more likely to be 
relationship-based loans, compared to mortgages, equipment loans, and motor vehicle loans. 
Following Berger and Udell (1995), for the first model, the dependent variable is interest rate 
premiums over prime rates for variable rate LOCs that are recently approved, and for the second 
model, the dependent variable is whether the LOC with either a fixed or a variable rate requires 
collateral or guarantors.14 In both cases the recently approved LOCs can be newly received or 
renewed from a previous LOC. Interest rate premiums are measured in basis points, and collateral 
and guarantor requirements are expressed as a dummy variable.  
However, the guarantor information for the most recent LOC is not provided in the 1987 
dataset. Instead, this study proxies for this information with the guarantor information that is 
                                                          
14
 The interest rate premiums within the SSBF data do not include fees received by institutions that have provided 
the LOCs. Within the Survey of Small Business Finances dataset, the total fee amount in dollars is available. The 
APRs for the loans including the fees have to be recalculated, and an appropriate index has to be used to find the 
interest rate premiums. This index can correspond to the time the loans are requested since this is the only available 
information within the dataset. However, adjusting for fees will only add a little information, along with noise, in the 
data. Also, according to Berger and Udell (1995), excluding the fees is not expected to cause any bias in the model 
since not all the fees depend on characteristics of borrowers, but are more related to the policies of the institutions 
providing the LOCs. 
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available for previous LOC loans that the firm has obtained from the recent LOC provider. Appendix 
A provides more information about the accuracy of this proxy.  
 
2.4.2 Pre-Existing Relationship Explanatory Variables  
 
The relationship variables are financial management services, previous loans, checking and 
savings accounts with the LOC provider, length of relationship, and distance between the firm and 
the LOC provider. Except for the management services, previous loans, and checking and savings 
variables, the relationship variables are expressed as continuous values.  
A firm has a financial management services account if it is getting transaction, cash 
management, brokerage, card processing, trust & pension, or credit related services from the LOC 
provider.15 Similarly, a firm has previous loan accounts with the LOC provider if it has already 
obtained credit, equipment, vehicle, mortgage, capital, or any other type of loans from the LOC 
provider. Checking and savings accounts are also included.16 Each of those accounts refers to a 
relationship between the firm and the LOC provider and is represented by four dummy variables.  
The longer the LOC provider serves the firm, the more private information it has about the 
firm. Based on this past relationship, the lender will most likely have a strong opinion regarding the 
borrower and will accordingly adjust the most recent loan contract terms. The length of relationship 
variable is expressed as months within the SSBF dataset. The natural logarithm of (1+length of 
relationship) is used to account for the possibility of diminishing marginal effects of additional years 
of relationship on the value of information gained. Previous studies have also included this variable 
within their relationship lending models (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; and 
Petersen and Rajan, 2002).17 
Relationship lending is more common for lenders that are geographically closer to their 
borrowers because monitoring is less costly. With improvements in technology and SBCS, distance 
                                                          
15
 Transaction services include obtaining paper money or coins, depositing or clearing checks or drafts from 
business customers, and making night deposits or wire transfers. Cash management services are managing 
businesses’ cash as well as providing lock-box services and sweep and zero balance accounts. Credit related services 
involve using banker’s acceptances, letters of credit, sales financing, or factoring. Trust services take into account 
managing 401K plans, pension funds, or business trusts. Card processing services include processing credit card 
receipts, signature based debit card or check card purchases, or PIN based debit card purchases.  
16
 Some of the small businesses in the dataset do not have a checking account with their recent LOC provider. It is 
possible that those small businesses may be borrowing from non-depository financial institutions or larger banks or 
using checking account services from other lenders.  
17
 Firms, who never did business with the lender prior to the recent loan, have 0 for the length of relationship 
variable within the dataset. Since ln (0) is undefined, ln (1+length of relationship) is included to avoid the missing 
values for these firms.  
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between lenders and borrowers increased, and lenders started using less relationship lending but 
more transactional based lending. The natural logarithm of (1+ distance) is included in the 
regressions to account for possible diminishing marginal effects of distance. The distance variable is 
measured in miles within the SSBF data.18  
 
2.4.3 Other Explanatory Variables 
 
If an LOC is accompanied by collateral, a personal guarantee, a cosigner, or other guarantors, 
then the LOC is considered to be secured, and the interest rate premium is expected to be lower. 
Also, Besanko and Thakor (1987) argue that collateral requirements may be high for a borrower with 
a lower risk because it is probable that higher collateral acts as a signaling process to reveal the 
default risk for a borrower. A less risky borrower would be willing to provide for more collateral 
compared to a riskier borrower because the less risky borrower will know that he will pay back the 
loan and not lose the collateral. In this case, the lender can differentiate between a lower and a higher 
risk borrower and can adjust for the interest rate premiums based on this information. On the other 
hand, Brick and Palia (2007) state that a riskier firm is more likely to be asked for collateral and 
guarantors and also has a higher interest premium to compensate for the higher risk. The variable, 
whether LOC is secured, is defined as a dummy variable for the first model, but excluded as an 
explanatory variable for the second model since it is the dependent variable.  
Some of the literature mentions a possibility that interest premium and collateral and 
guarantor requirements are simultaneously determined and that a potential endogeneity problem 
might arise in the regressions due to that. The literature analyzes the potential simultaneity issue and 
concludes that the simultaneity issue is minimal (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al., 2005; Brick 
and Palia, 2007; Degryse and Cayseele, 2000; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; and Harhoff and Korting, 
1998). Similar to Berger and Udell (1995), Degryse and Cayseele (2000), and Harhoff and Korting 
(1998), this study assumes collateral and interest premium conditions are determined in a sequential 
procedure, with the collateral decision preceding the interest rate determination. Hence, including 
collateral and guarantor requirements as an explanatory variable in the interest premium 
determination is not expected to cause endogeneity.19    
                                                          
18
 If the distance is less than 0.5 miles, then the variable is coded as 0 in the dataset. Since ln (0) is undefined, ln 
(1+distance) is considered to avoid the missing values for these firms.  
19
 The regression results stay very similar when collateral and guarantor requirements are dropped from the model. 
Consistent with the literature, this shows that the simultaneity issue is not significant.  
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The LOC amount granted is also a significant determinant for the contract terms. The 
collateral and guarantor requirement is determined by the amount of loan provided to a firm. 
Additionally, if there is a gap between the loan granted and the collateral and guarantor obtained, 
then the interest premium is adjusted to compensate for this risk. This variable is measured by the 
amount of LOC granted divided by the sales amount. 20 It may be argued that collateral and loan 
amount are to some extent simultaneously determined but this simultaneity issue is expected to be 
minor due to the fact that collateral plays some role but not to a great extent in determining loan 
amount. 21  
Just like the research of Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (2002), this research 
includes dummy variables to account for industry-wide differences. Firms in manufacturing, 
wholesale, retail, and business services are compared to firms in mining, construction, transportation 
/ public utilities, and finance / insurance industries.  
Informational asymmetries and degree of liability differ among organizational forms. 
Dummy variables are used to define whether a firm is a proprietorship, partnership, or corporation 
and the comparison basis is proprietorship.22 Compared to other organizational forms, in a 
proprietorship, even if a borrower does not need to provide guarantors, the lender has 100 percent 
personal commitment from the borrower and in the case of a default, the borrower can lose personal 
assets. However, a corporation will need to provide guarantors due to the nature of the organizational 
form.   
Institution type is defined by a dummy that equals to 1 if the LOC provider is a non-
depository financial institution or non-financial supplier, and 0 if the LOC provider is a depository 
financial institution. Han (2006) finds that compared to banks, non-banks generally make equipment 
loans, vehicle loans, and mortgage loans whereas banks mostly focus on cash-based lending such as 
lines of credit. Another difference is that each institution might have their own set of rules and 
regulations to follow. This might be a significant variable to include since lending practices and 
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 Ratio measure for the LOC amount granted to the borrower is used in the model because the dollar amount of 
LOC granted was correlated with the sales amount.  
21
 If collateral is not enough, the lender might decide not to grant the loan or grant a loan amount that is lower than 
the requested loan amount. There might also be circumstances where the lender might still grant the requested loan 
amount even if the collateral is not enough based on the merits of the application and the relationship between the 
borrower and the lender. For instance, the lender might charge a higher interest rate to cover the potential risk for the 
gap between the collateral and the loan amount or the lender might have a good opinion about the borrower and may 
not demand collateral and still provide the requested loan amount. To check for the endogeneity issue, loan amount 
is dropped from the collateral and guarantor regression. Similar coefficient values and standard errors are still 
obtained. Also, the correlation coefficient between these two variables is around 0.03. 
22
 Firms under “LLP, Tax Filed as Partnership” are included as partnerships, whereas firms under “LLP, Tax Filed 
as Corporation” are included as corporations. 
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regulations for different types of institutions might be different and thus might have different effects 
on interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements. Due to limitations in the 
publicly available SSBF dataset, this study cannot differentiate between small and large depository 
institutions.   
Credit score information for firms is available in the 2003 SSBF but this information is not 
available in the 1987 and 1993 SSBF. Since this information is not available in all of the SSBF 
datasets, this paper uses variables such as sales amount, leverage ratio, profitability ratio, current 
assets ratio, and accounts receivable collection period to proxy for credit riskiness of firms. These 
variables are included as part of the non-relationship variables. 
Sales is commonly used by lenders to decide on the size of a firm and is one of the main 
measures used in lending. In order to account for the diminishing marginal effects for sales, the 
natural logarithm of sales is used. The sales variable is also inflation adjusted and is expressed in 
2003 dollar values. 
Firms with higher leverage are considered to be riskier, are expected to have higher interest 
rate premiums, and are more likely to be asked for collateral or guarantors. Leverage is measured by 
total loans divided by total equity. 
Firms with higher profitability are considered to be less risky for lenders, and lenders are 
more willing to provide lower interest rate premiums and less likely to demand collateral and 
guarantor requirements from those firms. Profitability is measured by “Return on Assets (ROA)”, 
that is, operating profit divided by total assets.  
Firms with higher current assets are recognized to be less risky. The interest rate premiums 
are predicted to be lower and collateral and guarantor requirements are less likely for these firms. 
Current assets ratio is measured by current assets divided by total assets.23 
A high accounts receivable collection period indicates a collection problem and higher 
interest rate premiums are anticipated for firms with higher accounts receivable collection periods. 
Similarly, collateral and guarantor requirements are more likely for these firms. This variable is 
measured with accounts receivable divided by daily sales. 
Regarding contract terms, a lender is expected to favor a firm that is older compared to one 
that is younger or one that has just started because the lender has access to more information about 
the firm. If a firm has survived for many years, there is also a higher probability that more public 
                                                          
23
 Current assets is the sum of cash, accounts receivable, inventory, and other current assets. This study cannot use 
the current ratio as an explanatory variable because in the publicly available SSBF dataset, it is not possible to 
distinguish between the current liabilities and the total liabilities. That is why, only the current assets ratio rather 
than the current ratio is used as an explanatory variable. 
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information is available about the firm. Previous studies such as Berger and Udell (1995) and 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) also include age effect in their relationship lending studies. It is possible 
that the effect of each additional year for firm age decreases once a firm gets to a certain age; hence, 
age effect is measured by the natural logarithm of (1+age) for the two models. Age is measured in 
years within the dataset.24 
Firms in metropolitan areas might have different characteristics compared to firms in non-
metropolitan areas. To capture this effect, a dummy variable that equals to 1 is used for firms in 
metropolitan areas.25  
Lending theory states that loan spreads and collateral and guarantor requirements are affected 
by competition within banking markets. The Herfindahl index is used as a proxy for market 
competition in banking for the region within which the small business is located. A dummy variable 
is created and equals to 1 if the Herfindahl index is greater than or equal to 1,800. A Herfindahl index 
greater than or equal to 1,800 indicates a high concentration of banking. Increases in the Herfindahl 
index generally indicate a decrease in competition and an increase in market power. Due to the lock-
in problem, interest premiums and the likelihood of collateral and guarantor requirements are 
expected to be higher for markets with a Herfindahl index greater than or equal to 1,800.26, 27, 28 
 
 2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  
This research uses the 1987, 1993, and 2003 SSBF data, which is a survey conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors every five years. The most recent SSBSF data is the 2003 
dataset. The SSBF data contains information about firm and owner characteristics, a firm’s financial 
service suppliers, and use of financial services. Since the SSBF data comes from survey data and a 
finite target population, it does not have independent and identically distributed errors. Hence, it is 
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 Firms that have been established for less than one year, have 0 for the age variable within the dataset. Since ln (0) 
is undefined, ln (1+age) is included to avoid the missing values for these firms.  
25
 Distance between a firm and an LOC provider is also expected to be smaller if the firm is located in a 
metropolitan area. However, there is no multicollinearity between these variables in the model.  
26
 Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that there is more relationship lending in more concentrated markets and that 
young firms in concentrated markets (HHI>1,800) get lower interest rates and get more financing than firms in more 
competitive markets. On the other hand, Boot and Thakor (2000) conclude that a borrower is more likely to engage 
in relationship lending when there is more interbank competition. 
27
 Distance between a firm and an LOC provider is also expected to be smaller if the firm is located in a competitive 
market (the Herfindahl index is lower). However, there is no multicollinearity between these variables in the model.  
28
 Because bank ID numbers are not available in the publicly available SSBF datasets, there is not a way to combine 
the bank size information (large banks versus small banks) into this study. However, Herfindahl Index for market 
competition in banking for the region in which the small business is located, is to some extent expected to provide 
information regarding the banking structure for that region. 
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important to use survey design procedures that adjust for weights when the descriptive statistics are 
given and the regressions are performed.29 Weights, already computed and identified by the Federal 
Reserve staff, are used to adjust for population measures as well as for the correct variances. 30  
Additionally, missing information within the SSBF datasets is already imputed by the Federal 
Reserve staff. The 2003 SSBF data has multiple imputations whereas the rest of the pooled data (the 
1987 and 1993 SSBF) has a single imputation.31 Since the dataset does not have multiple imputations 
for all the components of the data, the 2003 SSBF data is not adjusted for multiple imputations and 
hence, regressions and descriptive statistics are run for each imputation of the 2003 data separately.  
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for firms that have recent LOCs that are based on 
variable rates and indexed to prime rates before the mid-1990s and for firms in 2003. Similarly, 
Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for firms that have recent LOCs before the mid-1990s 
and for firms in 2003.The samples from Table 2.1 are different from the ones in Table 2.2. Table 2.2 
does not differentiate among firms with variable or fixed interest rates and also does not differentiate 
among interest rates indexed to prime rates and other indexes. Additionally, these descriptive 
statistics are adjusted for weights. For the 2003 SSBF, this study reports the descriptive statistics 
corresponding to only imputation 3 because in the results section, the regression outcomes for only 
imputation 3 of 2003 are displayed and consistency in terms of the dataset is desirable. Note that the 
descriptive statistic values for the five imputations of the 2003 SSBF data are similar. 
For the variables that are represented with a dummy variable, the mean values are the 
proportions of firms that are in those categories. Based on Table 2.1, the natural logarithm of (1 + 
distance between firm and lending institution) was 1.511 in the mid-1990s and 1.667 in 2003. The 
proportion of firms that get financial management services from the LOC provider increased from 
50.7 percent before the mid-1990s to 58.7 percent in 2003. 32 The natural logarithm of (1+ length of 
relationship) on average also increased over time from 2.055 to 4.046 in 2003, but the proportion of 
firms that have checking accounts with the LOC provider decreased from 92.3 percent before the 
mid-1990s to 84.1 percent in 2003. Similarly, 28.8 percent of firms had a savings account with the 
LOC provider before the mid-1990s but only 18.5 percent of firms in 2003. Meanwhile, the 
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 Otherwise, standard errors will be underestimated and statistically significant results can be obtained when in fact 
they are not.  
30
 Detailed information about weight calculations is given in Appendix B.   
31
 Detailed information about imputation methods is provided in Appendix B.  
32
 For the 1987 dataset, the main sample is used rather than the Small Business Administration (SBA) sample since 
the other datasets from other years do not have a comparable SBA sample. 
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proportion of firms that already have previous loans with the LOC provider was around 95 percent 
both before the mid-1990s and in 2003. 
The proportion of firms that are in the wholesale trade industry, that have the corporate 
organizational form, that are located in a concentrated banking market, the firm’s sales amount, and 
the firm’s accounts receivable collection period decreased on average over the years whereas the 
profitability for firms and the proportion of firms in the business services industry on average 
increased over time.  
Descriptive statistic values in Table 2.2 are similar to those found in Table 2.1. Specifically, 
for relationship variables, the natural logarithm of (1+ distance between firm and institution) 
increased on average from 1.488 before the mid-1990s to 1.748 in 2003. The proportion of firms that 
get financial management services increased from 49 percent to 55.6 percent, whereas the proportion 
of firms that have checking and savings accounts decreased in 2003. The natural logarithm of (1+ 
length of relationship) also increased over time from 2.050 to 3.962 in 2003. The proportion of firms 
that already have previous loans with the LOC provider was on average 90 percent both before the 
mid-1990s and in 2003. 
 
2.6 Results 
 
When running the regressions, the 2003 data is not adjusted for multiple imputation 
procedures, but each of the five imputations from the 2003 data is treated separately because multiple 
imputations for the 1987 and 1993 SSBF data are not available. Each imputation of 2003 is 
separately pooled with the 1987 and 1993 SSBF data and five different datasets are obtained. The 
only difference among these five datasets is the different imputations for the 2003 SSBF data. The 
regression results obtained are very similar among these five datasets since the imputations from 
2003 are similar. Hence, results from only one dataset are displayed in this study. The results 
obtained from the dataset with imputation 3 of the 2003 SSBF are reported because this dataset 
provides significances that are consistent in the other four dataset results. However, results from the 
other four datasets are available upon request. 
For Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the data is obtained by pooling the 1987, 1993, and 2003 SSBF data. 
Table 2.3 reports the results from the first model, running the survey linear regression of interest rate 
premiums on relationship variables and Table 2.4 provides the average marginal effects from the 
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second model, running the survey logit regression of collateral and guarantor requirements on 
relationship variables.33 Note that the survey regressions take into account the weight variables. 
 
2.6.1 Results for the Interest Rate Premium Model 
 
Table 2.3 supports the hypothesis that the importance of relationships in small business 
lending has weakened over time. The first notable result is that checking account was no longer 
statistically significant in explaining interest rate premium in 2003 even though it was significant 
before the mid-1990s. A firm that had a checking account with the LOC provider paid 29.584 basis 
points more for its interest rate premium before the mid-1990s. In the literature, a positive 
relationship between contact terms and relationship variables tends to be explained by a lock-in 
problem.34 Another explanation might be attributed to the competition in the market. It is possible 
that in a competitive market, the LOC provider might have initially offered lower rates to attract 
borrowers. Through time, a lender establishes a relationship with the borrower and locks the 
customer into a relationship with that lender. After establishing this relationship, the lender learns the 
firm’s real risk level and adjusts the contract terms based on the real riskiness of the borrower. The 
interaction dummy between checking and the year 2003 is negative with a coefficient value of 
45.708 basis points. This shows that there was a significant magnitude decline in the effect of 
checking account from before the mid-1990s to 2003. Also, when the t-test for the joint significance 
is performed, this study finds that there is no significance associated with the checking account 
variable in 2003. This implies that even though the checking account variable was significant in 
explaining interest rate premiums before the mid-1990s, it was no longer significant in 2003.   
Second, the hypothesis can also be supported by looking at the non-relationship explanatory 
variables. Results in Table 2.3 show that some of the non-relationship variables gained significance 
in 2003 even though they were not significant before the mid-1990s. For instance, corporate 
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 All the results are based on at least a 10 percent significance level. More details about specific significance levels 
can be obtained by referring to tables.  
34 There are conflicting results in the literature in regards to relationship between interest rates and duration of a 
relationship. Greenbaum et al. (1989), Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990), and Von Thadden (1998) argue that as a bank 
observes proprietary information about a borrower over time, this creates a lock-in problem. The lender takes 
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passed on to the borrower. The interest rates and collateral requirements will decrease as the duration of the 
relationship increases. Berger and Udell (1995) find that loan rates for lines of credit and the probability that the 
lender requires collateral decrease as relationship length increases. 
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organizational form is one of the variables that gained significance in 2003. Even though there was 
no statistical difference between corporations and proprietorships in the interest rate premiums they 
paid for their LOCs before the mid-1990s, corporations paid 52.899 basis points more for their LOCs 
in 2003. It is possible that due to the limited liability within the corporate organizational form, 
corporations are willing to invest in riskier projects compared to proprietorships. Hence, these firms 
end up paying higher interest rate premiums compared to proprietorships. The interaction dummy for 
corporate organizational form and year 2003 is positive with a coefficient value of 64.324, implying 
that there was statistically a significant magnitude increase over time in the effect of the corporate 
organizational form on interest rate premiums.   
 Profitability is another variable that gained significance in 2003. The interaction dummy for 
profitability and the year 2003 has a coefficient of -4.189 basis points and implies that the magnitude 
for profitability significantly increased over time. Based on the t-test for the joint significance, as the 
profitability ratio increased by 1 percent, the firm paid 2.723 basis points less for its interest rate 
premium in 2003.   
Even though the accounts receivable collection period did not explain interest rate premiums 
before the mid-1990s, the t-test for the joint significance shows that accounts receivable collection 
period became significant in explaining interest rate premiums in 2003. For each additional day it 
took for the firm to collect its money, the firm ended up paying 0.265 basis points less for its interest 
rate premium in 2003. The sign for the coefficient value for the accounts receivable collection period 
variable is negative, contradicting the expectations of a positive coefficient value. It is most probable 
that there were some other risk factors that the study could not control for and might be affecting the 
variable, accounts receivable collection period. The interaction dummy for accounts receivable 
collection period and the year 2003 is also statistically significant and has a coefficient value of          
-0.288 basis points. This shows that there has been a significant magnitude increase in the coefficient 
for the variable, accounts receivable collection period.   
Age was not statistically significant in explaining interest rate premiums before the mid-
1990s but it was significant in 2003. The t-test for the joint significance shows that a firm that was 10 
years old versus a firm that was 9 years old paid 2.764 basis points less for its interest rate premium 
in 2003.35 The interaction dummy between age and the year 2003 also shows that there was a 
significant magnitude increase in the effect of age in 2003. Additionally, before the mid-1990s, there 
were not significant differences between firms that were located in a metropolitan area versus a non-
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metropolitan area. However, the significance of the interaction dummy between metropolitan area 
and the year 2003 indicates that the magnitude of the coefficient for the metropolitan area variable 
increased significantly in 2003. Also, the t-test result for the joint significance shows that the 
metropolitan area variable helped to explain interest rate premiums in 2003. In 2003, firms that were 
in a metropolitan area paid 55.147 basis points more for their interest rate premiums compared to 
firms in a non-metropolitan area. The higher premium may be due to the small business 
characteristics; metropolitan areas might have riskier borrowers that are more aggressive in their 
investments. A second possible explanation is that the pricing structure is more expensive in 
metropolitan areas.  
The Herfindahl index is another variable that gained significance in 2003. In 2003, a firm 
paid 34.902 basis points more if it was getting its loan from a market with a high Herfindahl index. It 
is possible that through consolidations the banking industry became more concentrated and banks 
took advantage of their customers and charged higher interest rate premiums. Organizational form, 
profitability, accounts receivable collection period, age, being in a metropolitan area, and the 
Herfindahl index are all used in hard-information based models. Hence, an implication of these 
variables gaining significance in 2003 is that hard-information is becoming more important over the 
years. 
Another important variable to consider is the amount of sales for the firm. This is a common 
variable used by lenders in evaluating firms. There is an increased effect of the sales variable over 
the years. A firm that has $150,000 worth of sales paid 5.897 basis points less before the mid-1990s 
but 14.387 basis points less in 2003 compared to a firm with sales of $100,000.36 A higher sales 
amount is most probably associated with a lower risk from the lender side and that is why the firm is 
charged a lower interest rate premium. The interaction dummy is also significant, implying that the 
increase in the magnitude of the coefficient value in 2003 is statistically significant.  
Even though the variable, whether LOC is secured, was not significant and did not 
statistically explain interest rate premiums in either period, there was a significant magnitude 
increase in 2003 for this variable. The interaction dummy has a coefficient value of -46.932 basis 
points.   
Third, there are some non-relationship explanatory variables that were significant before the 
mid-1990s but were no longer significant in 2003. For instance, before the mid-1990s, a firm that 
received its LOC from a non-depository financial institution or non-financial supplier paid 131.243 
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basis points more for its interest rate premium compared to obtaining it from a depository financial 
organization. This result is consistent with the findings of Carey et al. (1998). Carey et al. (1998) find 
that non-depository financial institutions are as much of a relationship lender as depository financial 
institutions are, but they have riskier borrowers. The riskiness in borrowers is reflected in the higher 
interest rate premiums charged by these non-depository financial institutions. Additionally, as the 
firm’s LOC ratio increased by 1 percent, its interest rate premium declined by 0.065 basis points 
before the mid-1990s. The coefficient sign is negative unlike expectations but the coefficient 
magnitude is economically not very significant.     
In summary, the checking account variable, which is a relationship variable, was no longer 
significant in explaining interest rate premiums in 2003. There is also a decline in the magnitude of 
the checking account variable in 2003. However, firm organizational form, profitability, age, firm’s 
accounts receivable collection period, metropolitan area, and the Herfindahl index became significant 
in explaining the interest rate premiums in 2003. The magnitudes for these variables, except the 
magnitude for Herfindahl index, also increased in 2003. The sales variable was significant in both 
periods and the magnitude of the coefficient for sales increased in 2003. Moreover, the magnitude of 
the coefficient for the variable, whether LOC is secured, increased in 2003. These results indicate 
that, over time, there is a declining effect for some of the relationship variables and an increasing 
effect for some of the non-relationship variables that are considered to be significant determinants for 
hard-information based models.  
 
2.6.2 Results for the Collateral and Guarantor Requirements Model 
 
When a survey logit is run on equation (2.1), coefficients for the log of the odds estimates for 
the explanatory variables, including the interaction terms, are obtained. Those results are reported in 
the form of average marginal effects. 37 Since this study is interested in two time periods, average 
marginal effects for explanatory variables are calculated for the period before the mid-1990s and for 
2003. To calculate the 2003 average marginal effects for the variables, the time interacted 
explanatory variables are integrated into the calculations. Table 2.4 provides the average marginal 
effects from running the survey logit regression on collateral and guarantor requirements. A t-test is 
also applied to test whether the two periods’ marginal effects are significantly different from each 
other. The t-test results give information regarding whether there has been a significant magnitude 
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change in the average marginal effects for the explanatory variables and these t-test results are also 
reported in Table 2.4. The results from Table 2.4 also support the hypothesis that the importance of 
borrower-lender relationships in small business lending has weakened over time.  
Some of the relationship variables were no longer significant in explaining the collateral and 
guarantor requirements in 2003 even though they were significant before the mid-1990s. For 
instance, the likelihood of securing the LOC before the mid-1990s was higher for firms that were at a 
farther distance. A firm that is 15 miles away versus 10 miles away from its lender was 1.386 percent 
more likely to be asked for collateral or guarantor requirements before the mid-1990s.38 One possible 
explanation is that as the distance gets larger, there is more informational opacity and the lender is 
more likely to ask for collateral or guarantor to overcome the associated risk. The distance variable 
no longer explained collateral and guarantor requirements in 2003. Distance might no longer have 
been an issue because the firm riskiness could have been measured through SBCS, without the need 
to establish a close relationship with the firm.  
Length of relationship was another variable that helped to explain collateral and guarantor 
requirements before the mid-1990s. However, this variable did not explain the collateral and 
guarantor requirements in 2003. Before the mid-1990s, a firm with 3 months compared to 2 months 
of relationship with its LOC provider was 1.151 percent less likely to have to secure its loans. 39 The 
t-test for the difference between the two period marginal effects also shows that the magnitude of the 
marginal effects for the length of relationship decreased in 2003. 
Before the mid-1990s, a firm that had a savings account with its LOC provider was 7.9 
percent less likely to be asked to secure its LOC. This negative value may be due to the relationship 
between the lender and the borrower and the lender obtaining further valuable information about the 
firm. However, there was no effect of savings account on collateral and guarantor requirements in 
2003. Savings account is an important relationship variable and it is important to note that savings 
account was no longer significant in 2003.   
Another significant relationship variable is whether the firm has previous loans with the LOC 
provider. Before the mid-1990s, when the firm got previous loans from the lender, the firm was 14.4 
percent more likely to be asked for collateral or guarantor requirements. This positive effect is 
generally explained in the literature by a lock-in problem created through the relationship between 
the firm and the lender. It might well be interpreted that with the new information gathered based on 
a previous loan relationship, the lender adjusts for the new loan contract terms that reflects the firm’s 
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real risk level. The average marginal effect of a previous loan account on the probability of being 
asked for collateral or a guarantor requirement was not significant in 2003. It can be concluded that 
the relationship variables, distance, length of relationship, savings account, and previous loan 
account, lost significance in 2003.  
The analysis of the non-relationship explanatory variables shows that there is a statistical 
increase in the significance levels in 2003 for some of the variables that are commonly used in hard-
information based models. For instance, some of the industry variables were significant in explaining 
the collateral and guarantor requirements in 2003 even though they were not significant before the 
mid-1990s. If a firm was in the manufacturing, retail trade, or business services industries, it was 
20.4 percent, 12.7 percent, and 11.9 percent less likely to be asked to provide collateral or guarantor 
requirements, respectively. For instance, firms in business services have less liquid assets to secure 
the loan. A possible reason for a lower probability of collateral and guarantor demand from these 
firms may be due to this fact. There were also significant increases in the magnitudes of the marginal 
effects for these industry variables in 2003.  
Moreover, the leverage ratio gained statistical significance in 2003 even though it was not 
significant before the mid-1990s in explaining the collateral and guarantor requirements. For a 100 
percent increase in the leverage ratio in 2003, a firm was 0.5 percent less likely to be asked for 
collateral or guarantor requirements but this value is not economically significant. A negative 
relationship may indicate that the lender perceives that the small business can afford to have more 
leverage and hence, the probability of the lender asking the firm to secure its LOC may be lower. 
There might well be a positive relationship between leverage and collateral and guarantor 
requirements if the firm exceeds a certain leverage level because after exceeding that limit, highly 
levered firms will be considered risky. The t-test between the two period marginal effects also shows 
that the magnitude for the leverage ratio increased in 2003 even though the value is not economically 
significant.  
Corporate organizational form is another variable that gained significance in 2003. A firm 
that has a corporate organizational form has a marginal effect of 13.9 percent in 2003. A lender is 
more likely to ask a corporation to secure the loan so that the lender can have the equivalent of a 
personal commitment in the case of default. The leverage ratio, organizational form, and industry 
types are the variables that are commonly used for hard-information based models and hence it is 
important that these variables became statistically significant in 2003 whereas they were not before 
the mid-1990s. 
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 The sales variable was significant both before the mid-1990s and in 2003. A firm with 
$150,000 worth of sales was 1.581 percent more likely before the mid-1990s and 1.176 percent more 
likely in 2003 to secure its LOC compared to a firm with $100,000 worth of sales.40 This result is 
consistent with the findings of Degryse and Cayseele (2000) who also find a positive relation 
between firm size and collateral requirement. One explanation is that a firm with higher sales is 
bigger in size and is more likely to have assets to secure the LOC and hence is more likely to be 
required to provide collateral and guarantor compared to a smaller firm that may not be able to afford 
to provide collateral or guarantors. However, it cannot really be said whether the magnitude effect of 
sales variable decreased over time since the t-test shows that the differences between the two period 
marginal effects are not statistically significant.  
On the other hand, there are some non-relationship variables that were previously significant 
but lost significance in explaining the collateral and guarantor requirements in 2003. As the ratio for 
amount of LOC granted got higher by 100 percent, the likelihood of a firm securing the loan was 
43.3 percent higher before the mid-1990s. Based on the t-test for the difference between the two 
period marginal effects, it is concluded that the magnitude effect of the amount of recent LOC 
granted declined in 2003. The variables, LOC provider, age of firm, and metropolitan area are the 
other variables that explained collateral and guarantor requirements before the mid-1990s but not in 
2003. Before the mid-1990s, a firm that obtained its LOC from a non-depository or non-financial 
supplier was 23.6 percent less likely to secure its loan. A firm that was 10 years old versus 9 years 
old was 0.496 percent less likely to secure its loan because an older firm most probably has more 
publicly available information about the firm and thus is considered less risky.41 A firm that was 
located in a metropolitan area was 5.7 percent less likely to secure its LOC. Unlike expectations, 
firms in a metropolitan area were less likely to secure their loans. It is possible that firms in 
metropolitan areas rent rather than own the buildings they operate in and hence it is likely that they 
cannot use these building as collateral and that is why it is less likely for these firms to provide 
collateral.   
In summary, Table 2.4 results display that in 2003, distance, length of relationship, savings 
account, and previous loan account were no longer significant in explaining collateral and guarantor 
requirements, even though they were significant before the mid-1990s. There was also a significant 
magnitude decline in the marginal effects for the length of relationship variable in 2003. Leverage 
ratio, corporate organizational form, and industry variables such as manufacturing, retail trade, and 
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business services industries gained significance in explaining the collateral and guarantor 
requirements in 2003. There were also increases in the magnitudes of the marginal effects for 
leverage ratio and the industry variables in 2003. The sales variable was significant in both periods. 
However, the magnitude for the marginal effects for the sales variable was not statistically different 
between the two time periods, before the mid-1990s and in 2003. All these results support the 
hypothesis that there were no effects of relationship variables on collateral and guarantor 
requirements by 2003 and some of the hard-information based variables gained significance in 2003.   
Overall, the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 support that small business lending structure 
changed in time and borrower-lender relationships are becoming less significant over time in 
determining the loan contract terms. Even though it is not the purpose of this study to explain the 
reasoning behind this change, a few of the possible reasons might still be mentioned. One possible 
explanation is that with technological improvements and use of SBCS models after the mid and late 
1990s, lenders were able to use hard-information to decide on the loan contract terms. Another 
explanation is that, with the consolidation of the banking system from 1984 to 2003, larger banks 
started to dominate the banking sector. It is possible that more small businesses started borrowing 
from these larger banks that are advantaged in using hard-information for lending purposes. That is 
why, in 2003, the relationship variables may not have explained the loan contract terms but instead 
we see an increase in the effect of hard information based variables on loan contract terms.  
 
2.7 Robustness  
 
Similar to the main model, all the robustness results report the findings obtained from the 
dataset with imputation 3 of the 2003 SSBF because this dataset provides significances that are 
consistent with the other four dataset results. Moreover, the average marginal effects are reported for 
the logit regressions on the collateral and guarantor requirements. The t-test results for the difference 
between the marginal effects in different time periods are also provided along with the average 
marginal effect results in the tables.42  
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2.7.1 Method 1.  Interaction Dummies for Each Year  
 
Method 1 pools all the years into one dataset but uses different time dummies for each 
individual year, 1987, 1993, and 2003 and runs a survey linear regression and survey logit with time 
interacted dummies for each of these periods rather than just one time interaction for period 2003.  
Survey linear regression results are provided in Table 2.5. These results show that borrower-
lender relationships explained interest rate premiums both in 1987 and in 1993 but not in 2003. For 
instance, a firm that had a checking account paid 78.461 basis points more for its interest rate 
premium in 1987. The magnitude of the coefficient for the checking account variable was also higher 
in 1987 compared to 2003. A firm that got financial management services paid 38.925 basis points 
more for its interest rate premium in 1993. Additionally, a firm that had 3 months versus 2 months of 
relationship with its LOC provider paid 4.340 basis points lower for its interest rate premium in 
1993.43 But, none of the relationship variables explained interest rate premiums in 2003. These 
results support the hypothesis that significance of borrower-lender relations in small business lending 
might have declined over time.  
In terms of non-relationship variables, even though corporate organizational form, age, 
metropolitan area, and Herfindahl index variables were not significant in 1987 and 1993, they 
became significant in explaining interest rate premiums in 2003. There are also significant magnitude 
increases over time for these non-relationship variables. Similarly, sales and profitability ratio were 
not significant in 1987, but they became significant in explaining interest rate premiums both in 1993 
and 2003. These non-relationship variables are the most commonly used variables in hard-
information based models and the results regarding these non-relationship variables indicate that over 
time, lenders started using hard-information when lending to small businesses. Additionally, the 
variables, whether the LOC is secured, the type of LOC provider, current assets ratio, and retail trade 
industry, helped to explain interest rate premiums only in 1993. There were also significant effects 
for ratio of amount of LOC granted in 1987 and 1993, accounts receivable collection period in 1987 
and in 2003, and wholesale trade industry in 1987.  
Moreover, when the magnitudes for the marginal effect values for the non-relationship 
variables are compared between 1993 and 1987 (Table 2.5a), and between 2003 and 1993 (Table 
2.5), the results in general support a trend for decreasing magnitudes from 1987 to 1993 but 
increasing magnitudes from 1993 to 2003. These results also validate that the hard information based 
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variables are getting more important in 2003. Overall, Table 2.5 provides results that are consistent 
with Table 2.3 and support the hypothesis that effects of relationship variables declined in 2003.  
Table 2.6 reports average marginal effects from the survey logit model. Table 2.6a provides 
the t-test results for the hypothesis that the difference between average marginal effects for different 
time periods is significant. These results indicate that distance was significant in explaining collateral 
and guarantor requirements in 1987 but not in 1993 and 2003. A firm that was 15 miles away from 
its lender compared to a firm that is 10 miles away was 2.211 percent more likely to secure the loan 
in 1987.44 The average marginal effect of previous loans on the probability of securing the loan was 
14 percent in 1993 but having a previous loan was not significant in 2003. Furthermore, the t-test for 
the difference between the two period marginal effects for length of relationship also shows that the 
magnitude of the marginal effects for the length of relationship decreased from 1987 to 2003. These 
results show that the relationship variables did not explain the collateral and guarantor requirements 
in 2003 even though some of the relationship variables explained the likelihood to secure the loan in 
1987 and 1993.  
This study also finds that some of the hard-information based variables gained statistical 
significance in 2003 and explained the likelihood to secure the loan even though they were not 
statistically significant before. For instance, some of the industry types, such as manufacturing, retail, 
and business services industries, and leverage ratio helped to explain the collateral and guarantor 
requirements in 2003 even though they were not significant in 1987 and 1993. Corporate 
organizational form gained significance both in 1993 and 2003. In addition to these, the sales 
variable was significant in all periods. On the other hand, LOC provider type, firm age, and 
metropolitan area helped to explain collateral and guarantor requirements only in 1993. Ratio of LOC 
amount was significant in both 1987 and 1993 and partnership organizational form was only 
significant in 1987.  
Even though marginal effects for some of the non-relationship variables show a decreasing 
magnitude from 1987 to 1993 (Table 2.6a) and an increasing magnitude from 1993 to 2003 (Table 
2.6a), some other non-relationship variables show the opposite. Hence, a general trend cannot be 
concluded from running t-tests between the differences of the different time period marginal effects. 
However, the results provided in Table 2.6 are still consistent with the findings in Table 2.4 and 
support the hypothesis that the importance of borrower-lender relationships declined over time. 
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2.7.2 Method 2.  Collateral Requirements to Secure the Recent LOC 
 
Method 2 only concentrates on the collateral requirements whereas guarantor requirements 
are also originally included when defining the variable “whether LOC is secured or not”. The 
purpose is not to proxy for the guarantor information in the 1987 dataset and to analyze how the 
survey linear and logit results differ when guarantor requirements are not included in the model.  
Table 2.7 reports the survey linear regression for the interest rate premium. Most of the 
results are similar to the ones in Table 2.3. Similar to Table 2.3 results, checking account was 
significant before the mid-1990s but this variable lost its significance in 2003 and also its magnitude 
effect declined in 2003. However, different than the Table 2.3 results, distance and financial 
management service variables became significant in 2003, contradicting the hypothesis that 
importance of borrower-lender relationships declined over time.  
An additional difference from Table 2.3 results is that secured LOCs helped to explain 
interest rate premiums both before the mid-1990s and in 2003, even though the previous results in 
Table 2.3 indicated just a significant magnitude change. A firm that has its LOC secured paid 18.245 
basis points more before the mid-1990s and paid 34.365 basis points less for its interest rate premium 
in 2003.  It is possible that before the mid-1990s, riskier firms were asked to secure their loans and 
were also charged with higher interest rate premium. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
collateral acts as a signal about the quality of the firm. A firm that will pay back its loan will not be 
afraid to provide more collateral. Hence, in 2003 firms that can secure their loans were considered 
less risky and they were charged lower interest rate premiums. Moreover, profitability and current 
assets ratios and retail trade industry were also significant before the mid-1990s, even though these 
variables were not significant in Table 2.3 for the before mid-1990s time frame. Another difference 
from Table 2.3 results is that corporate organizational form was not significant in explaining interest 
rate premiums in 2003. 
Table 2.8 reports the average marginal effects from the survey logit regression on collateral 
requirements. Before the mid-1990s, a firm with 3 months compared to 2 months of relationship with 
the LOC provider was 2.301 percent less likely to be required to secure its loans but in 2003, the 
firms were 1.007 more likely to be asked for collateral. 45 However, the t-test for the difference 
between the two period marginal effects shows that the magnitude of the marginal effects for the 
length of relationship decreased in 2003. On the other hand, the distance variable gained significance 
in 2003 even though it was not significant before the mid-1990s. In 2003, a firm that was 15 miles 
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away from the lender was 1.386 percent more likely to provide collateral compared to a firm that is 
only 10 miles away.46  
Regarding the non-relationship variables, different than the Table 2.4 results, the industry 
variables were significant before the mid-1990s rather than in 2003. Profitability ratio and the LOC 
provider variables were significant in 2003. The other remaining non-relationship variables still are 
comparable to results in Table 2.4. Even though the second robustness method results show that 
some of the relationship variables are still significant in explaining interest rate premiums and 
collateral and guarantor requirements, it can still be argued that the effect for other relationship 
variables declined and some of the hard-information based variables gained significance over time.   
 
2.8 Conclusions 
 
This research is motivated by the improvements in the SBCS for small business lending after 
the mid and late-1990s and tries to understand the changing small business lending structure. This 
study initially uses the 1987, 1993, and 2003 SSBF datasets to answer whether the importance of 
relationships in small business lending weakened in 2003. To answer this question, this research 
applies a survey linear regression for interest rate premiums and a survey logit model for collateral 
and guarantor requirements on relationship variables, for recently received LOCs. Different than the 
literature, the importance of borrower-lender relationships over time is directly compared in a single 
regression.  
This study finds that none of the relationship variables explained interest rate premiums in 
2003, even though the relationship variable, whether the firm has checking account with the lender, 
explained interest rate premiums before the mid-1990s. There is also a decline in the magnitude of 
the coefficient for the checking account variable in 2003. This result indicates that the effect for the 
checking account variable declined over time for the interest rate premium. In addition to this 
relationship variable effect, this study also finds that some of the hard-information based variables 
such as corporate organizational form, profitability, accounts receivable collection period, age, 
metropolitan area, and Herfindahl index gained significance in explaining interest rate premiums in 
2003 even though they were not significant before the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the sales variable 
was significant in both periods and the magnitude effect for the sales variable increased in 2003.  
For collateral and guarantor requirements, this study shows that the distance, length of 
relationship, savings account, and previous loan accounts variables were significant variables that 
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helped to explain collateral and guarantor requirements before the mid-1990s but not in 2003. This 
study also finds that none of the relationship variables explain collateral and guarantor requirements 
in 2003. Moreover, some of the hard-information based variables such as industry variables, 
corporate organizational form, and leverage ratio helped to explain collateral and guarantor 
requirements in 2003 even though they did not help to explain them before the mid-1990s.  
Based on these results, there is enough evidence to conclude that the effect of borrower-
lender relationships on interest rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements has 
weakened over time. The findings for this study are consistent with the literature that there have been 
changes in the small business lending sector. This change might be attributed to technological 
improvements and use of hard information such as SBCS models in small business lending. For 
instance, there has been more competition for lending to small businesses by larger banks and non-
depository financial institutions that specialize in the use of hard information based lending models. 
Moreover, during the 1980s and 1990s, with the consolidation of the banking sector, larger banks 
dominated the banking sector and started lending to small businesses.  
Due to the competitiveness of the small business market and the increased use of hard 
information in small business lending, lenders, specifically small banks, might want to reconsider 
their lending procedures. When evaluating characteristics of small business borrowers, small banks 
might give more emphasis to hard-information based models such as the SBCS, even though it may 
be initially costly to adopt these SBCS models. In particular, small banks would then be better able to 
compete with non-depository financial institutions and larger banks.  
Furthermore, the small businesses that meet the criteria of SBCS models will have a larger 
pool of lenders to choose from; for example, small banks, larger banks, and non-depository financial 
institutions and small businesses will have greater bargaining power when borrowing. These small 
businesses will also benefit from lower costs resulting from more favorable loan contract terms.  For 
instance, with SBCS, lenders lower their cost of lending due to lower cost of monitoring. The lender 
can then reflect these lower costs in more favorable loan contracts with borrowers.  
Additionally, understanding changes in the small business lending structure might help to 
better comprehend small businesses' financing sources for possible investment opportunities. 
Understanding the changes in small business lending structure will also help to improve efficiency in 
the small business lending system. However, it is also worth noting that there will always be small 
businesses that will not be able to afford to provide public information and that will still depend on 
relationship-based lending.  
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This paper would have benefited from a dataset that has more recent information regarding 
small businesses and their relationship based lending. Unfortunately, the SSBF dataset is limited with 
the 2003 year as the most recent year. Moreover, a future study might include in the model small 
business credit scores for firms as additional explanatory variables. This might help to better 
understand the reasons behind changes in the small business lending sector. Even though the credit 
score information is not available for the 1987 and 1993 SSBF datasets, it is available for the 1998 
and 2003 datasets. By using the 1998 and 2003 datasets, a credit score model can be constructed and 
the small business credit scoring information can be estimated for the years 1987 and 1993. 
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2.10 Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Linear Regression 
 
   
  
Before the Mid-1990s                                 2003   
Ho: Difference btw two 
period mean values=0 
Before the Mid-1990s (1987 and 1993 Data) Versus 2003 
Mean 
Values  
Standard 
Error 
  
Mean 
Values  
Standard 
Error 
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
Interest Rate Premium 151.194 4.937 
 
160.795 9.111 
 
9.602 10.363 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 1.511 0.061 
 
1.667 0.076 
 
0.156 0.097 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.507 0.025 
 
0.587 0.030 
 
0.08
**
 0.039 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 2.055 0.041 
 
4.046 0.090 
 
1.99
***
 0.099 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.923 0.013 
 
0.841 0.021 
 
-0.083
***
 0.024 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.288 0.022 
 
0.185 0.022 
 
-0.103
***
 0.031 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans 0.939 0.012 
 
0.957 0.012 
 
0.018 0.017 
Whether LOC is secured 0.790 0.020 
 
0.805 0.024 
 
0.016 0.032 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 3.594 3.351 
 
0.250 0.031 
 
-3.345 3.352 
Manufacturing Industry 0.141 0.015 
 
0.123 0.018 
 
-0.017 0.023 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.189 0.019 
 
0.114 0.017 
 
-0.076
***
 0.026 
Retail Trade Industry 0.231 0.021 
 
0.192 0.026 
 
-0.039 0.033 
Business Services Industry 0.232 0.021 
 
0.360 0.029 
 
0.128
***
 0.036 
Other Industries (mining, construction, 
transportation/public utilities, finance/insurance) 
0.208 0.020 
 
0.212 0.024 
 
0.004 0.031 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.189 0.021 
 
0.237 0.028 
 
0.048 0.035 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.056 0.011 
 
0.081 0.017 
 
0.025 0.021 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.755 0.022 
 
0.682 0.030 
 
-0.073
*
 0.037 
LOC Provider: Depository Financial Institution 0.981 0.006 
 
0.965 0.009 
 
-0.016 0.011 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.020 0.006 
 
0.035 0.009 
 
0.015 0.011 
Ln(Sales) 14.225 0.080 
 
13.686 0.088 
 
-0.539
***
 0.118 
Leverage Ratio 1.618 0.410 
 
0.837 0.407 
 
-0.780 0.578 
Profitability Ratio 0.405 0.085 
 
1.352 0.242 
 
0.946
***
 0.256 
Current Assets Ratio 0.636 0.015 
 
0.608 0.020 
 
-0.028 0.025 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 39.781 2.316 
 
27.271 2.158 
 
-12.509
***
 3.166 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 2.645 0.041 
 
2.649 0.039 
 
0.004 0.057 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.821 0.016 
 
0.794 0.027 
 
-0.027 0.032 
Herfindahl Index >=1,800 0.477 0.024 
 
0.411 0.029 
 
-0.066
*
 0.038 
Number of Observations 897     684         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.2: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Logit 
 
  
  
Before the Mid-
1990s                                    
  2003   
Ho: Difference btw 
two period mean 
values=0 
Before the Mid-1990s (1987 and 1993 Data) Versus 2003 
Mean 
Values  
Standard 
Error 
  
Mean 
Values  
Standard 
Error 
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
Whether LOC is secured 0.748 0.017 
 
0.749 0.021 
 
0.001 0.027 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 1.488 0.048 
 
1.748 0.064 
 
0.261
***
 0.080 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.490 0.019 
 
0.556 0.024 
 
0.066
**
 0.031 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 2.050 0.033 
 
3.962 0.071 
 
1.912
***
 0.078 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.889 0.013 
 
0.809 0.018 
 
-0.080
***
 0.022 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.250 0.017 
 
0.171 0.017 
 
-0.079
***
 0.024 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans 0.905 0.012 
 
0.900 0.015 
 
-0.006 0.019 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 2.288 2.087 
 
0.583 0.308 
 
-1.706 2.110 
Manufacturing Industry 0.115 0.011 
 
0.106 0.013 
 
-0.009 0.017 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.166 0.014 
 
0.109 0.013 
 
-0.058
***
 0.019 
Retail Trade Industry 0.221 0.016 
 
0.189 0.019 
 
-0.033 0.025 
Business Services Industry 0.280 0.018 
 
0.384 0.023 
 
0.104
***
 0.030 
Other Industries (mining, construction, 
transportation/public utilities, finance/insurance) 
0.217 0.016 
 
0.212 0.020 
 
-0.004 0.026 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.238 0.017 
 
0.270 0.023 
 
0.032 0.029 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.059 0.009 
 
0.074 0.012 
 
0.016 0.015 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.703 0.018 
 
0.656 0.024 
 
-0.048 0.030 
LOC Provider: Depository Financial Institution 0.957 0.009 
 
0.929 0.012 
 
-0.027
*
 0.015 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.044 0.009 
 
0.071 0.012 
 
0.027
*
 0.015 
Ln(Sales) 13.950 0.062 
 
13.426 0.074 
 
-0.524
***
 0.097 
Leverage Ratio 1.472 0.287 
 
0.759 0.374 
 
-0.714 0.471 
Profitability Ratio 0.402 0.064 
 
1.097 0.156 
 
0.694
***
 0.169 
Current Assets Ratio 0.625 0.011 
 
0.603 0.016 
 
-0.022 0.020 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 38.438 1.926 
 
28.060 1.732 
 
-10.378
***
 2.590 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 2.596 0.032 
 
2.622 0.032 
 
0.026 0.046 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.777 0.014 
 
0.787 0.022 
 
0.010 0.026 
Herfindahl Index >=1,800 0.495 0.019 
 
0.416 0.023 
 
-0.079
***
 0.030 
Number of Observations 1,353     1,084         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Survey Linear Regression Results 
   
Before the Mid-1990s (1987 and 1993 Data ) Versus 2003 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
2003 
Coefficient 
2003 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 6.657 4.317 9.837 6.095 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Distance) 3.180 7.469 
  
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 12.261 9.849 24.906 16.333 
Interaction for 2003 -Financ. Management Services 12.645 19.072 
  
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -8.318 6.638 1.319 5.802 
Interaction for 2003- Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 9.636 8.816 
  
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 29.584
*
 16.282 -16.124 19.067 
Interaction for 2003 -Checking Account -45.708
*
 25.073 
  
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -10.989 10.500 11.010 22.235 
Interaction for 2003 -Savings Account 21.998 24.589 
  
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans -2.108 16.721 -19.892 29.716 
Interaction for 2003 -Loan -17.784 34.097 
  
Whether LOC is Secured 16.763 11.895 -30.169 20.588 
Interaction for 2003 -Secured LOC -46.932
**
 23.777 
  
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted -0.065
***
 0.018 -20.118 22.863 
Interaction for 2003-Amount of Recent LOC Granted -20.053 22.863 
  
Manufacturing Industry 4.461 18.129 25.594 30.075 
Interaction for 2003 -Manufacturing 21.133 35.117 
  
Wholesale Trade Industry -10.602 16.790 -20.074 22.433 
Interaction for 2003 -Wholesale Trade -9.472 28.020 
  
Retail Trade Industry -23.254 15.928 -4.914 21.347 
Interaction for 2003 -Retail Trade 18.340 26.634 
  
Business Services Industry -2.679 16.165 30.826 21.285 
Interaction for 2003 -Business Services 33.504 26.727 
  
Partnership Organizational Form -9.750 20.365 -30.618 33.804 
Interaction for 2003 -Partnership -20.869 39.465 
  
Corporate Organizational Form -11.425 13.132 52.899
**
 25.946 
Interaction for 2003 -Corporation 64.324
**
 29.080 
  
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial supp. 131.243
**
 61.219 66.356 56.104 
Interaction for 2003 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  -64.887 83.039     
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 Continued: Survey Linear Regression Results 
   
Before the Mid-1990s (1987 and 1993 Data ) Versus 2003 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
2003 
Coefficient 
2003 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(Sales) -14.543
***
 3.897 -35.483
***
 4.899 
Interaction for 2003-Ln(Sales) -20.940
***
 6.260 
  
Leverage Ratio -0.615 0.485 -0.213 0.787 
Interaction for 2003 -Leverage 0.401 0.925 
  
Profitability Ratio 1.466 0.923 -2.723
*
 1.577 
Interaction for 2003 -Profitability -4.189
**
 1.827 
  
Current Assets Ratio -28.793 18.663 -9.375 28.926 
Interaction for 2003 -Current Assets Ratio 19.418 34.425 
  
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.023 0.082 -0.265
*
 0.151 
Interaction for 2003 -Accts Receivable -0.288
*
 0.171 
  
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 3.488 7.046 -29.003
**
 11.426 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Age) -32.491
**
 13.423 
  
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -3.526 11.918 55.147
***
 19.252 
Interaction for 2003 -Metropolitan 58.673
***
 22.643 
  
Herfindahl Index  5.166 10.038 34.902
**
 16.823 
Interaction for 2003-Herfindahl Index 29.737 19.590 
  
Time Dummy for Year 1993 -10.942 9.746 
  
Time Dummy for Year 2003 305.894
***
 84.498 
  
Constant 352.559
***
 53.906 658.452
***
 65.070 
R-Square 0.205 
   
Number of observations 1,581       
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Survey Logit Results - Average Marginal Effects       
 
  
 
Before the Mid-1990s 
 
2003   
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Before the Mid-1990s  (1987 and 1993 Data ) Versus 2003 dy/dx 
Standard 
Error 
  dy/dx 
Standard 
Error 
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 0.037
**
 0.015 
 
0.012 0.014 
 
-0.024 0.021 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.024 0.035 
 
0.004 0.046 
 
0.028 0.058 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.040
*
 0.022 
 
0.019 0.012 
 
0.059
**
 0.025 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.109 0.074 
 
0.094 0.075 
 
-0.015 0.105 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.079
**
 0.040 
 
-0.074 0.053 
 
0.005 0.066 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans 0.144
**
 0.067 
 
0.078 0.074 
 
-0.066 0.100 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 0.433
***
 0.130 
 
0.081 0.068 
 
-0.351
**
 0.146 
Manufacturing Industry 0.054 0.050 
 
-0.204
**
 0.082 
 
-0.258
***
 0.096 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.002 0.055 
 
-0.118 0.084 
 
-0.120 0.100 
Retail Trade Industry 0.055 0.048 
 
-0.127
*
 0.072 
 
-0.183
**
 0.086 
Business Services Industry 0.016 0.044 
 
-0.119
**
 0.059 
 
-0.134
*
 0.074 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.100 0.062 
 
0.055 0.067 
 
-0.045 0.091 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.063 0.045 
 
0.139
***
 0.052 
 
0.076 0.069 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.236
**
 0.120 
 
-0.044 0.085 
 
0.193 0.147 
Ln(Sales) 0.039
***
 0.012 
 
0.029
*
 0.015 
 
-0.011 0.019 
Leverage Ratio 0.001 0.002 
 
-0.005
**
 0.002 
 
-0.006
**
 0.003 
Profitability Ratio -0.005 0.008 
 
-0.002 0.005 
 
0.003 0.009 
Current Assets Ratio -0.089 0.063 
 
0.012 0.061 
 
0.101 0.088 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.0003 0.0004 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.0004 0.0007 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.052
**
 0.022 
 
-0.007 0.028 
 
0.045 0.036 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.057
*
 0.035 
 
-0.051 0.052 
 
0.006 0.062 
Herfindahl Index  -0.021 0.035 
 
0.003 0.038 
 
0.024 0.052 
Time Dummy for Year 1993 0.176
***
 0.039 
      
Time Dummy for Year 2003 0.139
***
 0.047 
      
Predicted prob(collateral & guarantor req.=1) 0.748
***
 0.017 
 
0.749
***
 0.021 
   
Number of observations 2,437               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Survey Linear Regression Results 
     
2003 Versus 1987 and 1993 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 1987 
Coefficient 
1987 
Standard 
Error 
 1993 
Coefficient 
1993 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance btw Firm and Institution) 9.837 6.095 6.130 5.754 4.882 5.071 
Interaction for 1987 -Ln(1+ Distance) -3.707 8.382 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Ln(1+ Distance) -4.955 7.929 
    
Whether Firm Obtains Fin. Mang. Services 24.906 16.333 7.037 16.002 38.925
***
 12.028 
Interaction for 1987 -Fin. Mang. Services -17.869 22.865 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Fin. Mang. Services 14.018 20.284 
    
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 1.319 5.802 -3.148 9.460 -15.086
*
 8.255 
Int. for 1987- Ln(1+ Length of Relation.) -4.467 11.098 
    
Int. for 1993- Ln(1+ Length of Relation.) -16.405 10.090 
    
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -16.124 19.067 78.461
**
 39.831 12.534 15.724 
Interaction for 1987 -Checking Account 94.585
**
 44.159     
Interaction for 1993 -Checking Account 28.658 24.714 
    
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 11.010 22.235 -17.149 18.502 -14.006 10.748 
Interaction for 1987 -Savings Account -28.159 28.926 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Savings Account -25.016 24.696 
    
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans -19.892 29.716 n/a n/a 6.255 15.357 
Interaction for 1993 -Loan 26.147 33.450 
    
Whether LOC is Secured -30.169 20.588 6.497 17.954 27.747
**
 13.235 
Interaction for 1987 -Secured LOC 36.665 27.317 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Secured LOC 57.916
**
 24.475         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
  Loan in 1987 perfectly predicts collateral requirements. 
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Table 2.5 Continued: Survey Linear Regression Results 
     
2003 Versus 1987 and 1993 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 1987 
Coefficient 
1987 
Standard 
Error 
 1993 
Coefficient 
1993 
Standard 
Error 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted -20.118 22.863 -18.726
***
 6.823 -0.087
***
 0.019 
Interaction for 1987-Amount of Recent LOC Granted 1.393 23.859 
    
Interaction for 1993-Amount of Recent LOC Granted 20.031 22.863 
    
Manufacturing Industry 25.594 30.075 4.515 31.274 -8.404 17.930 
Interaction for 1987 -Manufacturing -21.080 43.389 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Manufacturing -33.998 35.014 
    
Wholesale Trade Industry -20.074 22.433 -53.184
*
 31.701 1.668 15.983 
Interaction for 1987 -Wholesale Trade -33.110 38.836 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Wholesale Trade 21.742 27.544 
    
Retail Trade Industry -4.914 21.347 -27.205 25.706 -34.497
*
 17.871 
Interaction for 1987 -Retail Trade -22.291 33.414 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Retail Trade -29.583 27.840 
    
Business Services Industry 30.826 21.285 -3.509 25.566 -15.308 16.971 
Interaction for 1987 -Business Services -34.335 33.267 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Business Services -46.134
*
 27.222     
Partnership Organizational Form -30.618 33.804 45.980 28.845 -28.640 24.307 
Interaction for 1987 -Partnership 76.598
*
 44.438     
Interaction for 1993 -Partnership 1.978 41.636 
    
Corporate Organizational Form 52.899
**
 25.946 -14.121 19.243 -5.235 16.965 
Interaction for 1987 -Corporation -67.020
**
 32.303     
Interaction for 1993 -Corporation -58.134
*
 31.001         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Continued: Survey Linear Regression Results 
     
2003 Versus 1987 and 1993 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 1987 
Coefficient 
1987 
Standard 
Error 
 1993 
Coefficient 
1993 
Standard 
Error 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial supp. 66.356 56.104 166.740 163.171 125.841
**
 52.963 
Interaction for 1987 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  100.384 172.547 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  59.485 77.154 
    
Ln(Sales) -35.483
***
 4.899 -0.653 5.650 -28.243
***
 4.257 
Interaction for 1987-Ln(Sales) 34.830
***
 7.478     
Interaction for 1993-Ln(Sales) 7.240 6.491 
    
Leverage Ratio -0.213 0.787 -0.186 0.897 -0.689 0.473 
Interaction for 1987 -Leverage 0.028 1.193 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Leverage -0.476 0.919 
    
Profitability Ratio -2.723
*
 1.577 4.398 5.222 1.709
*
 0.926 
Interaction for 1987 -Profitability 7.121 5.454 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Profitability 4.432
**
 1.829     
Current Assets Ratio -9.375 28.926 -21.254 29.683 -49.420
**
 21.454 
Interaction for 1987 -Current Assets Ratio -11.880 41.447 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Current Assets Ratio -40.046 36.014 
    
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.265
*
 0.151 0.242
**
 0.117 -0.056 0.092 
Interaction for 1987 -Accts Receivable 0.508
***
 0.191     
Interaction for 1993 -Accts Receivable 0.210 0.177 
    
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -29.003
**
 11.426 2.809 9.187 4.776 8.388 
Interaction for 1987 -Ln(1+ Age) 31.812
**
 14.661     
Interaction for 1993 -Ln(1+ Age) 33.778
**
 14.174         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Continued: Survey Linear Regression Results 
     
2003 Versus 1987 and 1993  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 1987 
Coefficient 
1987 
Standard 
Error 
 1993 
Coefficient 
1993 
Standard 
Error 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 55.147
***
 19.252 -4.551 17.903 5.505 15.113 
Interaction for 1987 -Metropolitan -59.698
**
 26.290 
    
Interaction for 1993 -Metropolitan -49.642
**
 24.476     
Herfindahl Index  34.902
**
 16.823 -7.876 16.095 16.977 10.774 
Interaction for 1987-Herfindahl Index -42.778
*
 23.282 
    
Interaction for 1993-Herfindahl Index -17.925 19.977 
    
Time Dummy for Year 1987 -526.362
***
 115.034 
    
Time Dummy for Year 1993 -116.365 88.194 
    
Constant 658.452
***
 65.070 132.091 97.263 542.087
***
 59.532 
R-Square 0.227 
     
Number of observations 1,581           
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.5a : T-Test for Difference of Coefficients from Survey Linear Regression 
 
Ho: 1993-1987 
  
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard Error 
  
Ln(1+ Distance btw Firm and Institution) -1.248 7.669 
 
Whether Firm Obtains Fin. Mang. Services 31.888 20.019 
 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -11.938 12.556 
 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -65.927 42.822 
 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 3.143 21.397 
 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans 6.255 15.357 
 
Whether LOC is Secured 21.251 22.305 
 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 18.638
***
 6.823 
 
Manufacturing Industry -12.918 36.050 
 
Wholesale Trade Industry 54.852 35.502 
 
Retail Trade Industry -7.292 31.308 
 
Business Services Industry -11.799 30.686 
 
Partnership Organizational Form -74.620
**
 37.721 
 
Corporate Organizational Form 8.886 25.654 
 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial supp. -40.899 171.552 
 
Ln(Sales) -27.590
***
 7.074 
 
Leverage Ratio -0.504 1.014 
 
Profitability Ratio -2.689 5.303 
 
Current Assets Ratio -28.166 36.625 
 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.298
**
 0.149 
 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 1.967 12.441 
 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 10.056 23.429 
 
Herfindahl Index  24.852 19.368 
 
Number of observations 1,581   
 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Survey Logit Results - Average Marginal Effects 
         1987   1993   2003 
  dy/dx 
Standard 
Error 
  dy/dx 
Standard 
Error 
  dy/dx 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance btw Firm and Institution) 0.059
**
 0.026 
 
0.013 0.015 
 
0.012 0.014 
Whether Firm Obtains Fin. Mang. Services 0.00002 0.058 
 
-0.066 0.043 
 
0.004 0.046 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.044 0.035 
 
-0.021 0.027 
 
0.019 0.012 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.275 0.179 
 
0.039 0.061 
 
0.094 0.075 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.102 0.067 
 
-0.024 0.044 
 
-0.074 0.053 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans n/a n/a 
 
0.140
**
 0.059 
 
0.078 0.074 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 0.510
***
 0.175 
 
0.518
**
 0.213 
 
0.081 0.068 
Manufacturing Industry 0.112 0.083 
 
0.012 0.060 
 
-0.204
**
 0.082 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.081 0.088 
 
-0.039 0.068 
 
-0.118 0.084 
Retail Trade Industry 0.077 0.077 
 
0.047 0.056 
 
-0.127
*
 0.072 
Business Services Industry 0.002 0.072 
 
0.052 0.052 
 
-0.119
**
 0.059 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.210
***
 0.067 
 
-0.028 0.089 
 
0.055 0.067 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.018 0.066 
 
0.101
*
 0.060 
 
0.139
***
 0.052 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial supp. 0.176 0.191 
 
-0.305
**
 0.121 
 
-0.044 0.085 
Ln(Sales) 0.045
**
 0.020 
 
0.043
***
 0.014 
 
0.029
*
 0.015 
Leverage Ratio 0.007 0.006 
 
-0.003 0.003 
 
-0.005
**
 0.002 
Profitability Ratio 0.002 0.021 
 
-0.005 0.006 
 
-0.002 0.005 
Current Assets Ratio -0.154 0.101 
 
-0.031 0.071 
 
0.012 0.061 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.0004 0.0007 
 
0.0001 0.0003 
 
0.0007 0.0006 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.033 0.030 
 
-0.119
***
 0.029 
 
-0.007 0.028 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.011 0.052 
 
-0.094
**
 0.044 
 
-0.051 0.052 
Herfindahl Index  -0.007 0.055 
 
-0.044 0.042 
 
0.003 0.038 
Time Dummy for Year 1993 0.171
***
 0.062 
      
Time Dummy for Year 2003 0.138
***
 0.052 
      
Predicted prob(collateral & guarantor req.=1) 0.672
***
 0.028 
 
0.812
***
 0.021 
 
0.749
***
 0.021 
Number of observations 2,437               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
    
  Loan in 1987 perfectly predicts collateral requirements. 
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Table 2.6a: Survey Logit Results - Average Marginal Effects 
         Ho: 1993-1987  Ho: 2003-1987  Ho: 2003-1993 
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
  
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance btw Firm and Institution) -0.046 0.030 
 
-0.046 0.030 
 
-0.001 0.021 
Whether Firm Obtains Fin. Mang. Services -0.066 0.073 
 
0.004 0.074 
 
0.070 0.063 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.023 0.044 
 
0.064
*
 0.037 
 
0.040 0.030 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -0.236 0.189 
 
-0.181 0.194 
 
0.055 0.096 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.078 0.080 
 
0.028 0.085 
 
-0.050 0.069 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans 0.140
**
 0.059 
 
0.078 0.074 
 
-0.062 0.095 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 0.008 0.276 
 
-0.429
**
 0.188 
 
-0.436
*
 0.224 
Manufacturing Industry -0.100 0.102 
 
-0.316
***
 0.116 
 
-0.216
**
 0.101 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.119 0.111 
 
-0.199 0.122 
 
-0.080 0.108 
Retail Trade Industry -0.030 0.095 
 
-0.205
*
 0.106 
 
-0.174
*
 0.091 
Business Services Industry 0.050 0.089 
 
-0.121 0.093 
 
-0.171
**
 0.079 
Partnership Organizational Form -0.238
**
 0.111 
 
-0.155 0.095 
 
0.083 0.112 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.083 0.089 
 
0.121 0.084 
 
0.038 0.079 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial supp. -0.481
**
 0.226 
 
-0.220 0.209 
 
0.261
*
 0.148 
Ln(Sales) -0.002 0.024 
 
-0.016 0.025 
 
-0.014 0.021 
Leverage Ratio -0.010
*
 0.006 
 
-0.012
**
 0.006 
 
-0.002 0.003 
Profitability Ratio -0.007 0.022 
 
-0.004 0.022 
 
0.003 0.008 
Current Assets Ratio 0.124 0.124 
 
0.166 0.118 
 
0.043 0.094 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.0003 0.001 
 
0.0003 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.086
**
 0.041 
 
0.026 0.041 
 
0.112
***
 0.040 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.083 0.068 
 
-0.041 0.074 
 
0.043 0.068 
Herfindahl Index  -0.037 0.069 
 
0.009 0.067 
 
0.047 0.057 
Number of observations 2,437               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
       Loan in 1987 perfectly predicts collateral requirements. 
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Table 2.7: Survey Linear Regression Results       
Before the Mid-1990s (1987 and 1993 Data ) Versus 2003 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
2003 
Coefficient 
2003 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 6.217 4.276 10.491
*
 6.173 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Distance) 4.274 7.510 
  
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 13.644 9.816 28.289
*
 16.453 
Interaction for 2003 -Financ. Management Services 14.645 19.158 
  
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -8.054 6.476 1.512 5.839 
Interaction for 2003- Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 9.566 8.720 
  
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 32.668
**
 16.291 -18.559 18.896 
Interaction for 2003 -Checking Account -51.228
**
 24.949 
  
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -14.060 10.511 9.254 21.759 
Interaction for 2003 -Savings Account 23.313 24.165 
  
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans -1.068 16.502 -15.873 28.363 
Interaction for 2003 -Loan -14.805 32.815 
  
Whether LOC is Secured 18.245
**
 9.177 -34.365
**
 15.851 
Interaction for 2003 -Secured LOC -52.609
***
 18.315 
  
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted -0.074
***
 0.017 -17.940 21.966 
Interaction for 2003-Amount of Recent LOC Granted -17.866 21.966 
  
Manufacturing Industry -0.113 17.898 27.590 30.593 
Interaction for 2003 -Manufacturing 27.703 35.444 
  
Wholesale Trade Industry -14.261 16.662 -17.803 22.432 
Interaction for 2003 -Wholesale Trade -3.542 27.943 
  
Retail Trade Industry -27.532
*
 15.725 -7.761 21.732 
Interaction for 2003 -Retail Trade 19.771 26.825 
  
Business Services Industry -5.241 16.127 29.630 21.422 
Interaction for 2003 -Business Services 34.871 26.814 
  
Partnership Organizational Form -2.418 20.179 -35.426 33.711 
Interaction for 2003 -Partnership -33.008 39.289 
  
Corporate Organizational Form -6.200 13.214 40.947 27.160 
Interaction for 2003 -Corporation 47.146 30.204 
  
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial supp. 139.954
**
 61.723 64.290 54.483 
Interaction for 2003 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  -75.664 82.329     
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
53 
Table 2.7 Continued: Survey Linear Regression Results       
Before the Mid-1990s (1987 and 1993 Data ) Versus 2003 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
2003 
Coefficient 
2003 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(Sales) -15.913
***
 3.831 -34.301
***
 4.754 
Interaction for 2003-Ln(Sales) -18.388
***
 6.105 
  
Leverage Ratio -0.661 0.480 0.087 0.785 
Interaction for 2003 -Leverage 0.748 0.920 
  
Profitability Ratio 1.522
*
 0.921 -3.011
*
 1.677 
Interaction for 2003 -Profitability -4.533
**
 1.914 
  
Current Assets Ratio -30.888
*
 18.518 -6.180 28.694 
Interaction for 2003 -Current Assets Ratio 24.708 34.151 
  
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.058 0.077 -0.268
*
 0.149 
Interaction for 2003 -Accts Receivable -0.326
*
 0.168 
  
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 3.100 7.028 -29.261
**
 11.435 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Age) -32.361
**
 13.421 
  
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -1.907 11.748 57.173
***
 19.602 
Interaction for 2003 -Metropolitan 59.080
***
 22.852 
  
Herfindahl Index  6.607 10.074 34.649
**
 16.799 
Interaction for 2003-Herfindahl Index 28.043 19.588 
  
Time Dummy for Year 1993 -10.778 9.729 
  
Time Dummy for Year 2003 264.826
***
 83.005 
  
Constant 369.116
***
 53.115 633.942
***
 63.786 
R-Square 0.211 
   
Number of observations 1,578       
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.8: Survey Logit Results - Average Marginal Effects       
   
 
Before the Mid-1990s   2003 
  
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Before the Mid-1990s  (1987 and 1993 Data ) Versus 2003 dy/dx 
Standard 
Error 
  dy/dx 
Standard 
Error   
Difference 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 0.013 0.015 
 
0.037
**
 0.016 
 
0.024 0.022 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.016 0.039 
 
0.035 0.052 
 
0.020 0.065 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.080
***
 0.026 
 
0.035
**
 0.016 
 
0.115
***
 0.030 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.039 0.080 
 
0.013 0.073 
 
-0.026 0.108 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.029 0.043 
 
-0.074 0.054 
 
-0.044 0.070 
Whether Firm Has Already Previous Loans 0.114 0.073 
 
0.092 0.080 
 
-0.021 0.109 
Ratio for Amount of Recent LOC Granted 0.229
**
 0.113 
 
0.055 0.045 
 
-0.174 0.122 
Manufacturing Industry 0.120
**
 0.060 
 
-0.074 0.070 
 
-0.194
**
 0.093 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.127
**
 0.058 
 
-0.039 0.075 
 
-0.167
*
 0.095 
Retail Trade Industry 0.075 0.057 
 
-0.094 0.074 
 
-0.169
*
 0.093 
Business Services Industry 0.019 0.054 
 
-0.077 0.059 
 
-0.096 0.080 
Partnership Organizational Form -0.164
*
 0.093 
 
-0.096 0.086 
 
0.068 0.127 
Corporate Organizational Form -0.077 0.050 
 
-0.120
**
 0.059 
 
-0.043 0.077 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.231
**
 0.111 
 
-0.152
*
 0.085 
 
0.079 0.140 
Ln(Sales) 0.062
***
 0.014 
 
0.047
***
 0.014 
 
-0.015 0.020 
Leverage Ratio 0.004 0.003 
 
0.0001 0.002 
 
-0.004 0.004 
Profitability Ratio -0.003 0.008 
 
-0.016
**
 0.008 
 
-0.013 0.011 
Current Assets Ratio -0.049 0.073 
 
-0.020 0.069 
 
0.029 0.100 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.001 0.0004 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.0002 0.001 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.058
**
 0.028 
 
0.0001 0.032 
 
0.058 0.042 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.050 0.044 
 
-0.024 0.064 
 
0.027 0.078 
Herfindahl Index  0.008 0.041 
 
-0.024 0.046 
 
-0.033 0.062 
Time Dummy for Year 1993 0.086
**
 0.038 
      
Time Dummy for Year 2003 0.007 0.043 
      
Predicted prob(collateral req.=1) 0.551
***
 0.020 
 
0.439
***
 0.024 
   
Number of observations 2,431               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN BORROWER-LENDER 
RELATIONSHIPS ON SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT AVAILABILITY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The goal of this study is to answer whether borrower-lender relationships became less 
important over time in determining credit availability for small businesses and dollar amounts of 
credit for which small businesses are approved. In order to answer the research question, this study 
concentrates on effects of relationship variables on credit availability and amount of credit granted to 
small businesses over time.  
Due to information asymmetries and agency costs, a lender faces challenges in deciding to 
whom they should allocate capital. Since there are more informational asymmetries for small 
businesses due to less publicly available information and un-certified audited financial statements, it 
is harder for small firms to get regular loans and thus, relationship lending is especially significant 
for small firms when they are obtaining credit. Through stronger and more information sensitive 
relationships with their lenders, small businesses might have easier access to credit because lenders 
obtain private information about small businesses and use this information in their lending decisions. 
It is important to understand the direct effects of relationship lending and how borrower-lender 
relationships translate into financing and funding options for small businesses (Berger et al, 2005-b).  
Relationship lending is also commonly used by small banks. Due to the organizational 
structure of small banks, it is less costly for small banks to overcome the informational asymmetries 
through establishing close relationships with their borrowers and accumulating private information 
about their borrowers. Due to the ability of small banks to efficiently obtain private information 
about borrowers, small banks can better analyze the real risks of small businesses and hence might do 
a better job of easing the small firms’ credit constraints compared to larger banks (Berger et al, 2005-
b).  
However, with technological changes, including adoption of small business credit scoring 
models (SBCS) after the mid-1990s, small business credit markets have become more competitive 
and non-depository financial institutions and larger banks started lending more to small businesses 
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based on hard-information based models. The geographic area over which small businesses can 
borrow has also potentially widened (Berger and Frame, 2007 and Berger and Black, 2011). As a 
result of all these developments, SBCS increased small business credit availability for loans under 
$100,000 in terms of the overall quantity of lending, lending to opaque and risky borrowers, lending 
within low income and high income areas, lending over greater distances, and increasing the loan 
maturity (Berger and Frame, 2007, Berger et al., 2005-a, Frame et al. 2001, and Frame et al. 2004). 
There is an increasing usage of SBCS and the use of SBCS will likely continue to evolve. Moreover, 
with the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based approach of the Basel II Accord, the largest U.S. banking 
organizations can get favorable capital treatment for small business loans that are managed under 
“retail exposures”, including small business loans under SBCS and this is expected to further 
encourage a secondary market for small business loans to emerge (Berger and Frame, 2007 and 
Berger et al, 2005-a).  
With the increased usage of credit scoring for small business loans, the value of relationships 
on small business loans has changed (Berger et al, forthcoming). It is likely that effects of borrower-
lender relationships on the lending process have weakened over time and the market share for smaller 
banks in lending to small businesses has declined. Hence, it is interesting to analyze whether 
relationships are still significant in the lending process, especially in determining credit availability 
and credit amounts for small businesses and to think about what implications the study results may 
have for small banks and small businesses. To make it explicit, the motivation of the paper is to 
understand the changes in lending structure for small businesses but not to verify whether these 
changes are caused by SBCS. However, the interest in the research question arose from the 
improvements in the SBCS for small business lending after the mid and late-1990s. 
Using the 1987, 1993, and 2003 SSBF datasets, this study applies two models to analyze the 
effects of relationship variables on credit availability and dollar amounts of credit provided to small 
businesses. The first model runs a survey regression of fraction of trade credits paid late on 
relationship variables. The second model runs a survey regression of the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of dollar amount of line of credit (LOC) granted to dollar amounts of sales for small businesses 
on relationship variables. One significant contribution of this study is that both of these models 
directly compare changes in the effects of borrower-lender relationships on small business loans from 
a period prior to emergence of SBCS to a period after the emergence of SBCS. For this purpose, 
interaction effects are incorporated between relationship variables and the year 2003 as explanatory 
variables.  In addition, t-tests for the joint significances of the sum of coefficients of relationship 
variables and time interacted variables are applied. These t-tests help to identify whether effects of 
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relationship on the credit availability and amounts of credit provided to small businesses were 
significant in 2003. Other than a direct comparison of the relationship variables over time, an 
additional contribution of this study to the literature is that firms that have recently obtained lines of 
credit (LOCs) are used as a sample for the purposes of the study. This is the first paper that 
distinguishes between types of recent loans and that focuses on only the firms with recent LOCs as 
the sample for the credit availability and loan decision models. The reason for focusing on LOCs is 
that they are the only loan types that are based primarily on borrower-lender relationships. However, 
previous studies such as Petersen and Rajan (1994) focus on firms with trade credit information and 
Cole et al (2004) and Berger et al (2005-b) focus on firms with recent loans, not just the LOCs, for 
their credit availability and loan decision models.  
Additionally, this paper uses principal component analysis (PCA) to decrease the dimensions 
of the relationship variables and develop a smaller number of artificial variables that will account for 
most of the variance in the observed relationship variables. The goal is to explain borrower-lender 
relationships with fewer variables rather than including a list of all possible relationship variables and 
to capture an overall effect of borrower-lender relationships on credit availability and on the LOC 
amount granted, rather than having different effects for each relationship variable. This is the first 
paper in the relationship lending literature that applies PCA for decreasing the dimensions of the 
relationship variables.  
If the study finds that significance of relationships is declining, one of the reasons might be 
attributed to improvements in technology and the use of SBCS models in small business lending. 
With the developments in small business lending, non-depository financial institutions and larger 
banks that are advantaged in hard-information based models started lending to small businesses, and 
small businesses that meet the criteria of SBCS models have a larger pool of lenders to choose from; 
for example, small banks, larger banks, and non-depository financial institutions. Having these 
additional sources of funds is significant for small businesses because small firms can only develop 
into bigger companies through acquiring funds. With additional lenders to choose from, small 
businesses will also have greater negotiation power that will most likely result in favorable loan 
terms.  
It will also be important for small banks to understand how the nature of relationship lending 
has changed. If importance of relationships is no longer significant or is declining in explaining 
credit availability and credit amounts, then small banks might consider new ways to adopt and 
improve on hard-information based models. For instance, they may consider purchasing scores from 
external vendors or might develop their own scores. SBCS can put increased competitive pressures 
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on small banks in the long run since SBCS can be used by lenders of any size and at any distance 
from borrowers. It may be worthwhile for small banks to improve on hard-information based models 
so that they can better compete and not lose market share to larger banks and non-depository 
financial institutions in the long run. However, it is worth noting that there will always be small 
businesses that will not be able to provide hard-information and that will still be dependent on 
relationship-based loans. 
Another implication will be on governmental policies for antitrust purposes. Since distance 
between borrowers and lenders is increasing due to technological improvements and the use of 
SBCS, in the longer run, a local presence by banks may not be required to lend to small businesses. 
Hence antitrust policy makers may consider redefining the appropriate geographic market definition 
for antitrust purposes (Berger et al., 2005-a).  
Additionally, following the 2008 U.S. financial crisis and the subsequent European financial 
crisis, the U.S. economy has weakened and unemployment rates have increased. In order to 
strengthen the economy and deal with the consequences of the crises, small businesses can be 
encouraged to invest and increase production. Thus, it is important to understand changes in the 
small business lending structure to better comprehend small businesses' financing sources for 
possible investment opportunities. Understanding the changes in the small business lending structure 
will also help to improve efficiency in the small business lending system.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
This study adapts its models from the previous relationship lending literature on the 
availability and amounts of credit provided to small businesses. More detail on this literature is 
provided below. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that a firm with close ties to a lender has a lower cost of 
borrowing and greater availability of funds compared to a firm with no relationship. Firms get more 
benefits of this relationship from increases in the quantity of financing provided than from reductions 
in the price of credit. Petersen and Rajan (1995) conclude that firms are less credit constrained in 
concentrated markets compared to firms in competitive markets. In a concentrated market, the lender 
accepts lower returns up front and is willing to finance more firms with the expectation that he can 
obtain future surplus from the borrower through higher interest rates in the future. Thus, older firms 
in concentrated markets are less credit constrained but ultimately pay higher rates compared to firms 
in competitive markets.  
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Harfhoff and Korting (1998) combine studies by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and 
Udell (1995) and study the impact of relationships on collateral requirements and interest rates for 
LOCs and on credit availability. They find that the relationship variables have some effect on interest 
rates but more on collateral requirements and credit availability. Cole (1998) studies factors that 
affect the credit allocation decision. He finds that a lender is more likely to extend credit to a firm 
with which it has a previous relationship. However, the likelihood of extending credit decreases with 
the number of sources of financial services used by the firm.  
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) use bank level data from Germany. They find that housebanks 
provide liquidity insurance when firms experience downgrading.47 However, in the case of large 
downgrading, there is no additional gain from relationship lending. They conclude that loan pricing 
is not really much affected by relationship lending.  
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) review the relationship lending literature. One of the areas on 
which they focus is the effects of relationship on the availability and quantity of credit. They state 
that a firm that has a longer relationship with its lender has greater availability of funds and lower 
costs of financing. They also mention that credit availability for small businesses is more of a 
concern compared to the availability of credit to larger businesses because larger businesses can 
afford to borrow from a variety of credit sources. They also focus on differences between lending by 
large and small banks to small businesses and the consolidation of the banking system. DeYoung et 
al. (2004) argue that deregulation and technological advances have made the distinction stronger 
between larger banks that have a comparative advantage in the use of hard-information, impersonal 
relationships, low unit costs and standardized loans, and smaller banks that have a comparative 
advantage in the use of soft information and relationship loans.  
Berger and Udell (2006) discuss effects of different financial institution structures on lending 
technologies and their effects on small business credit availability. Cole et al. (2004) analyze the 
differences between large and small banks in their loan approval process. They conclude that small 
banks rely on personal interactions whereas larger banks rely on standard quantitative criteria when 
granting loans. 
Berger and Udell (1996) state that large banks issue fewer loans to small businesses based on 
soft information. Rather, large banks have advantages in lending to small businesses who can afford 
to provide hard-information. Berger et al. (2005-b) recognize that larger banks do not interact 
personally with their borrower but instead depend on financial records whereas small banks are better 
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 Housebank notion refers to banks with strong bank-customer relations. 
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than large banks in processing soft information when granting loans to their borrowers. Based on 
their study, they also find that firms that borrow from larger banks are more credit constrained 
compared to firms that borrow from smaller banks. Results of Berger et al. (2007) are consistent with 
the hypothesis that large banks offset their disadvantage in processing soft information by using their 
advantage in hard-information based lending to lend to opaque small businesses.  
Carter and McNulty (2005) find that small banks are better at lending to small businesses. 
However, their advantage for small business loans appears to have declined for loans less than 
$100,000, which is consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (2005-a) that credit scoring has 
allowed larger banks get into the market for small business loans under $100,000. 
Torre et al. (2010) conclude that large banks find small business lending markets profitable to 
work with and that relationship lending is not the only way to extend credit to small businesses. 
Large banks are increasingly applying different transactional technologies such as credit scoring, 
asset based lending, factoring, fixed asset lending and leasing when lending to small businesses. 
Larger banks are better than small banks in using the automated risk models and benefit from 
economies of scale and scope. Craig and Hardee (2007) suggest that firms turn to alternative sources 
of financing from other financial institutions such as capital leasing firms, mortgage companies, and 
financial brokers. They find significant evidence that these alternative sources of debt financing are 
replacing banks, especially for small businesses with negative equity. Additionally, Berger et al. 
(forthcoming) study the application of Consumer Credit Scoring (CCS) on small business lending. 
They examine the effects of CCS of the small business owners on the quantity and quality of small 
business lending at community banks. They find that for community banks, CCS is associated with 
increased small business lending after a learning period but it has no effect on the quality of the loan.  
One major contribution of this paper is that year 2003, when SBCS models became more 
popular, is compared to previous years in order to make inferences about changes in the importance 
of relationship in small business lending. 
 
3.3 Model 
 
Two models, model 1 and model 2, are used for this study. Model 1 uses percentage of trade 
credit paid late to try to understand more about small business credit availability. Model 2 uses the 
ratio of dollar amounts of LOC granted to dollar amounts of sales to learn more about the amount of 
LOC granted to small businesses. For each model, the year 1987 is compared to the year 2003 and 
the year 1993 is compared to the year 2003. The year 2003 represents a time period when SBCS 
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models became popular whereas the time periods 1987 and 1993 represent a time period before the 
SBCS models. Below is a more detailed explanation for each model.48   
 
3.3.1 Model 1. Percentage of trade credits paid late by small businesses 
 
Berger et al. (2005-b) state that small banks are more advantaged in accumulating private 
information and in processing soft information when they are granting loans to small businesses. 
Hence, small banks are better at easing the small businesses’ credit constraints. Based on this 
assumption, it is reasonable to expect that relationship variables and small banks play a significant 
role in determining small business credit availability, and small businesses that can establish 
relationships with their lenders will be better at getting loans. As Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Berger et al. (2005-b) argue, small businesses that do not develop long term relationships with their 
lenders are more likely to be credit constrained.  
Based on Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger et al. (2005-b), this study uses the fraction of 
trade credit paid late to reflect the extent to which the firm is credit constrained.49 This variable is 
preferred over debt level because debt level reflects both the firm’s demand for credit and the supply 
of credit by the lender, and hence the debt level may underestimate the credit available to small 
businesses (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). For instance, a firm might have a low amount of credit 
because it is credit constrained on the supply side or because the firm had low demand for credit. 
This study focuses on only the sample of firms that have recently received LOCs (that are 
still outstanding) and that have obtained trade credit during the last year. 50 LOCs are the only loan 
type that is determined primarily through relationship lending. In addition, LOCs are regularly 
monitored by the lender and adjusted each year based on recent firm information. By focusing on the 
most recent LOCs, this paper ensures that firms’ characteristics match the time period when the loans 
are either originated or renewed. On the other hand, Berger et al (2005-b) focused on firms that 
recently obtained loans, including recent capital leases, LOCs, mortgages, vehicle loans, and 
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 Because bank ID numbers are not available in the publicly available SSBF datasets, there is not a way to combine 
the bank size information (large banks versus small banks) into this study. However, Herfindahl Index for market 
competition in banking for the region in which the small business is located, is to some extent expected to provide 
information regarding the banking structure in that region. 
49
 Petersen and Rajan (1997) also find that small businesses that are constrained by their institutional lenders will 
rely more on trade credit.  
50
 This study only uses firms that have been approved for their most recent LOCs but does not focus on firms whose 
recent LOCs are denied because Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that being turned down for a loan has statistically no 
significant effect on the amount of trade credit a firm is offered. Similar to Petersen and Rajan (1997), Cole (2011) 
also finds that being turned down is insignificant in explaining amount of trade credit offered.  
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equipment loans, as their sample. They used time dummies to represent when these most recent loans 
were originated. Since this study only focuses on recent LOCs and these LOCs are annually adjusted 
unlike mortgage, vehicle or equipment loans, this research does not distinguish between the time 
loans are originated. However, this study distinguishes between periods before and after the 
implementation of SBCS by using time interactions for periods before 2003 versus 2003.   
 
3.3.2 Model 2. Amounts of LOCs provided to small businesses 
 
The second model analyzes the effects of borrower-lender relationships on the amount of 
LOC a firm receives. Before applying for loans, firms have a fairly good idea of the appropriate loan 
amount they can get or an idea about whether their loan application for a certain loan amount will be 
approved by the lender. Therefore, firms who apply for loans are the ones who believe they can get 
the requested loan amount. So, firms request these loan amounts and the lender’s decision process is 
whether to grant the requested loan amount. However, there may be rare situations where the lender 
might decide to give the loan but the amount would be less than the requested amount. These 
situations would generally occur with newer businesses. Also, there might be a few cases when the 
requested loan amount will be denied based on the credit conditions of the firm or based on the 
reputation of the firm.51 Most of the time, the decision process of the lender does not specifically 
focus on whether to approve the loan application and then grant the loan amount conditional on the 
loan approval. Instead, the lender’s decision is whether to grant the loan amount requested by the 
firm. Therefore, this study only focuses on loan amounts.  
It is possible to argue that a selection bias might occur based on the small businesses’ choices 
of whether to apply for loans or which lender to apply to for a loan. Firms may choose not to apply 
for loans because of fear of rejection or it may be possible that firms will choose to apply to lenders 
with whom they have a previous relationship and where there is a higher probability for their loan 
applications to be accepted. There might be a selection bias because the borrowers who do not apply 
for loans are not randomly excluded from the sample of loan amounts since the firms self-select 
themselves based on the loan amount they think they will be granted by the lender. The publicly 
available 1987 and 2003 SSBF datasets do not provide information regarding whether the firm 
applied for credit or not. Thus, it is not really possible to directly look into this issue.  
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 The 1987 and 2003 SSBF datasets do not provide information regarding whether the most recent LOC is denied 
and thus, firms with denied recent LOCs are not included in the sample. 
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Even though Cole et al. (2004) use a sample of firms with recent loans in examining loan 
decision models, the sample for model 2 in this study, similar to model 1, is based on firms that have 
recently been approved for their most recent LOCs and that are still outstanding because LOCs are 
the only loan type primarily based on relationship. The difference from model 1 is that the sample is 
not constrained to be only the firms that have obtained trade credit during the last year.  
 
3.3.3 Model 1 and Model 2 Regressions 
 
In models 1 and 2, a survey regression that is adjusted for weights is applied to equation 
(3.1). Because the purpose of this study is to understand the changes in effects of relationship 
variables on credit availability and LOC amounts granted to small businesses, equation (3.1) is run 
for each model: a regression of 1) percentage of trade credit paid late by small businesses on 
relationship variables for model 1 and a regression of 2) LOC amounts granted to small businesses 
on relationship variables for model 2.  The difference between the two models is that in model 1 
percentage of trade credit paid late is used as the dependent variable whereas in model 2 the ratio of 
the LOC amount granted is used as the dependent variable. However, explanatory variables are 
similar in both models.  
In each model, models 1 and 2, the years before when the SBCS models became popular (the 
years 1987 and 1993) are compared to the year after when the SBCS models became more widely 
used (the year 2003). Thus, across each model, the year 1987 is compared to the year 2003 in one 
regression and the year 1993 is compared to the year 2003 in another regression. For this purpose, the 
1987 SSBF dataset is pooled together with the 2003 SSBF dataset (1987-2003 pooled dataset) and 
the 1993 SSBF dataset is pooled together with the 2003 SSBF dataset (1993-2003 pooled dataset). 
To reemphasize, the purpose of the study is not to verify whether the changes in lending structure are 
caused by SBCS but to evaluate changes in relationship-based lending to small businesses. However, 
the study is motivated by the emergence of SBCS for small business lending after the mid and late 
1990s and that is why relationship lending in the years before the SBCS models emerged are 
compared to relationship lending in the year 2003 after the SBCS models became popular.  
To measure the magnitude changes in the explanatory variables from 1987 to 2003 in the 
1987-2003 pooled dataset and from 1993 to 2003 in the 1993-2003 pooled dataset, time interacted 
relationship variables are included as additional explanatory variables in equation (3.1). For each 
pooled dataset and each model, equation (3.1) is applied and a total of 4 regressions are run. 
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(   )                        (   )      (   )             
where β,  , δ,  ,   are the coefficients for explanatory variables, α is the intercept, and e is the error 
term. In model 1, Y is the percentage of trade credit paid late. In model 2, Y is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio for dollar amount of LOC granted to dollar amount of sales. R is a vector of pre-existing 
relationship explanatory variables; C is a vector of other control variables such as firm, contract, and 
industry characteristics; R*T refers to the interaction variables between time and relationship 
variables. A dummy T, which is one if year is 2003 and zero else, is created. C*T refers to the 
interaction variables between time and other control explanatory variables. The interaction variables 
provide information regarding magnitude changes in explanatory variables from 1987 to 2003 in the 
1987-2003 pooled dataset and from 1993 to 2003 in the 1993-2003 pooled dataset.  
In model 1, when comparing 1987 to 2003 (the 1987-2003 pooled dataset), a two-sided 
survey Tobit regression is applied to equation (3.1) because the fraction of trade credit paid late is 
bounded with zero and one-hundred. The value zero refers to firms that do not pay their trade credit 
late. The dependent variable Y in equation (3.1) is replaced with Y*, a latent variable that is observed 
for values greater than zero and censored otherwise and equation (3.1) is replaced with equation 
(3.2).  
(   )                             (   )      (   )                 
The observed Y is defined by the following equation (Greene, 2002).  
Y =      Y* if Y* > 0 
0 if Y* ≤ 0 
In model 1, when comparing 1993 to 2003 (the 1993-2003 pooled dataset), an ordered survey 
logit procedure is applied for equation (3.1) because in the 1993 SSBF dataset, the dependent 
variable, the percentage of trade credit paid late, is provided on a 1-5 categorical scale rather than on 
a continuous scale. To compare the year 1993 to 2003, the 2003 SSBF dataset is also recoded on a 
scale of 1 to 5.   
On the other hand, in model 2, for each pooled dataset, the 1987-2003 dataset and the 1993-
2003 dataset, a survey linear regression is applied for equation (3.1).   
The hypotheses for both models 1 and 2 are: 
(    )                
A rejection of the null hypothesis in (H3.1) implies that there is a significant magnitude 
change in the coefficient for the specified relationship variable from 1987 to 2003 in the 1987-2003 
pooled dataset and from 1993 to 2003 in the 1993-2003 pooled dataset.  
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(    )                 
(    )                
A rejection of the null hypothesis in (H3.2) implies that the specified relationship variable 
significantly explains the percentage of trade credit paid late or the LOC amounts in 1987 in the 
1987-2003 pooled dataset and in 1993 in the 1993-2003 pooled dataset.  A rejection of null 
hypothesis in (H3.3) indicates that the specified relationship variables significantly explain 
percentage of trade credit paid late or LOC amounts in 2003 but this study expects not to reject the 
null hypothesis in (H3.3). The expectation is that relationship variables that previously explained 
percentage of trade credit paid late or LOC amounts became insignificant in 2003. It is also possible 
that relationship variables stayed significant in 2003 (after the implementation of the SBCS) but 
coefficient signs of relationship variables are the opposite of what would be expected under effective 
relationships. For instance, in markets where relationships play a significant role (effective 
relationship lending), small businesses that have relationships with their lenders are expected to be 
less credit constrained and are also expected to get higher dollar amounts of loans than small 
businesses with no relationships. Firms that are less credit constrained will also be less likely to pay 
their trade credits late and pay a lower percentage of their trade credits late because they probably 
would not need the delays in the trade credit payments as an alternative source of financing. 
However, in markets where relationship lending is declining, one may also expect to see the opposite 
of what is expected under effective relationship lending. By analyzing these hypotheses, small banks 
can determine whether the power of relationship lending is declining.  
 
3.4 Variables 
 
 Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 3.4.3 describe variables under dependent variable, relationship 
variables, and firm, market, and contract characteristics, respectively. 
 
3.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 
 For model 1, the dependent variable is the percentage of trade credit paid late. In 1993, this 
information is available on a 1-5 categorical scale.  Scales 1 to 5 refer to categories of zero, less than 
half, about half, more than half, and almost all or all of trade credit paid late, respectively. On the 
other hand, in 1987 and 2003 this information is available in percentages. For model 1, when 
comparing the year 1993 to the year 2003, the variable percentage of trade credit in the 2003 SSBF 
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dataset is recoded on a 1-5 categorical scale in order to be consistent with the 1993 SSBF dataset. For 
model 1, when comparing the year 1987 to the year 2003, the variable percentage of trade credit is 
kept in its original form that is in percentages. For model 2, the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of dollar amount of LOCs granted to dollar amount of sales and expressed as 
continuous values for the 1987-2003 pooled dataset and the 1993-2003 pooled dataset. 
 
3.4.2 Relationship Variables  
 
The borrower-lender relationship variables are for the lender who provides the borrower’s 
most recent LOC. The LOCs are preferred over other loans because LOCs are provided on the basis 
of borrower-lender relationships. By focusing on firms that have recent LOCs, time periods for trade 
credit and loan are also matched with the time period for the relationship variables. 
Based on previous literature such as Petersen and Rajan (1994), under relationship lending 
and before the technological era, small businesses that can establish relationships with their lenders 
will do better at getting loans compared to small businesses that do not have relationships. Hence, a 
positive relation is expected between relationship variables and credit availability and loan amount. 
Moreover, according to Petersen and Rajan (1994), the fraction of a firm’s trade credit paid late is a 
good measure of how much the firm is credit constrained. For instance, a firm that is credit 
constrained is expected to pay more of its trade credit late and use the delays in the trade credit 
payments as an alternative source of financing. So, firms that are credit constrained are expected to 
pay a higher percentage of their trade credit late whereas firms that have long-term relations with 
their lenders pay a lower percentage of trade credit late and a negative relation is anticipated between 
the percentage of trade credit paid late and relationship variables. However, with recent technological 
advances, including adoption of SBCS after the mid-1990s, there has been an increase in small 
business lending based on hard-information based models. Thus, one would expect less 
differentiation between firms that have relations and firms that do not have relations in terms of 
credit availability and loan amount or a negative relation between relationship variables and credit 
availability and loan amount and a positive relation between relationship variables and percent of 
trade credit paid late.   
One way to measure the borrower-lender relationship is the distance between the small 
business and its lender. Before recent technological advances, a firm that was farther in distance from 
its lender was less likely to establish close relationships with its lenders because it was costlier to 
maintain a relationship at a farther distance. Hence, a small business at farther distance was expected 
67 
 
to have more difficulty obtaining credit, be more credit constrained and hence, to have a higher 
percentage of trade credit late. It was also likely that under relationship lending, a small business at a 
farther distance would have had lower dollar amounts of loans granted because a small business 
would have been considered to be riskier due to limited extraction of private firm information by the 
lender. After recent technological advances, one would expect higher credit availability and loan 
amounts to firms at a farther distance and these firms would also be expected to pay a lower 
percentage of trade credit late. Interestingly, the previous literature such as Berger et al (2005-a), 
Frame et al. (2001), and Frame et al. (2004) find that SBCS is associated with higher loan quantities, 
prices, and loan risks for loans under $100,000 due to reduced lending costs allowing lenders to 
expand their net lending with higher average risks. Additionally, DeYoung et al. (2008) argue that if 
scale economies, resulting from credit scoring models, make a marginal loan application more 
profitable, banks are encouraged to expand loan volume by approving riskier loans at the margin, 
reducing average credit quality. So, with the SBCS, larger banks are expected to lend to riskier firms 
who are outside of the banks’ local markets. One might expect a correlation between riskiness and 
the percentage of trade credit paid late. Thus, distance may also be positively related with percentage 
of trade credit paid late rather than a negative relation as previously mentioned. Distance is measured 
in miles and expressed as the natural logarithm of (1+distance) to account for the possible 
diminishing marginal effects of distance.52  
The duration of the relationship between the firm and its LOC provider also provides 
information about the strength of the borrower-lender relationships and about the likelihood for a 
firm to be credit constrained and the amount of loan it can get. The duration is measured by the 
variable length of relationship that is provided in terms of months within the SSBF dataset. The 
natural logarithm of (1+length of relationship) is used to account for the possibility of diminishing 
marginal effects of additional months of relationship on the value of information gained.53  
Other relationship variables are whether the firm has checking, savings or previous loan 
accounts with the recent LOC provider, or if it is getting financial management services from the 
lender that provided the recent LOC.54 Financial management services account includes transaction, 
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 If the distance is less than 0.5 miles, then the variable is coded as 0 in the dataset. Since ln (0) is undefined, ln 
(1+distance) is considered to avoid the missing values for these firms.  
53
 Firms that never did business with the lender prior to the recent loan, have 0 for the length of relationship variable 
within the dataset. Since ln (0) is undefined, ln (1+length of relationship) is included to avoid the missing values for 
these firms.  
54
 Some of the small businesses in the dataset do not have a checking account with their recent LOC provider. It is 
possible that those small businesses may be borrowing from non-depository financial institutions or larger banks or 
using checking account services from other lenders. 
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cash management, brokerage, card processing, trust & pension, or credit related services.55 Previous 
loan account includes credit, equipment, vehicle, mortgage, capital, or any other type of loans from 
the LOC provider. Each of these variables is measured by a dummy variable.56 Before recent 
technological advances, firms with checking accounts at small banks benefited from higher credit 
availability (Cole et al., 2004).57  
The strength of relationship can be also measured by whether the LOC provider is the firm’s 
single source of conducting financial relations and is measured by a dummy variable.58 Under 
relationship-based lending, firms that use a single financial source are expected to have stronger 
relations with their lenders because their lenders will not hesitate to invest in the relation. Cole 
(1998) suggests that the likelihood of extending credit declines with increases in the number of 
sources of financial services used by the firm. Before recent technological advances, if a firm used 
more than one source, it was likely that a lender would be hesitant to spend time in developing 
relationships with the firm and hence the likelihood of extending credit and loan amount was 
expected to decline.  
Another variable that measures the strength of the relationship is based on whether the firm 
provides audited financial statements. A firm that can afford to provide hard-information will also 
have borrowing opportunities from other lenders and will be less likely to depend on relationship-
based loans. With the recent improvements in technology, these firms are expected to pay a lower 
percentage of their trade credit late and to receive higher loan amounts over time. The information 
regarding whether the firm uses audited financial statements is only provided for the 2003 dataset. 
This information is not directly available in the 1987 and 1993 SSBF data. Instead, this study uses 
record type information as a way to develop proxies related to audited financial statements. The 
SSBF data asks whether the small business uses any records for the interview purposes and if yes, 
what type of records they use. If the firm used any type of records for interview purposes, it is 
                                                          
55
 Transaction services include obtaining paper money or coins, depositing or clearing checks or drafts from 
business customers, and making night deposits or wire transfers. Cash management services are managing 
businesses’ cash as well as providing lock-box services and sweep and zero balance accounts. Credit related services 
involve using banker’s acceptances, letters of credit, sales financing, or factoring. Trust services take into account 
managing 401K plans, pension funds, or business trusts. Card processing services include processing credit card 
receipts, signature based debit card or check card purchases, or PIN based debit card purchases.  
56
 All firms in the 1987 dataset have previous loans with the lender, thus this variable is not used for the 1987-2003 
pooled dataset. 
57
 Norden and Weber (2010) find that information on account activity improves default prediction models and is 
especially useful for monitoring small businesses and individuals. Moreover, firms with a checking account pay 
higher credit spreads on loans if the bank has obtained early warning indications from credit line usage and checking 
account about future borrower defaults.  
58
 In the 1987 dataset, all firms have multiple relations including lenders other than their LOC provider. So, this 
variable is dropped from the regressions for the 1987-2003 dataset. 
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measured by a dummy variable that equals to one, else zero. A firm with records compared to a firm 
without any records is expected to depend less on relationship-based loans. Then among the ones 
who use records, the dataset asks additional questions about the types of records used. This study 
only focuses on two types of records and measures them by two dummy variables, financial 
statements / accounting records and tax records. If a firm uses financial or accounting records, then it 
is more likely that the firm has audited financial statements. However, if the firm is using tax records, 
then it is more probable that the firm does not have financial audited statements and instead the 
lender uses tax return records as a reliable source to get information about the firm when lending to 
the firm.  
Another relationship variable is based on the method used to conduct business with the LOC 
provider. A dummy variable is created to determine whether the most frequent method used to 
conduct business is in person. This method is compared to methods such as through telephone, mail, 
wire/transfers, ATM or internet. If the method of conducting business is in person, then it is likely 
that the small business is in the early stages of a relationship with the lender and the lender does not 
have much information about the firm whereas the other methods represent circumstances where the 
lender has more information about the firm.  
 
3.4.3 Market, Firm, and Contract Characteristics   
 
The Herfindahl index is used as a proxy for market competition in banking for the region in 
which the small business is located. A dummy variable is created and equals to 1 if the Herfindahl 
index is greater than or equal to 1,800. A Herfindahl index greater than or equal to 1,800 indicates 
high concentration in the banking market. Increases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a 
decrease in competition and an increase in market power. Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that there is 
more relationship lending in more concentrated markets because banks invest in relationships when 
borrowers are less likely to find alternative future sources of credit. Before the emergence of SBCS, 
due to relationship lending, one would expect a firm to have more credit availability, be less credit 
constrained, and have higher loan amounts in concentrated markets.  
Firms in metropolitan areas might have different characteristics compared to firms in non-
metropolitan areas. To capture this effect, a dummy variable that equals to 1 is used for firms in 
metropolitan areas. Institution type is defined by a dummy that equals to 1 if the LOC provider is a 
non-depository financial institution or non-financial supplier, and 0 if the LOC provider is a 
depository financial institution. Han (2006) finds that compared to banks, non-banks generally make 
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equipment loans, vehicle loans, and mortgage loans whereas banks mostly focus on cash-based 
lending such as LOCs. Another difference is that each institution might have their own set of rules 
and regulations to follow. This might be a significant variable to include since lending practices and 
regulations for different types of institutions might be different and thus might have different effects 
on credit availability and loan amounts.  
An older firm is expected to be less credit constrained compared to a younger firm because 
more public information is available about this firm. Additionally, only a firm that has a good 
reputation can exist in the market for a long time, so one would expect an older firm to pay less of its 
trade credit late. The age variable also captures different stages of the life cycle for the firm. Based 
on different stages in a company’s life cycle, the firm’s use of loans might differ. Generally, an older 
firm is expected to be maturing in its resources and operations and have fewer loans. Firm age is 
measured by the number of years the firm is in existence or under current management. It is possible 
that the effect of each additional year of firm age decreases once a firm gets to a certain age; hence, 
age effect is measured by the natural logarithm of (1+age).59 
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s sales amount. A larger firm is 
presumably less credit constrained and pays less of its trade credit late (Berger et al., 2005-b and 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994). This variable is only used for the trade credit model. It is not included for 
the loan amount model because the dependent variable, loan amount per sales, in model 2 already 
accounts for the size effect.  
The attributes of firm ownership structure also help to explain credit availability and loan 
amount. Three types of organization structures are considered; corporation, proprietorship, and 
partnership. It is easier for corporations to raise capital compared to proprietorships and partnerships 
because corporations can issue preferred and common stocks. Because corporations do have access 
to more capital, one would expect corporations to pay a lower percentage of their trade credit late and 
also to demand a lower loan amount. On the other hand, it is also possible that corporations may have 
more credit rationing due to a corporation’s incentive to take on risky projects because of limited 
liability. The corporate organizational structure is the comparison basis.  
Firms in manufacturing, wholesale, retail, business services, and other (mining, 
transportation / public utilities, and finance / insurance industries) are compared to firms in 
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 Firms that have been established for less than one year have 0 for the age variable within the dataset. Since ln (0) 
is undefined, ln (1+age) is included to avoid the missing values for these firms.  
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construction.60 Different industries may use different sources of funds including trade credit 
depending on their industry structure (whether they have tangible or depreciable assets) and might 
also have different constraints when getting credit. For instance, Cole (2011) finds that firms in 
services, wholesale, and retail-trade industries are less likely to use credit. Also, among the firms that 
use trade credit, firms in service industries use lower amounts of trade credit. Moreover, if a firm 
pays its trade credit late, depending on the industry, the firm might be forced to pay cash for its future 
purchases or be declined for future supplies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). It may be worthwhile to 
evaluate the effects of industry on percentage of trade credit paid late and on the loan amount 
obtained. 
Credit availability and loan amounts are expected to be higher for firms with good credit 
quality. One measure of credit quality is signaled by education level of the owner and is measured in 
four dummy variables. The first category refers to owners with high school graduate or equivalent or 
less than high school degree. The second category is owners with some college education but no 
degree granted, associate degree with occupational / academic programs, or trade school / vocational 
program. The third category is owners with a college degree and the fourth category is owners with a 
post graduate degree. The comparison basis is owners with a post graduate degree. 
A firm with higher leverage is presumed to be riskier. One would expect a highly levered 
firm to be more credit constrained and also to pay a higher percentage of its trade credit late. Lenders 
would also be less willing to grant additional loan amounts for a highly levered firm. Leverage is 
measured by total amount of loans divided by total equity. To avoid any possible correlation and 
endogeneity between leverage ratio and the ratio of amount of LOC granted in models 1 and 2, the 
LOC amount is deducted from total amounts of loans. 
A firm with higher profitability is considered to be less risky for lenders and will be less 
credit constrained because lenders are more willing to lend to firms with higher profitability. This 
firm will also pay a lower percentage of its trade credit late because the firm can use the funds it 
generates from its operations to pay off its trade credits. It is also possible that as the firm’s 
profitability increases, the firm demands a lower amount of loans because it can use the funds it 
generates from its operations as an additional financing source. Profitability is measured by “Return 
on Assets (ROA)”, that is, operating profit divided by total assets.  
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 Because the proportion of firms in mining, transportation / public utilities, and finance / insurance industries is 
small, each of these categories is combined under the category of “other”. Mining has the fewest number of firms 
among these three categories.  
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Since in the SSBF dataset it is not possible to measure current ratio for a firm, this study 
instead uses current assets ratio. 61 A firm with a higher current assets ratio (current assets divided by 
total assets) can be inferred to be more liquid and also less risky. One would expect this firm to pay a 
lower percentage of its trade credit late and to obtain loans easier. It is also possible that the firm will 
need fewer loans due to higher current assets and hence will demand a lower amount of loan. For 
instance, in times when funds are needed, rather than borrowing, the firm may sell off its current 
assets to generate cash.  
A high accounts receivable collection period indicates a collection problem. A firm with 
higher accounts receivable collection period can use the delays in trade credit as an additional 
funding source. Thus, the firm is expected to pay a higher percentage of its trade credit late. A lender 
might also be willing to provide lower amounts of loans because the lender might consider the firm 
to be more risky compared to a firm that has a lower accounts receivable collection period. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that the firm may demand a higher loan amount because the firm may 
need additional funds due to delays in accounts receivable collection. This variable is measured with 
accounts receivable divided by daily sales. 
The Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) credit score is available for the 1998 and 2003 SSBF data 
and is also used as a measure of firm credit quality in the 1998-2003 regression models in the 
robustness section. The D&B credit score is expressed in 4 categories, ranging from the most risky to 
the least risky group. The comparison is based on the first category that is the most risky group. 
However, the 1987 and 1993 SSBF data do not have this information so the credit score is avoided 
for those regressions. 62  
Another credit quality measure is whether a firm is required to secure its LOC either by 
collateral or a guarantor. It is likely that if a firm is riskier, it will be asked to secure its loans (Brick 
and Palia, 2007). A firm that secures its loans is expected to get lower amounts of loans and pay a 
higher percentage of its trade credit late.63,64 On the other hand, Besanko and Thakor (1987) argue 
                                                          
61
 Current assets is the sum of cash, accounts receivable, inventory, and other current assets. This study cannot use 
the current ratio as an explanatory variable because in the publicly available SSBF dataset, it is not possible to 
distinguish between the current liabilities and the total liabilities. That is why, only the current assets ratio rather 
than the current ratio is used as an explanatory variable.  
62
 The 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 SSBF data also have information regarding “whether the owner and the firm has 
been delinquent on its personal or firm debt”, “whether the owner has been bankrupt in the last seven years”, and 
“whether there has been judgments against the owner in the last three years”. However, there is not much variation 
in the samples for these variables and hence, these variables are not included in the regressions. 
63
 Simultaneity between collateral and loan amount can to some extent be argued. Loan amount determines the 
collateral and guarantor requirements. It might well be that collateral also determines the loan amount. If there is not 
enough collateral, the lender might decide not to grant the loan or grant a loan amount that is lower than the 
requested loan amount. However, there might be circumstances where the lender might still grant the requested loan 
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that collateral requirements may act as a signaling process to reveal information about the lower risk 
for a borrower. For instance, a less risky borrower would be willing to provide more collateral 
compared to a riskier borrower because the less risky borrower will know that he will pay back the 
loan and not lose the collateral. 
Trade credit information is also used by lenders to measure firm credit quality characteristics. 
Two dummy variables are used for this purpose. The first dummy measures whether the firm uses 
trade credit and the second dummy measures whether the firm pays its trade credit late. These two 
variables are included for model 2 but avoided for model 1 because the dependent variable for model 
1 is the percentage of trade credit paid late.  
The amount of LOC granted might also be a signal for credit worthiness. This variable is 
measured by the ratio of LOC amount to sales amount. A higher ratio implies that a firm is less credit 
constrained and thus, is expected to pay a lower percentage of its trade credit late. This variable is 
used for model 1 but avoided for model 2 because in model 2 the dependent variable is the amount of 
LOC granted.  
 
3.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
  
The 2003 SSBF data has multiple imputations whereas the 1987 and 1993 SSBF have a 
single imputation. Since the SSBF dataset does not have multiple imputations for all years, the 2003 
SSBF data is not adjusted for multiple imputations and each imputation of 2003 is pooled separately 
with the 1987 and 1993 SSBF data. Regressions and descriptive statistics are run for each of these 
pooled datasets. Both the descriptive statistics and the regression results are consistent among each of 
the pooled datasets with different imputations for 2003. To be consistent with the discussion of 
results in a previous study by Durguner (2011), this study reports the results only for the pooled 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
amount even if the collateral is not enough based on the merits of the application and the relationship between the 
borrower and the lender. For instance, the lender might charge a higher interest rate to cover the potential risk for the 
gap between the collateral and the loan amount or the lender might have a good opinion about the borrower and may 
not demand collateral and still provide the requested loan amount. Hence, it may be argued that collateral and loan 
amount are to some extent simultaneously determined but this simultaneity issue is expected to be minor due to the 
fact that collateral plays some role but not to a great extent in determining loan amount. To check for this issue, 
collateral and guarantor requirements are dropped from the loan amount regression and similar coefficient values 
and standard errors are still obtained. Also, the correlation between securing the loan and loan amount is very small. 
Moreover, previous literature such as Berger et al (2005-b) uses both loan amount and collateral requirements in 
their regressions.  
64
 Petersen and Rajan (1997) also include the interest risk premium on the most recent loan as a measure of credit 
quality for their trade credit regressions. This study excludes this variable from the trade credit regressions because 
it would have required only focusing on LOCs with variable rates and hence, it would decrease the observation 
numbers in the sample. 
74 
 
dataset with imputation 3 for the 2003 dataset. The other imputation results are available upon 
request. The descriptive statistics displayed in Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 are also adjusted for 
weight information which is provided in the dataset. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report descriptive statistics for firms that have recently obtained LOCs and 
that have trade credit. Table 3.1 focuses on the sample from the 1987-2003 pooled dataset whereas 
Table 3.2 focuses on the sample from the 1993-2003 pooled dataset. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide 
descriptive statistics for firms that have recently obtained LOCs. Table 3.3 describes the sample from 
the 1987-2003 pooled dataset and Table 3.4 focuses on the sample from the 1993-2003 pooled 
dataset. Different than Tables 3.1 and 3.2, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 do not limit the sample to firms that 
have trade credit. Tables 3.1 through 3.4 also report t-test results for the null hypothesis that the 
difference between the two-period mean values is equal to zero.  
Based on Table 3.1, firms on average paid 14.111 and 15.893 percent of their trade credit late 
in 1987 and in 2003, respectively. The descriptive statistics on relationship variables show that the 
distance and the relationship length between firm and lender increased and significantly fewer firms 
had account relations with their lenders in 2003.  For instance, 96.7 percent of firms had checking 
accounts and 25.5 percent of firms had savings accounts in 1987 but only 83.8 percent of firms had 
checking accounts and 17.9 percent of firms had savings accounts in 2003. The percentage of firms 
who use their financial and tax return records for interview purposes also decreased from 37 percent 
to 21 percent and from 34.7 percent to 22 percent, respectively from 1987 to 2003. Additionally, 
fewer firms used the personal method of conducting business with their lenders in 2003. In 1987, it 
was 86.4 percent of firms that preferred a personal method of conduct but in 2003, it was 71.7 
percent of firms. Some of these above mentioned descriptive statistics indicate a decline in the use of 
relationships and signal a movement towards hard-information based lending methods in 2003.  
There are also significant differences in the mean values of non-relationship variables. For 
instance, there were more firms borrowing from non-depository or non-financial suppliers in 2003, 
which is consistent with the expectations that small businesses have started borrowing from lenders 
other than small banks. There were also more firms in the business services industry, but fewer firms 
in the retail trade industry in 2003. Average leverage ratio for a firm decreased from 1.237 in 1987 to 
-0.187 in 2003 whereas the average profitability ratio increased from 0.326 in 1987 to 0.859 in 2003. 
Only 67.7 percent of firms had to secure their LOCs in 1987 whereas 77.8 percent of firms had to 
secure their LOCs in 2003. The ratio of LOC to sales also increased from 0.149 in 1987 to 0.216 in 
2003. 
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Based on Table 3.2, the length of relationship between firm and lender increased from 1993 
to 2003. The proportion of firms that had previous loan accounts and that used financial management 
services from their lenders increased, from 83.7 percent in 1993 to 92.8 percent in 2003 and from 
39.3 percent in 1993 to 58.7 percent in 2003, respectively. On the other hand, fewer firms had 
savings accounts with their lenders. It was 26.3 percent of firms that had savings account in 1993 but 
17.9 percent of firms in 2003. The proportion of firms that used their tax return records for interview 
purposes declined from 1993 to 2003; it was 30.2 percent of firms in 1993 but only 21.8 percent of 
firms in 2003. The decline in the savings account and in the percent of firms that used tax return 
records in 2003 also indicate a decline in relationship and an increase in hard-information based 
lending methods.  
Fewer firms are located in concentrated markets; it was 54.4 percent of firms in 1993 but 
42.4 percent of firms in 2003. This might signal that more lenders started lending to small businesses 
and the markets have become more competitive. More firms were in the business services industry 
but fewer firms were in the wholesale trade industry in 2003. The proportion of shareholders with 
education less than high school increased from 18.1 percent in 1993 to 24.6 percent in 2003. The 
average profitability of firms increased from 0.367 in 1993 to 0.861 in 2003. Also, the accounts 
receivable collection period went down from an average of 44 days in 1993 to 29 days in 2003.   
Descriptive results in Table 3.3 are similar to those found in Table 3.1. Two variables, trade 
credit and trade credit paid late, are worth mentioning since those two variables are not included in 
Table 3.1 because they are not part of model 1. Only 89.8 percent of firms had trade credit and 55.7 
percent of firms paid their trade credit late in 1987 whereas 77.8 percent of firms had trade credit and 
37.8 percent of firms paid their trade credit late in 2003. Similarly, the descriptive results in Table 3.4 
resemble those from Table 3.2. In addition to results in Table 3.2, the proportion of firms that paid 
their trade credit late decreased from 52 percent in 1993 to 37.8 percent in 2003. The decreases in the 
percent of trade credit paid late might signal that small businesses had more credit availability in 
2003 and were able to afford to pay off more of their trade credits on time.  
 
3.6 Results 
 
All regression results are based on at least the 10 percent significance level. Specific 
significance levels are available in tables. The regression results validate that borrower-lender 
relationships are becoming less significant over time in lending to small businesses. One possible 
explanation might be that with improvements in technology and wider use of personal computers, it 
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became easier for borrowers to communicate with lenders at a farther distance. Additionally, lenders 
were able to benefit from hard-information based lending models such as SBCS models and thus, the 
market for small business lending has become more competitive by lenders that are farther in 
distance and that are advantaged in hard information. Additionally, over the two decades from 1984-
2003 with the consolidation of the banking system, the number of small banks started decreasing and 
larger banks that are advantaged in hard-information based lending models started to dominate the 
banking sector. However, the model’s purpose is not to explain the reasons but just to evaluate the 
changes in lending structure for small businesses. Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 explain the regression 
results in detail.  
 
3.6.1 Regression Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late 
  
 Sections 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 provide regression results for percentage of trade credit paid late 
on relationship variables for the periods 1987-2003 and 1993-2003, respectively. 
 
3.6.1.1 Survey Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late for 1987-2003 
 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report the Tobit regression results for percentage of trade credit paid late 
and compares the year 1987 to 2003. Specifically, Table 3.5 displays the average marginal effects of 
Pr [0 ≤Y], how the probability of paying trade credit late (being uncensored) changes with respect to 
the regressors. Table 3.6 shows the marginal effects of the censored expected value E[Y], how the 
observed percentage of trade credit paid late changes with respect to the regressors, for observations 
(censored or uncensored) randomly drawn from the population. A t-test is also applied to test 
whether the two periods’ marginal effects are significantly different from each other. The t-test 
results give information regarding whether there has been a significant magnitude change in the 
average marginal effects for the explanatory variables and these t-test results are also reported in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that in 2003, lenders started lending to firms at a farther distance 
but that are riskier. Distance was significant in explaining percentage of trade credit paid late in 2003 
even though it was not statistically significant in 1987.  A firm that is 15 miles away versus 10 miles 
away from its lender was 1.162 percent more likely to pay its trade credit late and also paid 0.672 
percent more of its trade credit late in 2003.65 Thus, one can conclude that firms that are farther in 
                                                          
65
 (ln(1+15)-ln(1+10))*0.031*100 = 1.162 percent, (ln(1+15)-ln(1+10))*1.794 = 0.672 percent 
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distance were riskier because one would expect riskier firms to be more likely to pay their trade 
credit late and similarly pay a higher percent of their trade credit late. This result is in fact consistent 
with previous literature findings. Berger et al. (2005-a), Frame et al. (2001), and Frame et al. (2004) 
find that with SBCS, lenders started lending to riskier borrowers because they can compensate the 
losses from loans through increased efficiencies in the loan approval and loan monitoring stages.  
A firm that has a checking account compared to a firm without any checking account was 
13.6 percent more likely to pay its trade credit late and paid 7.058 percent more of its trade credit late 
in 2003 whereas this variable did not explain percentage of trade credit paid late in 1987.66 This 
positive effect in 2003 can be attributed to the decline in the importance of relationships. Under 
effective relationship lending, a firm that can develop relations with its lender is expected to be less 
credit constrained and pay a lower percent of its trade credit late because the firm can use the funds 
to pay for its trade credit on time. If relationships are no longer as important, then it is possible that 
the firm, even if it has a checking account, is more credit constrained and thus might pay a higher 
percentage of its trade credit late. Another explanation is that with SBCS, riskier firms started 
borrowing. It is possible that these riskier firms might also have checking accounts with their lenders 
and may also pay a higher percentage of their trade credit late.  
In 1987, a firm that has a savings account with its lender was 17 percent less likely to pay its 
trade credit late and paid 9.015 percent less of its trade credit late than a firm without a savings 
account. This result is consistent with the expectation that a firm who has a relationship with its 
lender in 1987 is less credit constrained and pays a lower percentage of its trade credit late but this 
variable lost its significance in 2003.  
The variable, any records, was not statistically significant in explaining percentage of trade 
credit paid late in 1987. However, it became significant in 2003. Compared to a firm that does not 
use any records, a firm that uses records for interview purposes was 8.1 percent less likely to pay its 
trade credit late and paid 4.778 percent less of its trade credit late in 2003. Firms that have records 
might use less relationship-based loans since they can access different borrowing sources due to the 
ability to provide some source of hard information about the firm. Under effective relationship 
lending, firms that do not have relationship-based loans are expected to be more credit constrained. 
                                                          
66 Only 3.3 percent of firms in 1987 do not have a checking account with their lender but this variable is not dropped 
from the regressions since it does not inflate other regression results. A similar situation exists for the variable: non-
depository financial institution or family. Only 1 percent of firms in 1987 got their loans from a non-depository 
financial institution or family.  However, this variable is also not dropped from the regression because it does not 
inflate the regression results for other variables. 
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But, the regression results support the hypothesis that firms that use some type of a record became 
less credit constrained and paid lower percentages of their trade credit late in 2003.  
Similarly, the variable, financial records for interview purposes, also supports the result 
regarding the variable, any records. If a firm uses financial records for interview purposes, this may 
signal that the firm is more likely to have audited financial statements. Hence, the firm is less likely 
to depend on relationship-based loans because it can afford to provide hard information about the 
firm and can borrow from a variety of lenders such as larger banks or non-depository financial 
institutions. In 1987, a firm that used financial records for interview purposes was 13.4 percent more 
likely to pay its trade credit late and also paid 8.112 percent more of its trade credit late than a firm 
with no financial records. The magnitudes of the marginal effects for the variable, financial records, 
decreased from 1987 to 2003. Additionally, the variable financial records, was not significant in 
2003. The results regarding financial records in 1987, in a way support the findings of Berger et al 
(2005-b);  that is larger banks depend more on financial records when lending and small businesses 
that borrow from larger banks are hence more credit constrained compared to firms that borrow from 
smaller banks that are better at processing soft information. Moreover, the variable, tax return 
records, became significant in 2003 even though this variable was not significant in 1987. If a firm 
uses tax return records for interview purposes, this might signal that the firm depends more on 
relations compared to a firm that uses financial records or any other records. In 2003, a firm that used 
tax return records was 9.6 percent more likely to pay its trade credit late and paid 6.025 percent more 
of its trade credit late. This result supports the hypothesis that a firm that is more likely to do 
relationship-based loans was more credit constrained in 2003.  
In 2003, a firm that personally contacts its lender was 9 percent more likely to pay its trade 
credit late and paid 4.93 percent more of its trade credit late than a firm that uses other methods of 
conducting business. The magnitudes of the marginal effects for the variable, method of conducting 
business, increased from 1987 to 2003. If a firm’s method of conducting business is in person, this 
signals that the firm does relationship-based borrowing. Especially, this would happen at the early 
stages of a relationship. Hence, under declining relationship lending, it is expected that these firms 
will be more credit constrained in 2003. In summary, the relationship variables suggest that the 
importance of relationships in lending to small businesses declined in 2003.  
Regression results regarding non-relationship explanatory variables also support the 
hypothesis. For instance, compared to a firm in a competitive banking market, a firm in a 
concentrated banking area was 9 percent less likely to be credit constrained and paid 5.246 percent 
less of its trade credit late in 1987 but was 7.9 percent more likely to pay its trade credit late and also 
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paid 4.643 percent more of its trade credit late in 2003. The magnitude of the marginal effects for the 
Herfindahl index variable decreased in 2003. The results regarding the Herfindahl index for year 
1987 confirms the findings of Petersen and Rajan (1995); that is, there is more relationship lending in 
concentrated markets and firms in concentrated markets are less credit constrained compared to firms 
in competitive markets. However, firms in concentrated markets became more credit constrained in 
2003. 
Compared to a corporation, a firm with proprietorship organizational form is expected to be 
more limited in terms of obtaining funding because a corporation can raise capital through issuing 
common or preferred stock whereas a proprietorship is expected to depend more on loans or inside 
funding. Due to limited funds, a proprietorship is expected to have a higher probability of paying its 
trade credit late and also to pay a higher percentage of its trade credit late. In 2003, compared to a 
corporation, a proprietorship was 20.3 percent more likely to pay its trade credit late and paid 13.743 
percent more of its trade credit late. The magnitudes of marginal effects for proprietorship also 
increased in 2003.  
Older firms were less credit constrained in 1987. A firm that was in the wholesale or retail 
industry was also less credit constrained in 1987 and a firm in the other industries was less credit 
constrained in 2003, compared to a firm in the construction industry.  
As the firm experiences delays in its accounts receivables, the firm was more likely to pay its 
trade credit late and also paid more of its trade credit late both in 1987 and in 2003. Most likely, the 
firm used delays in paying trade credit to compensate for the higher time required to collect for their 
accounts receivable. A firm that was asked to secure its LOC was 17.5 percent more likely to pay its 
trade credit late and paid 9.021 percent more of its trade credit late in 2003. It is possible that a risky 
firm is asked to secure its LOC and one would expect a risky firm to pay its trade credit late. The 
magnitude of the marginal effects for the variable, secured LOC, also increased in 2003. It is 
important that the variable, secured LOC, became significant in 2003 even though it was not 
significant in 1987 because secured LOC might be considered as a hard-information based variable. 
Furthermore, both in 1987 and in 2003, for each additional increment of increase in the LOC ratio, 
the firm was less likely to pay its trade credit late and paid a lower percentage of its trade credit late. 
Being able to receive higher loan amounts from a lender can signal that a firm has a higher credit 
quality and a better reputation and thus, the firm might be better at obtaining funds. Then, the firm 
might use these funds to pay for its trade credit on time.  
 
80 
 
3.6.1.2 Survey Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late for 1993-2003 
 
Table 3.7 shows the average marginal effects for outcome 3 (paying about half of trade credit 
late) from running survey ordered logit for percentage of trade credit paid late and compares the year 
1993 to 2003. Marginal effects for other outcomes are available in Tables C.1 through C.4 in 
Appendix C. A t-test is also applied to test whether the two periods’ marginal effects are significantly 
different from each other. 
A firm that was 15 miles away from its lender versus 10 miles away was 0.262 percent more 
likely to pay about half of its trade credit late in 2003.67 Additionally, there is statistically a 
significant magnitude increase for the distance variable in 2003 even though the magnitude is 
economically not significant. This result confirms the previous results from section 3.6.1.1 and 
conforms with the relationship literature that with SBCS, lenders started lending to riskier customers.  
In 1993, as the length of the relationship between the firm and the lender increased, the firm 
was less likely to pay half of its trade credit late. For instance, a firm with 3 months of relationship 
with its lender was 0.489 percent less likely to pay half of its trade credit late compared to a firm with 
2 months of relationship.68 This result implies that firms that have more relationships with their 
lenders were less credit constrained in 1993. In 2003, the variable length of relationship was no 
longer statistically significant.  
A firm that had a checking account with its lender compared to one that did not have a 
checking account was approximately 3.7 and 3 percent more likely to pay about half of its trade 
credit late in 1993 and in 2003, respectively, but the decrease in the magnitudes of the marginal 
effects is not statistically significant. One would expect checking account to indicate the intensity of 
borrower-lender relationships because checking accounts are profitable instruments for lenders to 
generate funds. Under effective relationship-based lending, a firm with a checking account is 
expected to be less credit constrained because it will be more convenient for the bank to lend money 
to this firm. With funds borrowed, the firm is expected to pay for its trade credit on time. However, 
in 1993, unlike expectations, these firms were more credit constrained and were more likely to pay 
their trade credit late. One possible reason for this is that through a checking account, the lender can 
follow firm activities and learn about the true nature of the firm and in fact, the firm can be a risky 
one and hence, be credit constrained. Once the firm experiences credit difficulties, it would be also 
more likely for this firm to be late on its trade credits and use the delay in trade credits as an 
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 (ln(1+15)-ln(1+10))*0.007*100 = 0.262 percent 
68
 (ln(1+3)-ln(1+2))*0.017*100 = 0.489 percent 
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additional funding source. On the other hand, the result for 2003 confirms that a firm that had a 
checking account was more credit constrained. The year 2003 is the time period when the SBCS 
models became popular and it is possible that firms without checking accounts were able to borrow 
more funds on the basis of hard-information they provided.    
A lender will prefer to use tax return records if the firm does not have financial statements or 
accounting records. Hence if a firm uses tax return records for interview purpose this might indicate 
that the firm is more likely to use relationship-based loans. A firm that used tax return records was 
2.3 percent less likely to pay about half of its trade credit late in 1993, compared to a firm that does 
not use tax return records. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms that establish relationships 
with their lenders are less credit constrained. The magnitude for the tax return records variable 
declined in 2003. However, in 2003, these firms were more credit constrained. In summary, the 
results regarding relationship variables overall suggest that the importance of relationships in lending 
to small businesses declined in 2003. 
Results regarding non-relationship explanatory variables are similar to those from Tables 3.5 
and 3.6. For instance, firms in concentrated markets, firms with proprietorship organizational form, 
firms with higher accounts receivable collection periods, and firms that need to secure their LOCs 
were more likely to pay half of their trade credits late in 2003. Additionally, for each 100 percent 
increase in LOC ratio, the firm was 0.01 percent more and 3.1 percent less likely to pay about half of 
its trade credit late in 1993 and in 2003, respectively. Moreover, firms in wholesale trade, retail trade, 
and other industries were less likely to pay half of their trade credit late both in 1993 and in 2003. 
A firm that received its LOC from a non-depository or a non-financial supplier was 7.6 
percent more likely to pay about half of its trade credit late in 1993. Previous literature finds that 
non-depository institutions are more likely to lend on hard-information. Hence, this result conforms 
with the hypothesis that a firm that is not involved in a relationship will be more credit constrained in 
1993. Moreover, a firm with higher profitability was less credit constrained in 2003.   
 
3.6.2 Survey Linear Regression Results for the Ratio of Granted LOC to Sales 
 
 Sections 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2 provide survey linear regression results for the LOC ratio on 
relationship variables for the periods 1987-2003 and 1993-2003, respectively. 
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3.6.2.1 Survey Linear Regression Results for1987-2003 
 
Table 3.8 displays the regression results from the survey linear regression of the ratio of 
granted LOC to sales and compares the year 1987 to 2003. Table 3.8 suggests that firms at a farther 
distance were granted lower amounts of LOC in 1987. For each 1 percent increase in (1 + distance), a 
firm’s LOC ratio was 0.12 percent lower in 1987. This result supports the hypothesis that small 
businesses that are farther away from lenders have less access to credit because lenders cannot afford 
to get into relationships with these borrowers due to distance and the lender considers the firm to be 
riskier due to limited extraction of private information about the firm. However, in 2003 this variable 
became insignificant in explaining loan amount and indicates that in 2003 firms that are farther away 
from their lenders did not obtain statistically significant different LOC amounts compared to firms 
that are in closer proximity to their lenders. It is possible that with all the technological developments 
and improvements in SBCS, even though the firm is farther away, the lenders were still able to obtain 
information about the firm and lenders based their lending decisions on the hard-information 
obtained.   
A firm that had a checking account with its lender had a 62.167 percent lower LOC ratio in 
1987.69 There was also a significant decline in the magnitude of the coefficient for the checking 
account variable in 2003 but the checking account variable was not significant in explaining loan 
amount in 2003. The negative effect for checking account in 1987 is unexpected. The expectation is 
that in 1987, a firm with a checking account would have a higher LOC ratio. One possible 
explanation for the negative effect in 1987 is that through a checking account, the lender can know 
more about the cash activities for a firm and hence, learn about the true nature of the firm. If the firm 
is riskier, the lender may give a lower LOC amount. 
In 2003, a firm’s LOC ratio was 30.372 percent lower if the firm had a savings account 
compared to a firm with no savings account with its lender.70  Under effective relationship lending, 
one would expect a positive relation between savings account and loan amount. However, in 2003 
the regression results show a negative relation. This result suggests that even if the firm has a savings 
account with the lender, it does not necessarily receive higher amounts of LOCs because savings 
account with the firm might not really provide any additional information for the borrower or that the 
firm might have a lower need for a LOC.  
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 (e^(-0.972)-1)*100 = -62.167 percent 
70
 (e^(-0.362)-1)*100 = -30.372 percent 
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If a firm uses tax return records to answer interview questions, this may imply that the firm 
does not have financial statements that it can refer to and the firm uses more relationship-based loans. 
This variable was significant in 1987 but lost significance in 2003. A firm that uses tax return records 
was granted a 56.518 percent higher LOC ratio in 1987.71 This result is consistent with expectations 
under effective relationship lending. Moreover, the insignificance of tax return record in 2003 
suggests that there was not really statistically a significant difference between firms that use tax 
return records and firms that do not use tax return records. This might indicate that relationships did 
not matter so much in 2003. Additionally, the time interaction dummy shows that the magnitude for 
the tax return records variable declined in 2003. The results regarding relationship variables in 
general support the hypothesis that relationships were less significant in lending to small businesses 
in 2003. 
In 2003, a firm that had a proprietorship organizational form had a 50.381 percent higher 
LOC ratio compared to a firm that had a corporate organizational form.72 One explanation is that it is 
easier for corporations to raise capital from different sources whereas for a proprietorship most of 
their funds will come through inside funding or loans and hence, their loan demand might be higher 
than a corporation. Moreover, firms in manufacturing or business services industries had a higher 
LOC ratio in 2003 and their coefficient magnitudes also increased in 2003.   
A firm with a higher leverage ratio was granted a lower LOC ratio both in 1987 and in 2003. 
Since higher leverage ratio might indicate riskiness from the lender side, the lender might prefer to 
lend smaller loan amounts to the firm. Profitability was a significant variable in explaining LOC ratio 
in 2003 even though this variable was not statistically significant in 1987. More profitable firms had 
lower LOC ratio. It is possible that these firms used their profits as sources of funds and hence, 
needed smaller loan amounts. On the other hand, both in the years 1987 and 2003, firms with 
collection problems had a higher LOC ratio because they might have needed more loans to cover 
their financial needs during collection periods. The time interaction for the accounts receivable 
collection period shows that the coefficient magnitude for this variable declined in 2003.  
Both in 1987 and in 2003, a firm that secured its LOC had 55.116 percent and 67.867 percent 
higher LOC ratios than a firm that did not secure its LOC, respectively.73 By securing the LOC, the 
borrower signals to the lender that he is willing to pay back the loan and he is a good quality 
borrower. The lender also minimizes its risk by securing the LOC. Thus, the lender might be willing 
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to lend higher amounts. However, the increase in the magnitude of LOC ratio in 2003 is not 
statistically significant. A firm that had trade credit had a 36.745 percent lower LOC ratio in 2003.74 
Since the firm used trade credit, its demand for loans might have been less. The coefficient 
magnitude for the trade credit variable also increased in 2003. If a firm pays trade credit late, the 
lender can use this information as a measure of low credit quality. For instance, a firm that pays trade 
credit late had 30.650 percent and 25.472 percent lower LOC ratios in 1987 and in 2003, 
respectively.75 However, the decrease in the magnitude in 2003 for the variable, paying trade credit 
late, is not statistically significant.  
 
3.6.2.2 Survey Linear Regression Results for1993-2003 
 
Similar to Table 3.8, Table 3.9 presents the regression results from the survey linear 
regression of the ratio of granted LOC to sales on relationship variables but compares the year 1993 
to 2003. In Table 3.9, the variable, length of relationship, significantly explained LOC ratio in 1993 
but its magnitude effect declined in 2003 and it was also not statistically significant in explaining the 
LOC ratio in 2003. However, the sign for length of relationship for year 1993 is unexpected. For 
each 1 percent increase in (1+length of relationship), the firm received a 0.182 percent lower LOC 
ratio in 1993. Under strong relationships, one would expect a higher LOC ratio for additional months 
of relationship. One explanation for this negative sign is that through interactions with the borrower, 
the lender realizes that the firm is actually riskier and the lender might actually lower the LOC ratio.  
Consistent with findings in Table 3.8, the variable savings account, became significant in 
2003. A firm that had a savings account received a 29.883 percent lower LOC ratio than a firm with 
no savings relation with its lender in 2003.76 Moreover, a firm with a previous loan account with its 
lender received a 49.631 percent higher LOC ratio in 1993.77 Previous loan account may actually 
stand as a measure of credit quality. The lender can use the information about borrower performance 
regarding previous loans when they are granting loans. In general, the results regarding relationship 
variables suggest that the importance of relationships in lending to small businesses declined in 2003. 
The results regarding non-relationship explanatory variables are also similar to those from 
Table 3.8. A proprietorship firm received a 49.182 percent higher LOC ratio in 2003 but this variable 
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did not help to explain LOC ratio in 1993.78 Firms in manufacturing and business services industries 
received higher LOC ratios than firms in the construction industry in 2003.  
In terms of credit quality characteristics, a firm that had an owner with a high school degree, 
associate degree, and college degree received 35.403 percent, 35.144 percent, and 34.164 percent 
lower LOC ratios in 1993, compared to a firm that had an owner with a post-graduate degree, 
respectively.79 A firm with a higher leverage ratio received a lower LOC ratio in 2003. Most 
probably, the firm had elevated loan amounts and was considered risky by the lender. Firms with 
higher profitability also received lower LOC ratios in 2003. Firms with a higher current assets ratio 
received lower LOC ratios in 1993, which might be explained by the liquidity of the firm and less 
need for loans. Firms with higher account collection periods received higher LOC ratios in 1993, 
probably to compensate for the need of funds at times before the collection period. Firms that secured 
their LOCs were granted higher LOC ratios both in 1993 and in 2003. Additionally, in 2003, a firm 
that had a trade credit had a 39.468 percent lower LOC ratio compared to a firm that did not have a 
trade credit.80 In 2003, a firm that paid its trade credit late also obtained a 24.270 percent lower LOC 
ratio than a firm that did not pay its trade credit late.81  
In conclusion, the results from four regressions indicate that firms that have relationships 
with their lenders were less credit constrained and had higher loan amounts in 1987 and 1993. 
However, in 2003, firms that have relationships were more credit constrained and had lower loan 
amounts. The regression results validate that small business lending structure changed over time and 
borrower-lender relationships are becoming less significant over time. Even though it is not the 
purpose of the study to explain the reasoning behind the changes in the lending structure, some of the 
reasons might still be mentioned. One possible explanation is that with technological improvements 
and use of SBCS models after the mid and late 1990s, lenders were able to use hard-information in 
their lending decisions. That is why, in 2003, even if firms did not have relationships with their 
lenders, they were still able to get higher credit availability and higher loan amounts, because these 
firms most probably were able to provide hard information about the firm. Additionally, over the two 
decades of 1984-2003, with the consolidation of the banking system, larger banks that are 
advantaged in hard-information based lending models started to dominate the banking sector. Since 
larger banks may have higher lending limits compared to small banks, it is possible that in 2003 
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credit availability and loan amounts were greater for small businesses, especially if these firms 
borrowed from larger banks. 
 
3.7 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
 In addition to the above results, borrower-lender relationship variables are subjected to PCA. 
The purpose is to determine whether borrower-lender relationship variables can be expressed in 
smaller dimensions that will capture an overall effect of borrower-lender relationships on credit 
availability and on the LOC amount granted, rather than having different effects for each relationship 
variable. However, the PCA indicates that the nature of relationship variables in the dataset is such 
that they are independent from each other and hence, it becomes harder to categorize relationship 
variables. Thus the PCA is not very efficient.   
Rather than using PCA to decrease the dimension of relationship variables, Berger and Black 
(2011) develop an index of relationship by combining three relationship variables under subjective 
cutoff points for: length of relationship, checking account, and whether the bank is the firm’s 
exclusive lender.82 Because the relationship variables that are used in this study are more extensive, it 
is harder to establish an index of relationship that will capture most of the variance in the sample, as 
in Berger and Black (2011). Even if this index could be created, the PCA should also be able to 
capture at least the same information. This study prefers to apply PCA to analyze whether a smaller 
dimension of relationship variables can be determined. The PCA eigen decomposition is based on the 
Pearson correlation matrix from the borrower-lender relationship variables. 83  
To decide on the number of leading components to keep from the eigen decomposition, three 
criteria are used. The first criterion is the “eigenvalue one” criterion (Kaiser, 1960). In the dataset, 
only three components have eigen values greater than one, but they account for only 45 to 50 percent 
of the total variation from the Pearson correlation matrix.84 These results are available upon request. 
The second criterion is the scree plot test of the eigenvalues (Cattell, 1966). The scree plot test shows 
component 4 as the first break between the components with large eigenvalues and those with small 
                                                          
82
 Berger and Black (2011) define a relationship as strong if relationship length is greater than 10 years and the firm 
has either relationship breadth or exclusivity or both. They define a relationship as medium if relationship length is 
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over Polychoric correlation matrix.  
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eigenvalues. However, after component 4 the scree plot is not really flat but shows further steady 
declines. The scree plot results are also available upon request.  The third criterion is based on the 
cumulative proportion of variance. Researchers usually retain enough components so that the 
cumulative percent of variation accounts for at least 70 to 80 percent. The purpose of the study is to 
account for enough variation with the smallest dimensions of relationship variables; hence, 
components that account for a total proportion of variance of approximately 80 percent are retained.  
The interpretation of non-rotated components is usually quite difficult and the general 
tendency is to rotate the component solutions. This study applies varimax rotation to the 
components.85 Then, the component loadings from each of the leading components are used to create 
a series of uncorrelated artificial variables that explain 80 percent of the variation in the sample for 
the relationship variables. These newly constructed variables are then used as explanatory variables 
in the regressions.   
Tables 3.10, 3.13, 3.15, and 3.17 provide the varimax rotated principal components along 
with their variances and their component loadings. If the component loading for a variable in a 
certain component is greater than 0.40, then the variable is considered to play a significant role in 
that particular component. As observed from Tables 3.10, 3.13, 3.15, and 3.17, the PCA results are 
not so strong. For instance, the results would have been stronger if 90 percent of the total variation 
was accounted for with a fewer number of the components but in the dataset, it is only possible to 
retain 80 percent of the total variation with six to seven components. Secondly, PCA theory suggests 
that at least three variables should have significant loadings on each retained component. However, 
the components in each PCA for the dataset are explained with two distinguishing variable and the 
last two components in each PCA are explained with only one distinguishing variable. So, the PCA 
results can be concluded not to be strong. It is also worth noting that even if principal factor analysis 
with the principal components method is applied, the PCA results do not change much.  
In both of the datasets, 1987-2003 and 1993-2003, six to seven components explain 
approximately 80 percent of the variation and hence these six to seven components are used to 
construct new artificial relationship variables. Since it is not possible to label each of the artificial 
variables under specific relationship characteristics, this study will identify them as components 1 
through 7. Components 1 through 7 are then used as explanatory variables in the Tobit, ordered logit, 
and linear regressions. Because the results with respect to control variables (non-relationship 
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explanatory variables) are very similar to the original regressions results, only the results for 
components 1 through 7 are provided in the tables. 
Table 3.10 provides information about the varimax rotated components and their component 
loadings for the 1987-2003 dataset in model 1. The regression results with the artificial variables 
(components 1 through 6) for the Tobit in model 1 for the years 1987 and 2003 are provided in 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12. Components 2 and 6 were statistically significant in the year 1987 whereas 
components 2 and 5 were statistically significant in the year 2003. By referring to Table 3.10, 
component 2 captures information about using records, specifically financial records, component 5 is 
mostly explained by the length of relationship, and component 6 contains information about savings 
account. The results in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 support the hypothesis that importance of relationships 
has declined over time, except for component 5. As component 5 increased by 1 unit, the probability 
of paying trade credit late decreased by 4.6 percent and the percentage of trade credit paid late 
decreased by 2.680 percent in 2003. This suggests that with each additional month of relationship, 
the firm paid a lower percentage of trade credit late, supporting that relationships were still important 
in 2003.    
Table 3.13 provides information about the varimax rotated components and their component 
loadings for the 1993-2003 dataset for model 1. Table 3.14 shows the ordered logit regression results 
with the artificial variables (components 1 through 7) for outcome 3. Results for outcomes 1, 2, 4, 
and 5 are available upon request. Component 3, information about length of relationship and 
financial management service account, was statistically significant in 1993 and component 2, 
information about financial records, was statistically significant in 2003. Component 5, information 
about tax return records, was statistically significant in 2003. The signs for all the artificial variables 
are as expected and support the hypothesis that importance of relationship has decreased over time. 
Table 3.15 provides information about the varimax rotated components and their component 
loadings for the 1987-2003 dataset for model 2. Table 3.16 displays the linear regression results with 
the artificial variables (components 1 through 6) for model 2 and compares the year 1987 to 2003. 
For each additional unit increase in component 3, which provides information about tax records, the 
LOC ratio of the firm increased by 9.636 percent in 1987 whereas for each additional unit increase in 
component 6, which mainly provides information about savings account, the LOC ratio decreased by 
14.015 percent in 2003.86 These results are consistent with the expectations about decreases in the 
effects of relationship lending on loan amounts granted. 
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Table 3.17 provides information about the varimax rotated components and their component 
loadings for the 1993-2003 dataset in model 2. Table 3.18 provides the linear regression results with 
the artificial variables (components 1 through 7) for model 2 and compares the year 1993 to 2003. 
Referring to Table 3.17, component 1 provides information about distance and method of conducting 
business. Component 3 gathers information about checking and previous loan account. Component 7 
incorporates the savings account information. In Table 3.18, for each additional unit increase in 
components 1 and 3, the firm’s LOC ratio decreased by 16.556 percent and increased by 9.527 
percent respectively in 1993 and for each additional unit increase in component 7, the firm LOC ratio 
decreased by 14.530 percent in 2003.87 The result regarding component 1 contradicts the hypothesis 
that effect of relationship has decreased over time whereas the result regarding components 3 and 7 
confirm the hypothesis. A possible explanation for component 1 is that the lender might obtain 
information about the true nature of firm and hence provide the loan amounts based on that 
information. If the firm is riskier, then this might be the reason why firms were granted a lower LOC 
ratio in 1993.  
 In conclusion, the results from PCA are similar to the original results and they mostly suggest 
that firms that establish relationships were less credit constrained and obtained a higher LOC ratio 
before 2003 whereas they were more credit constrained and had a lower LOC ratio in 2003. 
However, for the 1987-2003 dataset, component 5 in Tables 3.11 and 3.12, which is heavily 
concentrated on length of relationship, contradicts the original results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Even if 
length of relationship was not statistically significant in the original regressions for the 1987-2003 
dataset (not significant in either 1987 or 2003), the PCA results find a negative relation between 
component 5 and percentage of trade credit late for year 2003. Another difference from the original 
results is found for the second model which is the linear regression of LOC ratio for the 1993-2003 
dataset. The result in Table 3.18 regarding component 1 that provides information about distance and 
method of conducting business, seems to be different than the original results in Table 3.9. Even if 
distance and method of conducting business were not statistically significant in Table 3.9 (not 
statistically significant in either 1993 or 2003 in Table 3.9), component 1 significantly explains LOC 
ratio in 1993 in Table 3.18. These differences might be explained by the fact that with PCA, this 
study only accounted for 80 percent of the variation in the sample and that is why some of the results 
differ from the original results.  
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3.8 Robustness 
 
Because the SBCS models became popular during the mid and late-1990s, the 1998 SSBF is 
used for robustness purposes. The relationship variables in year 1998 are compared to those in the 
year 2003. Since the sample in the 1998 SSBF dataset does not include firms with renewals of LOCs 
but only includes firms with new LOCs for the recent loan category, this study only focuses on the 
firms with new LOCs for the recent loan category in the 2003 dataset. This way, the datasets are 
comparable.  
Tables 3.19 and 3.20 provide marginal effects for the Tobit procedure for model 1. Table 
3.19 displays the average marginal effects for the probability of paying trade credit late and Table 
3.20 presents the average marginal effects for the observed percentage of trade credit paid late. Table 
3.21 displays the regression results from the survey linear regression of the ratio of granted LOC to 
sales. Different than the original regressions, these regressions include credit score information that is 
available in the 1998 and 2003 dataset.88 
Results from Tables 3.19 and 3.20 are somewhat different than the Tobit results displayed in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6.  Contradicting expectations, in 1998 firms that used financial management 
services and in 2003 firms that used financial records were more credit constrained. On the other 
hand, consistent with expectations, firms that had a previous loan account and that used tax return 
records were less credit constrained and paid a lower percentage of their trade credit late in 1998. 
Consistent with the findings in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, firms with savings account were also less credit 
constrained and paid a lower percentage of trade credit late in 1998 and firms whose method of 
contact was in person were more credit constrained and paid a higher percentage of their trade credit 
late in 2003. Other than these, both in 1998 and 2003, firms that were more creditworthy were less 
credit constrained and paid a lower percentage of their trade credit late.   
Results from Table 3.21 contradict the results from Tables 3.8 and 3.9. Different than the 
results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, a firm that is at a farther distance had a higher LOC ratio in 1998. 
Moreover firms that used a single source to conduct their financial relations had higher LOC ratios 
both in 1998 and in 2003.  Firms that had previous loan relations with their lender also had higher 
LOC ratios in 2003. The results from Table 3.21 show that some of the relationship variables were 
still significant in 2003.   
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3.9 Conclusions 
 
This research initially uses the 1987, 1993, and 2003 SSBF datasets to answer whether the 
importance of borrower-lender relationships in small business lending has weakened over time. The 
interest for the research question arose because of the improvements in technology and the use of 
SBCS models after the mid and late-1990s. However, the purpose of the study is not to verify the 
reasons behind the changes in the small business lending structure but to evaluate the changes in the 
lending structure.  
To answer the research question, the paper applies a survey Tobit procedure and an ordered 
logit for percentage of trade credit paid late and a survey linear regression of LOC ratio on 
relationship variables. Additionally, this study applies PCA for borrower-lender relationship 
variables. The purpose of using PCA is to analyze whether borrower-lender relationships can be 
explained in smaller dimensions. The results from PCA are also compared to the original results.  
This paper contributes to the previous literature in the sense that year 2003 when SBCS 
models became more popular is compared to previous years in order to make inferences about 
changes in the importance of relationship in small business lending. Moreover, this is the first paper 
in the relationship lending literature that applies PCA for decreasing the dimensions of the 
relationship variables. 
The PCA results show that the nature of relationship variables is such that they are 
independent from each other and hence it is hard to categorize the relationship variables. 
Furthermore, the regression findings support a decline in the importance of borrower-lender 
relationships on small business credit availability and the dollar amounts of LOCs granted to small 
businesses. These results favor the notion that lending structure for small businesses has changed. It 
is possible that with technological improvements and use of SBCS models after the mid and late 
1990s, lenders starting using hard-information in their lending decisions. That is why, in 2003, even 
if firms did not have relationships, they were able to get higher credit availability and higher loan 
amounts, because these firms most probably were able to provide hard information about the firm. 
Additionally, with the consolidation of the banking system during the years 1984 to 2003, larger 
banks that are advantaged in hard-information based lending models started to dominate the banking 
sector. Since larger banks may have higher lending limits compared to small banks, it is possible that 
in 2003 credit availability and loan amounts were greater for small businesses, especially if these 
firms borrowed from larger banks.  
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Due to wider use of hard-information, there has been more competition from larger banks 
and non-depository financial institutions in lending to small businesses. Since small businesses that 
meet the criteria of SBCS have a larger pool of lenders to choose from, small businesses will get 
greater bargaining power for loan terms.  
It is also important for small banks to understand how the nature of relationship lending has 
changed.  SBCS can put increased competitive pressures on small banks in the long run since SBCS 
can be used by lenders of any size and at any distance from borrowers. Since small banks are facing 
competition from larger banks and non-depository financial institutions, small banks might consider 
improving their hard-information based models to better compete with these larger banks and non-
depository financial institutions, even though it may be initially costly. For instance, they may 
consider purchasing scores from external vendors or might develop their own scores.  
Another implication will be on governmental policies for antitrust purposes. Since distance 
between borrowers and lenders is increasing due to technological improvements and the use of 
SBCS, in the longer run, a local presence by banks may not be required to lend to small businesses. 
Hence antitrust policy makers may consider redefining the appropriate geographic market definition 
for antitrust purposes (Berger et al., 2005-a).  
Additionally, understanding changes in small business lending structure might help to better 
comprehend small businesses' financing sources for possible investment opportunities. 
Understanding the changes in small business lending structure will also help to improve the 
efficiency in the small business lending system. However, it is worth mentioning that there will 
always be small businesses that will not be able to provide hard-information and that will still be 
dependent on relationship-based loans. 
This paper would have benefited from a dataset that has more recent information regarding 
small businesses and their relationship based lending. Unfortunately, the SSBF dataset is limited with 
the 2003 year as the most recent year. Moreover, for this study, the initial thought was to use bank 
type information in the models to differentiate between small and large banks. Because the publicly 
available SSBF datasets do not provide this information, the study could not measure the effects of 
bank types on credit availability and LOC amount granted. A future study can use another dataset 
that has bank type information and include bank types as additional explanatory variables in its 
models. This would directly help to understand whether there is a distinction between small and large 
banks in terms of providing credit to small businesses.   
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3.11 Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Tobit for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late 
 
1987 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two 
period mean values: 
2003-1987 
  Mean 
Std. 
Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late 14.111 1.563 
 
15.893 1.629 
 
1.781 2.257 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 1.352 0.067  
1.730 0.069 
 
0.378
***
 0.096 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 2.225 0.058  
4.001 0.078 
 
1.776
***
 0.097 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.967 0.012  
0.838 0.018 
 
-0.129
***
 0.022 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.255 0.028  
0.179 0.020 
 
-0.076
**
 0.035 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.649 0.031 
 
0.588 0.027 
 
-0.061 0.041 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.570 0.032 
 
0.573 0.026 
 
0.002 0.042 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.370 0.031  
0.210 0.022 
 
-0.160
***
 0.038 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.347 0.030 
 
0.220 0.023 
 
-0.127
***
 0.038 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.864 0.022  
0.717 0.024 
 
-0.147
***
 0.032 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.464 0.032 
 
0.418 0.026 
 
-0.046 0.041 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.762 0.021 
 
0.766 0.025 
 
0.004 0.033 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.010 0.006 
 
0.047 0.010 
 
0.037
***
 0.011 
LOC Provider: Depository Financial Institution 0.990 0.006  
0.953 0.010 
 
-0.037
***
 0.011 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 2.626 0.064 
 
2.658 0.035 
 
0.032 0.073 
Ln(Sales) 14.110 0.105 
 
13.685 0.078 
 
-0.425
***
 0.131 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.251 0.028 
 
0.234 0.025 
 
-0.017 0.038 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.077 0.017 
 
0.067 0.013 
 
-0.009 0.022 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.673 0.030   0.699 0.026   0.026 0.040 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.1 Cont.: Surv. Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Tobit for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late 
 
1987 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two 
period mean values: 
2003-1987 
  Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value 
Std. 
Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.113 0.019 
 
0.120 0.014 
 
0.007 0.024 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.162 0.024 
 
0.119 0.015 
 
-0.043 0.029 
Retail Trade Industry 0.278 0.029 
 
0.200 0.022 
 
-0.078
**
 0.036 
Business Services Industry 0.237 0.028 
 
0.341 0.025 
 
0.104
***
 0.038 
Construction Industry 0.133 0.021 
 
0.133 0.020 
 
0.000 0.029 
Other Industries (mining, transportation /public 
utilities, finance/insurance) 
0.077 0.018 
 
0.086 0.014 
 
0.009 0.023 
Leverage Ratio 1.237 0.302 
 
-0.187 0.224 
 
-1.425
***
 0.376 
Profitability Ratio 0.326 0.068 
 
0.859 0.159 
 
0.533
***
 0.174 
Current Assets Ratio 0.635 0.019 
 
0.599 0.017 
 
-0.037 0.025 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 32.404 2.646 
 
29.864 2.081 
 
-2.540 3.367 
Whether LOC is secured 0.677 0.030 
 
0.778 0.023 
 
0.101
***
 0.038 
Ratio of LOC to sales 0.149 0.012 
 
0.216 0.022 
 
0.067
***
 0.024 
Number of observations 447     921         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Ordered Logit for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two period 
mean values: 2003-1993 
 Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Category 1= Zero Percentage of Trade Credit Late 0.387 0.028 
 
0.514 0.027 
 
0.127
***
 0.039 
Category 2= Less than Half of Trade Credit Late 0.456 0.029 
 
0.335 0.026 
 
-0.121
***
 0.039 
Category 3= About Half of Trade Credit Late 0.067 0.014 
 
0.059 0.012 
 
-0.008 0.018 
Category 4= More than Half of Trade Credit Late 0.066 0.014 
 
0.040 0.013 
 
-0.026 0.019 
Category 5= Almost All or All of Trade Credit Late 0.023 0.008 
 
0.052 0.013 
 
0.028
*
 0.015 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 1.656 0.075 
 
1.730 0.070 
 
0.074 0.103 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 1.898 0.046 
 
3.986 0.078 
 
2.088
***
 0.091 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.843 0.021 
 
0.836 0.018 
 
-0.006 0.028 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.263 0.025 
 
0.179 0.020 
 
-0.084
***
 0.032 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.837 0.023 
 
0.928 0.015 
 
0.091
***
 0.028 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.393 0.027 
 
0.587 0.027 
 
0.194
***
 0.038 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. 0.531 0.029 
 
0.496 0.027 
 
-0.035 0.039 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.565 0.029 
 
0.567 0.027 
 
0.003 0.039 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.232 0.023 
 
0.207 0.022 
 
-0.025 0.032 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.302 0.027 
 
0.218 0.023 
 
-0.084
**
 0.035 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.722 0.025 
 
0.717 0.024 
 
-0.005 0.035 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.544 0.029 
 
0.422 0.026 
 
-0.122
***
 0.039 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.755 0.025 
 
0.763 0.026 
 
0.008 0.036 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.059 0.015 
 
0.048 0.010 
 
-0.011 0.018 
LOC Provider: Depository Financial Institution 0.941 0.015 
 
0.952 0.010 
 
0.011 0.018 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 2.582 0.039 
 
2.651 0.036 
 
0.069 0.053 
Ln(Sales) 13.903 0.088 
 
13.659 0.081 
 
-0.244
**
 0.119 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.194 0.025 
 
0.239 0.026 
 
0.044 0.036 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.061 0.014 
 
0.064 0.013 
 
0.003 0.019 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.745 0.027   0.698 0.027   -0.047 0.038 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.2 Cont.: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Surv. Ordered Logit for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two period 
mean values: 2003-1993 
  Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.140 0.017 
 
0.120 0.015 
 
-0.020 0.022 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.177 0.022  
0.121 0.016 
 
-0.056
**
 0.027 
Retail Trade Industry 0.211 0.024 
 
0.198 0.022 
 
-0.013 0.033 
Business Services Industry 0.278 0.027  
0.340 0.026 
 
0.062
*
 0.037 
Construction Industry 0.130 0.019 
 
0.134 0.021 
 
0.004 0.028 
Other Industries (mining, transportation /public 
utilities, finance/insurance) 
0.065 0.014 
 
0.087 0.015 
 
0.023 0.020 
Education <= High School 0.181 0.023  
0.246 0.024 
 
0.065
*
 0.033 
Education = Associate Degree, Trade School, College 
Classes but No College Degree Granted 
0.237 0.024 
 
0.228 0.022 
 
-0.009 0.033 
Education = College Degree 0.345 0.027 
 
0.317 0.025 
 
-0.028 0.037 
Education = Post Graduate Degree 0.237 0.025 
 
0.209 0.021 
 
-0.028 0.032 
Leverage Ratio -0.410 0.361 
 
-0.177 0.226 
 
0.233 0.426 
Profitability Ratio 0.367 0.120  
0.861 0.161 
 
0.494
**
 0.201 
Current Assets Ratio 0.633 0.017 
 
0.599 0.017 
 
-0.034 0.024 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 43.755 3.272  
29.336 2.054 
 
-14.419
***
 3.863 
Whether LOC is secured 0.812 0.024 
 
0.777 0.023 
 
-0.035 0.033 
Ratio of LOC to sales 5.030 4.810 
 
0.613 0.399 
 
-4.418 4.827 
Number of observations 667     896         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Linear Regression for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
1987 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two 
period mean values: 
2003-1987 
 Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Ln(LOC/Sales) -2.430 0.069  
-2.155 0.060 
 
0.275
***
 0.091 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 1.277 0.062  
1.746 0.064 
 
0.469
***
 0.089 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 2.236 0.053  
3.967 0.071 
 
1.731
***
 0.089 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.963 0.012  
0.810 0.018 
 
-0.154
***
 0.022 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.249 0.027  
0.171 0.017 
 
-0.077
**
 0.032 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.633 0.030  
0.557 0.024 
 
-0.076
**
 0.038 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.548 0.031 
 
0.579 0.024 
 
0.031 0.039 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.362 0.029  
0.224 0.020 
 
-0.138
***
 0.035 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.326 0.028  
0.232 0.021 
 
-0.095
***
 0.035 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.845 0.023  
0.703 0.022 
 
-0.142
***
 0.031 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.481 0.030  
0.416 0.023 
 
-0.064
*
 0.038 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.772 0.019 
 
0.786 0.022 
 
0.014 0.029 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.009 0.005 
 
0.071 0.012 
 
0.062
***
 0.013 
LOC Provider: Depository Financial Institution 0.991 0.005  
0.929 0.012 
 
-0.062
***
 0.013 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 2.636 0.059 
 
2.624 0.032 
 
-0.011 0.067 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.283 0.028 
 
0.269 0.023 
 
-0.013 0.036 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.068 0.015 
 
0.074 0.012 
 
0.006 0.019 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.649 0.029   0.657 0.024   0.007 0.038 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.3 Cont.: Surv. Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Linear Regression for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
1987 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two 
period mean values: 
2003-1987 
  Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.101 0.017 
 
0.106 0.013 
 
0.005 0.021 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.150 0.022 
 
0.108 0.013 
 
-0.041 0.026 
Retail Trade Industry 0.263 0.027  
0.188 0.019 
 
-0.075
**
 0.033 
Business Services Industry 0.251 0.027  
0.386 0.023 
 
0.134
***
 0.036 
Construction Industry 0.129 0.020 
 
0.115 0.017 
 
-0.015 0.026 
Other Industries (mining, transportation /public utilities, 
finance/insurance) 
0.105 0.020 
 
0.097 0.013 
 
-0.008 0.024 
Leverage Ratio 0.970 0.289  
-0.005 0.217 
 
-0.975
***
 0.362 
Profitability Ratio 0.400 0.068  
1.093 0.156 
 
0.693
***
 0.170 
Current Assets Ratio 0.614 0.018 
 
0.602 0.016 
 
-0.012 0.024 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 32.104 2.546 
 
29.995 2.240 
 
-2.109 3.391 
Whether LOC is secured 0.681 0.028  
0.750 0.021 
 
0.069
*
 0.036 
Whether Firm Has Trade Credit 0.898 0.019  
0.778 0.021 
 
-0.120
***
 0.028 
Whether Firm Pays Trade Credit Late 0.557 0.030  
0.378 0.023 
 
-0.179
***
 0.038 
Number of observations 490     1,087         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Survey Linear Regression for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two period 
mean values: 2003-1993 
  Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Ln(LOC/Sales) -2.399 0.064  
-2.163 0.061 
 
0.236
***
 0.088 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 1.631 0.069 
 
1.746 0.065 
 
0.116 0.095 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 1.911 0.041  
3.959 0.072 
 
2.048
***
 0.082 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.839 0.020 
 
0.808 0.018 
 
-0.031 0.027 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.263 0.023  
0.172 0.017 
 
-0.092
***
 0.029 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.832 0.021  
0.899 0.015 
 
0.067
***
 0.026 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.379 0.025  
0.557 0.024 
 
0.179
***
 0.034 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. 0.525 0.026 
 
0.498 0.024 
 
-0.027 0.035 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.550 0.026 
 
0.576 0.024 
 
0.026 0.035 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.241 0.021 
 
0.222 0.020 
 
-0.019 0.029 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.288 0.024  
0.231 0.021 
 
-0.057
*
 0.032 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.720 0.023 
 
0.703 0.022 
 
-0.017 0.032 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.527 0.026  
0.419 0.023 
 
-0.109
***
 0.035 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.772 0.022 
 
0.785 0.022 
 
0.013 0.031 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.060 0.014 
 
0.071 0.012 
 
0.012 0.019 
LOC Provider: Depository Financial Institution 0.940 0.014 
 
0.929 0.012 
 
-0.012 0.019 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 2.573 0.036 
 
2.622 0.032 
 
0.048 0.048 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.190 0.022  
0.272 0.024 
 
0.082
**
 0.032 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.055 0.012 
 
0.071 0.012 
 
0.016 0.017 
Corporate Organizational Form 0.755 0.024   0.656 0.024   -0.099
***
 0.034 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4 Cont.: Survey Mean Values of the Dataset for Running Surv. Linear Regression for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Diff. between two period 
mean values: 2003-1993 
 Mean Std. Err.   Mean Std. Err.   Value Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.129 0.015 
 
0.106 0.013 
 
-0.023 0.020 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.175 0.020 
 
0.109 0.013 
 
-0.065
***
 0.024 
Retail Trade Industry 0.195 0.021 
 
0.188 0.019 
 
-0.007 0.029 
Business Services Industry 0.304 0.025 
 
0.384 0.024 
 
0.080
**
 0.034 
Construction Industry 0.125 0.017 
 
0.116 0.017 
 
-0.009 0.024 
Other Industries (mining, transportation /public 
utilities, finance/insurance) 
0.073 0.013 
 
0.098 0.013 
 
0.025 0.019 
Education <= High School 0.195 0.021 
 
0.232 0.021 
 
0.037 0.030 
Education = Associate Degree, Trade School, College 
Classes but No College Degree Granted 
0.245 0.023 
 
0.232 0.020 
 
-0.013 0.030 
Education = College Degree 0.313 0.024 
 
0.332 0.023 
 
0.019 0.033 
Education = Post Graduate Degree 0.248 0.023 
 
0.204 0.019 
 
-0.044 0.030 
Leverage Ratio -0.507 0.312 
 
0.005 0.219 
 
0.513 0.381 
Profitability Ratio 0.366 0.104 
 
1.099 0.158 
 
0.733
***
 0.189 
Current Assets Ratio 0.635 0.015 
 
0.603 0.016 
 
-0.032 0.022 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 45.182 3.063 
 
29.611 2.236 
 
-15.571
***
 3.792 
Whether LOC is secured 0.817 0.021 
 
0.749 0.021 
 
-0.068
**
 0.030 
Whether Firm Has Trade Credit 0.823 0.020 
 
0.777 0.021 
 
-0.046 0.029 
Whether Firm Pays Trade Credit Late 0.520 0.026 
 
0.378 0.023 
 
-0.142
***
 0.035 
Number of observations 808     1,054         
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Survey Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Prob (Y>0) 
 
1987   2003   
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
  dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.004 0.021   0.031
**
 0.015   0.035 0.026 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.026 0.027   -0.017 0.014   0.010 0.031 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.061 0.077   0.136
*
 0.079   0.075 0.109 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.170
***
 0.045   -0.065 0.062   0.104 0.076 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.024 0.050   -0.012 0.045   -0.036 0.068 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.063 0.068   -0.081
*
 0.047   -0.019 0.082 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.134
**
 0.057   -0.019 0.046   -0.152
**
 0.073 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.014 0.052   0.096
*
 0.050   0.082 0.072 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.040 0.055   0.090
**
 0.045   0.129
*
 0.071 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.090
*
 0.047   0.079
*
 0.042   0.169
***
 0.063 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.056 0.041   0.026 0.053   -0.030 0.066 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.020 0.236   -0.011 0.102   0.009 0.256 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.049
*
 0.029   -0.011 0.029   0.038 0.041 
Ln(Sales) -0.004 0.017   -0.006 0.014   -0.002 0.022 
Proprietorship Organizational Form -0.047 0.053   0.203
***
 0.050   0.250
***
 0.073 
Partnership Organizational Form -0.022 0.125   0.092 0.068   0.114 0.143 
Manufacturing Industry -0.012 0.071   -0.051 0.072   -0.039 0.102 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.178
**
 0.082   -0.072 0.075   0.106 0.111 
Retail Trade Industry -0.116
*
 0.065   -0.116 0.076   0.000 0.099 
Business Services Industry -0.074 0.069   -0.110 0.069   -0.036 0.098 
Other Industries -0.022 0.076   -0.258
***
 0.072   -0.236
**
 0.105 
Leverage Ratio 0.0018 0.003   0.0005 0.003   -0.001 0.004 
Profitability Ratio -0.006 0.018   -0.010 0.008   -0.004 0.020 
Current Assets Ratio -0.156 0.104   -0.002 0.067   0.154 0.123 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.001
***
 0.000   0.001
***
 0.0004   0.000 0.001 
Whether LOC is secured 0.060 0.039   0.175
***
 0.045   0.115
*
 0.060 
Ratio of LOC to sales -0.276
*
 0.149   -0.172
***
 0.052   0.104 0.158 
Number of observations 1,368               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Survey Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Censored Expected Value Y 
 
1987   2003   
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
  dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.247 1.232   1.794
**
 0.909   2.041 1.530 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -1.540 1.601   -0.963 0.825   0.577 1.802 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 3.354 3.923   7.058
*
 3.642   3.705 5.350 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -9.015
***
 2.337   -3.620 3.185   5.395 3.948 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 1.394 2.896   -0.721 2.642   -2.115 3.909 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -3.784 4.205   -4.778
*
 2.788   -0.994 5.046 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 8.112
**
 3.556   -1.087 2.617   -9.199
**
 4.437 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.850 3.117   6.025
*
 3.433   5.175 4.637 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -2.436 3.473   4.930
**
 2.435   7.366
*
 4.242 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -5.246
*
 2.737   4.643
*
 2.477   9.889
***
 3.691 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 3.154 2.262   1.475 2.966   -1.678 3.731 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -1.144 13.165   -0.615 5.778   0.529 14.358 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -2.854 1.774   -0.612 1.653   2.242 2.425 
Ln(Sales) -0.232 1.001   -0.328 0.788   -0.096 1.274 
Proprietorship Organizational Form -2.698 2.958   13.743
***
 4.517   16.442
***
 5.398 
Partnership Organizational Form -1.289 6.964   5.998 5.078   7.287 8.607 
Manufacturing Industry -0.714 4.073   -2.837 3.927   -2.122 5.663 
Wholesale Trade Industry -9.102
**
 3.575   -3.942 3.944   5.160 5.328 
Retail Trade Industry -6.457
*
 3.410   -6.260 3.870   0.197 5.161 
Business Services Industry -4.187 3.740   -6.206 3.876   -2.020 5.408 
Other Industries -1.261 4.291   -11.932
***
 3.069   -10.671
**
 5.279 
Leverage Ratio 0.103 0.159   0.028 0.172   -0.075 0.234 
Profitability Ratio -0.362 1.069   -0.609 0.436   -0.248 1.155 
Current Assets Ratio -9.162 6.288   -0.111 3.929   9.050 7.430 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.066
**
 0.026   0.067
***
 0.024   0.000 0.035 
Whether LOC is secured 3.424 2.185   9.021
***
 2.403   5.597
*
 3.246 
Ratio of LOC to sales -16.201
*
 9.010   -10.018
***
 3.298   6.183 9.570 
Number of observations 1,368               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.7: Survey Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 3) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
Outcome = 3 (About Half) dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.002 0.003  
0.007
*
 0.004 
 
0.009
*
 0.005 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.017
*
 0.009 
 
-0.003 0.003 
 
0.013 0.009 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.037
***
 0.014 
 
0.030
**
 0.013 
 
-0.007 0.017 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.008 0.012 
 
-0.015 0.012 
 
-0.007 0.017 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.008 0.018 
 
-0.028 0.017 
 
-0.036 0.025 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.013 0.012 
 
-0.002 0.010 
 
0.010 0.015 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.003 0.010 
 
-0.006 0.009 
 
-0.004 0.014 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.017 0.014 
 
-0.011 0.011 
 
-0.028 0.018 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview -0.005 0.014 
 
-0.006 0.010 
 
-0.001 0.017 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -0.023
*
 0.012 
 
0.020
*
 0.012 
 
0.042
**
 0.017 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.004 0.013 
 
0.015 0.010 
 
0.011 0.016 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.012 0.011  
0.019
*
 0.010 
 
0.030
**
 0.015 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.002 0.015 
 
0.000 0.011 
 
0.003 0.019 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.076
***
 0.014 
 
0.007 0.024 
 
-0.069
**
 0.027 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 0.004 0.008 
 
-0.003 0.007 
 
-0.008 0.010 
Ln(Sales) 0.003 0.004 
 
-0.001 0.003 
 
-0.003 0.005 
Proprietorship Organizational Form -0.012 0.014  
0.044
***
 0.014 
 
0.056
***
 0.020 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.018 0.018   0.032 0.021   0.014 0.027 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.7 Cont.: Surv. Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 3) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Outcome = 3 (About Half) dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.014 0.018 
 
-0.011 0.017 
 
-0.024 0.025 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.030
*
 0.016 
 
-0.016 0.017 
 
0.014 0.023 
Retail Trade Industry -0.033
**
 0.016 
 
-0.029
**
 0.015 
 
0.005 0.021 
Business Services Industry -0.013 0.016 
 
-0.025 0.017 
 
-0.013 0.023 
Other Industries -0.032
*
 0.017 
 
-0.046
***
 0.012 
 
-0.015 0.020 
Education <= High School -0.0004 0.016 
 
0.007 0.014 
 
0.007 0.022 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree 0.006 0.016 
 
0.012 0.014 
 
0.006 0.021 
Education = College Degree 0.005 0.013 
 
-0.001 0.011 
 
-0.006 0.017 
Leverage Ratio 0.0004 0.001 
 
-0.0001 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
Profitability Ratio -0.002 0.002  
-0.003
*
 0.002 
 
-0.0005 0.003 
Current Assets Ratio -0.007 0.020 
 
-0.001 0.015 
 
0.006 0.025 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.0002 0.0001  
0.0002
**
 0.0001 
 
0.0004
***
 0.0001 
Whether LOC is secured 0.0004 0.013  
0.031
***
 0.009 
 
0.031
**
 0.016 
Ratio of LOC to sales 0.0001
***
 0.00002 
 
-0.031
**
 0.014 
 
-0.031
**
 0.014 
Number of observations 1,563               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
      2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.120
*
 0.063   0.005 0.047 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Distance) 0.125 0.078   
  
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.047 0.080   -0.009 0.037 
Interaction for 2003- Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.038 0.088   
  
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -0.972
***
 0.373   0.099 0.209 
Interaction for 2003 -Checking Account 1.072
**
 0.427   
  
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.145 0.161   -0.362
***
 0.129 
Interaction for 2003 -Savings Account -0.218 0.206   
  
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.022 0.145   -0.127 0.125 
Interaction for 2003 -Financ. Management Services -0.149 0.192   
  
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.341 0.218   0.013 0.120 
Interaction for 2003 -Records 0.354 0.248   
  
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.098 0.152   0.028 0.132 
Interaction for 2003 -Financial Records -0.070 0.201   
  
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.448
***
 0.159   -0.060 0.137 
Interaction for 2003 -Tax Return -0.508
**
 0.209   
  
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.111 0.164   0.005 0.133 
Interaction for 2003 -Conducting Bus. 0.116 0.211   
  
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.156 0.134   -0.161 0.112 
Interaction for 2003-Herfindahl Index -0.005 0.175   
  
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.137 0.120   -0.142 0.139 
Interaction for 2003 -Metropolitan -0.004 0.184   
  
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.558 0.641   0.183 0.263 
Interaction for 2003 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  0.741 0.693   
  
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.034 0.069   -0.086 0.093 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Age) -0.053 0.116   
  
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.144 0.145   0.408
***
 0.139 
Interaction for 2003 -Proprietorship 0.264 0.201   
  
Partnership Organizational Form 0.001 0.301   0.087 0.232 
Interaction for 2003 -Partnership 0.086 0.380   
  
Manufacturing Industry -0.215 0.239   0.317
**
 0.162 
Interaction for 2003 -Manufacturing 0.532
*
 0.289   
  
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.316 0.220   -0.122 0.195 
Interaction for 2003 -Wholesale Trade 0.195 0.294   
  
Retail Trade Industry -0.312 0.228   -0.079 0.175 
Interaction for 2003 -Retail Trade 0.233 0.287   
  
Business Services Industry -0.224 0.200   0.338
**
 0.154 
Interaction for 2003 -Business Services 0.562
**
 0.252   
  
Other Industries -0.093 0.324   0.289 0.253 
Interaction for 2003 -Other Industries 0.382 0.411       
This regression compares year 1987 to year 2003. 
  
  
  ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.8 Cont.: Surv. Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
      2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Leverage Ratio -0.022
**
 0.011   -0.018
**
 0.008 
Interaction for 2003 -Leverage 0.004 0.013   
  
Profitability Ratio -0.018 0.048   -0.059
***
 0.015 
Interaction for 2003 -Profitability -0.041 0.051   
  
Current Assets Ratio -0.188 0.286   -0.237 0.188 
Interaction for 2003 -Current Assets Ratio -0.048 0.342   
  
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.006
***
 0.001   0.002
**
 0.001 
Interaction for 2003 -Accts Receivable -0.004
***
 0.002   
  
Whether LOC is secured 0.439
***
 0.145   0.518
***
 0.131 
Interaction for 2003 -Secured LOC 0.079 0.196   
  
Whether Firm Has Trade Credit 0.183 0.291   -0.458
***
 0.157 
Interaction for 2003 -Trade Credit -0.641
*
 0.331   
  
Whether Firm Pays Trade Credit Late -0.366
***
 0.137   -0.294
**
 0.117 
Interaction for 2003 -Trade Credit Late 0.073 0.180   
  
Time Dummy for 2003 -0.760 0.806   
  
Constant -0.980 0.663   
  
Number of observations  1,577 
 
  
  
R-Squared 0.1947 
 
  
 
  
This regression compares year 1987 to year 2003.         
 ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
      2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 0.076 0.058 
 
0.007 0.048 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Distance) -0.069 0.075 
   
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.182
**
 0.082 
 
-0.016 0.038 
Interaction for 2003- Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.166
*
 0.090 
   
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -0.130 0.240 
 
0.062 0.212 
Interaction for 2003 -Checking Account 0.192 0.320 
   
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.102 0.121 
 
-0.355
***
 0.130 
Interaction for 2003 -Savings Account -0.253 0.177 
   
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.403
**
 0.179 
 
0.229 0.216 
Interaction for 2003 - Previous Loan -0.174 0.281 
   
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.049 0.125 
 
-0.112 0.128 
Interaction for 2003 -Financ. Management Services -0.161 0.179 
   
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. 0.073 0.121 
 
0.093 0.110 
Interaction for 2003 -Single Source 0.020 0.164 
   
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.040 0.195 
 
-0.009 0.119 
Interaction for 2003 -Records -0.049 0.229 
   
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.060 0.196 
 
0.020 0.134 
Interaction for 2003 -Financial Records -0.040 0.237 
   
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -0.117 0.169 
 
-0.071 0.139 
Interaction for 2003 -Tax Return 0.046 0.219 
   
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.201 0.133 
 
-0.002 0.133 
Interaction for 2003 -Conducting Bus. 0.199 0.188 
   
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.007 0.126 
 
-0.166 0.114 
Interaction for 2003-Herfindahl Index -0.159 0.170 
   
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.050 0.152 
 
-0.153 0.139 
Interaction for 2003 -Metropolitan -0.103 0.206 
   
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.491 0.339 
 
0.222 0.264 
Interaction for 2003 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  0.712
*
 0.429 
   
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 0.090 0.088 
 
-0.086 0.094 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Age) -0.175 0.129 
   
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.249 0.175 
 
0.400
***
 0.141 
Interaction for 2003 -Proprietorship 0.152 0.225 
   
Partnership Organizational Form 0.489 0.367 
 
0.066 0.236 
Interaction for 2003 -Partnership -0.423 0.437 
   
Manufacturing Industry 0.205 0.204 
 
0.297
*
 0.168 
Interaction for 2003 -Manufacturing 0.092 0.264 
   
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.249 0.184 
 
-0.124 0.200 
Interaction for 2003 -Wholesale Trade -0.373 0.272 
   
Retail Trade Industry 0.006 0.200 
 
-0.101 0.177 
Interaction for 2003 -Retail Trade -0.107 0.267 
   
Business Services Industry 0.139 0.192 
 
0.328
**
 0.160 
Interaction for 2003 -Business Services 0.188 0.250 
   
Other Industries 0.179 0.272 
 
0.289 0.261 
Interaction for 2003 -Other Industries 0.110 0.377       
This regression compares year 1993 to year 2003. 
     ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.9 Cont.: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
      2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Education <= High School -0.437
**
 0.217 
 
-0.011 0.164 
Interaction for 2003 -High School 0.426 0.272 
   
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree -0.433
**
 0.196 
 
-0.101 0.174 
Interaction for 2003 -Assoc, Trade.. 0.332 0.262 
   
Education = College Degree -0.418
**
 0.178 
 
-0.004 0.152 
Interaction for 2003 -College Degree 0.414
*
 0.234 
   
Leverage Ratio -0.013 0.016 
 
-0.018
**
 0.008 
Interaction for 2003 -Leverage -0.005 0.018 
   
Profitability Ratio -0.025 0.027 
 
-0.062
***
 0.016 
Interaction for 2003 -Profitability -0.036 0.031 
   
Current Assets Ratio -0.659
***
 0.230 
 
-0.237 0.186 
Interaction for 2003 -Current Assets Ratio 0.422 0.296 
   
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.005
***
 0.002 
 
0.002 0.001 
Interaction for 2003 -Accts Receivable -0.003 0.002 
   
Whether LOC is secured 0.341
**
 0.136 
 
0.505
***
 0.134 
Interaction for 2003 -Secured LOC 0.164 0.191 
   
Whether Firm Has Trade Credit -0.077 0.184 
 
-0.502
***
 0.156 
Interaction for 2003 -Trade Credit -0.424
*
 0.242 
   
Whether Firm Pays Trade Credit Late -0.024 0.143 
 
-0.278
**
 0.117 
Interaction for 2003 -Trade Credit Late -0.255 0.185 
   
Time Dummy for 2003 0.480 0.689 
   
Constant -2.315
***
 0.492 
   
Number of observations 1,862   
   R-Squared 0.197         
This regression compares year 1993 to year 2003. 
     ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.10: Principal Components Loadings (1987-2003, Model 1)       
    Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.654 -0.065 0.024 0.105 -0.162 -0.058 38.13% 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.003 -0.035 -0.031 0.002 0.953 -0.013 5.52% 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.376 0.004 0.064 0.535 0.030 0.038 36.13% 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.011 0.994 0.79% 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.123 0.006 -0.024 0.837 -0.005 -0.017 18.21% 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.060 0.532 0.403 -0.026 0.160 -0.007 22.37% 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.025 0.837 -0.159 0.013 -0.089 -0.002 11.49% 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.007 -0.089 0.898 -0.004 -0.050 0.002 7.92% 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.642 -0.048 0.016 -0.049 -0.170 -0.080 38.16% 
        Variance 1.412 1.363 1.202 1.195 1.032 1.008 
 Proportion of variance 15.69% 15.15% 13.36% 13.28% 11.47% 11.20%   
 
 
Table 3.11: Survey Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Prob (Y>0) 
  
1987 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
  dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Comp 1 0.0004 0.028 
 
0.016 0.017 
 
0.015 0.033 
Comp 2 0.041
**
 0.018 
 
-0.039
**
 0.019 
 
-0.080
***
 0.027 
Comp 3 -0.014 0.018 
 
0.030 0.020 
 
0.044 0.027 
Comp 4 0.012 0.027 
 
0.026 0.019 
 
0.014 0.033 
Comp 5 -0.029 0.045  
-0.046
**
 0.022 
 
-0.018 0.050 
Comp 6 -0.071
***
 0.018   -0.029 0.027   0.042 0.032 
The relationship variables are replaced with newly constructed variables through PCA. 
   
 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.12: Surv. Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Censored Expected Value Y 
 
1987 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Comp 1 0.024 1.678 
 
0.919 0.999 
 
0.895 1.954 
Comp 2 2.398
**
 1.069 
 
-2.296
**
 1.163 
 
-4.693
***
 1.589 
Comp 3 -0.846 1.081 
 
1.740 1.210 
 
2.585 1.625 
Comp 4 0.704 1.559 
 
1.487 1.113 
 
0.783 1.914 
Comp 5 -1.689 2.653 
 
-2.680
**
 1.292 
 
-0.991 2.951 
Comp 6 -4.166
***
 1.166   -1.662 1.542   2.504 1.932 
The relationship variables are replaced with newly constructed variables through PCA. 
  
  
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
 
 
Table 3.13: Principal Components Loadings (1993-2003, Model 1) 
        Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Unexplained 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.685 -0.050 -0.003 0.012 0.038 0.049 -0.086 31.30% 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.045 0.042 0.791 -0.107 -0.106 0.163 -0.067 22.59% 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.234 -0.072 0.150 0.517 0.111 -0.050 0.102 35.08% 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.003 0.000 -0.019 -0.024 -0.016 0.023 0.977 3.01% 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account -0.075 0.042 -0.082 0.836 -0.057 0.058 -0.062 18.02% 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.121 -0.093 0.577 0.128 0.125 -0.273 0.077 34.03% 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.011 -0.019 0.043 0.035 0.023 0.942 0.027 7.68% 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.033 0.533 0.080 -0.022 0.459 0.021 0.030 21.11% 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.017 0.826 -0.016 0.032 -0.151 -0.031 -0.008 13.43% 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.007 -0.106 -0.059 -0.026 0.849 0.025 -0.029 11.91% 
Whether Firm's Method of Conduct is In Person 0.673 -0.035 -0.008 -0.046 0.040 0.031 -0.105 33.60% 
         Variance 1.457 1.320 1.283 1.282 1.256 1.049 1.035 
 Proportion of variance 13.25% 12.00% 11.66% 11.65% 11.42% 9.54% 9.41%   
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Table 3.14: Surv. Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 3) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two period 
coefficients=0 
Outcome = 3 (About Half) dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx Std. Err.   Difference Value 
Std. Err. 
Comp 1 0.006 0.005 
 
0.002 0.004 
 
-0.005 0.006 
Comp 2 0.004 0.005  
-0.009
*
 0.005 
 
-0.013
*
 0.007 
Comp 3 -0.013
*
 0.008 
 
-0.002 0.005 
 
0.011 0.009 
Comp 4 0.006 0.005 
 
-0.001 0.004 
 
-0.008 0.006 
Comp 5 -0.003 0.004  
0.008
*
 0.004 
 
0.011
*
 0.006 
Comp 6 -0.004 0.005 
 
-0.005 0.005 
 
-0.001 0.007 
Comp 7 -0.001 0.006   -0.006 0.006   -0.005 0.008 
The relationship variables are replaced with newly constructed variables through PCA. 
 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 3.15: Principal Components Loadings (1987-2003, Model 2)         
   Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.696 -0.131 0.089 0.132 -0.134 -0.029 32.79% 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.014 -0.040 -0.014 0.007 0.959 -0.010 4.85% 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.384 -0.009 0.032 0.524 0.018 0.049 35.81% 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 -0.008 0.996 0.57% 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.123 0.017 -0.014 0.840 0.006 -0.021 17.47% 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.053 0.528 0.402 -0.022 0.144 0.001 22.75% 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.038 0.821 -0.142 0.021 -0.101 -0.010 13.62% 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.001 -0.074 0.891 -0.003 -0.030 0.005 9.21% 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.591 -0.150 0.126 -0.014 -0.172 -0.068 41.45% 
        Variance 1.407 1.375 1.200 1.199 1.027 1.006 
 Proportion of variance 15.64% 15.28% 13.33% 13.32% 11.41% 11.18%   
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Table 3.16: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
    
 
2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Comp 1 0.016 0.090 
 
0.018 0.051 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 1 0.002 0.104 
   
Comp 2 -0.037 0.056 
 
0.018 0.049 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 2 0.055 0.074 
   
Comp 3 0.092
*
 0.049 
 
-0.022 0.050 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 3 -0.113 0.070 
   
Comp 4 -0.039 0.086 
 
-0.030 0.048 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 4 0.008 0.098 
   
Comp 5 0.053 0.123 
 
-0.012 0.058 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 5 -0.065 0.136 
   
Comp 6 -0.046 0.070 
 
-0.151
***
 0.056 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 6 -0.104 0.090 
   
The relationship variables are replaced with newly constructed variables through PCA. The regression compares  
year 1987 to year 2003. ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 3.17: Principal Components Loadings (1993-2003, Model 2) 
        Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Unexplained 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.675 -0.056 0.007 0.036 -0.012 0.035 -0.082 32.55% 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.039 0.015 -0.111 -0.061 0.821 0.135 -0.075 20.71% 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.234 -0.042 0.519 0.038 0.136 -0.016 0.125 34.92% 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.005 -0.002 -0.031 -0.011 -0.028 0.024 0.971 3.98% 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account -0.074 0.029 0.824 -0.024 -0.096 0.053 -0.082 19.65% 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.130 -0.064 0.184 0.075 0.534 -0.281 0.107 37.04% 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.014 -0.012 0.035 0.011 0.049 0.947 0.028 6.97% 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.035 0.538 -0.016 0.449 0.084 0.020 0.031 20.54% 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.016 0.829 0.022 -0.165 -0.025 -0.022 -0.012 12.26% 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.012 -0.107 -0.010 0.869 -0.045 0.008 -0.020 9.66% 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.681 -0.042 -0.042 0.050 -0.007 0.005 -0.098 33.11% 
         Variance 1.453 1.341 1.322 1.240 1.237 1.048 1.044 
 Proportion of Variance 13.21% 12.19% 12.02% 11.28% 11.25% 9.53% 9.49%  
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Table 3.18: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
    
 
2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Comp 1 -0.181
***
 0.064 
 
0.0003 0.053 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 1 0.182
**
 0.083 
   
Comp 2 0.039 0.053 
 
0.014 0.049 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 2 -0.025 0.073 
   
Comp 3 0.091
*
 0.056 
 
0.063 0.059 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 3 -0.028 0.081 
   
Comp 4 -0.027 0.047 
 
-0.031 0.049 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 4 -0.004 0.068 
   
Comp 5 -0.126 0.086 
 
-0.045 0.055 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 5 0.080 0.102 
   
Comp 6 0.007 0.060 
 
0.056 0.052 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 6 0.049 0.079 
   
Comp 7 -0.053 0.056  
-0.157
***
 0.057 
Interaction for 2003 -Comp 7 -0.104 0.080 
   
The relationship variables are replaced with newly constructed variables through PCA. The regression compares  
year 1993 to year 2003. ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.19: Survey Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Prob (Y>0) 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
  dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.025 0.017 
 
0.009 0.015 
 
0.035 0.023 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.010 0.018 
 
0.010 0.016 
 
0.001 0.024 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.139 0.092 
 
-0.026 0.082 
 
-0.165 0.123 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.307
***
 0.070 
 
-0.036 0.079 
 
0.271
**
 0.108 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account -0.129
**
 0.062 
 
-0.040 0.080 
 
0.089 0.101 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.154
**
 0.061 
 
0.046 0.059 
 
-0.108 0.085 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.031 0.058 
 
0.067 0.053 
 
0.098 0.078 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.042 0.063 
 
-0.042 0.072 
 
-0.083 0.097 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.114 0.085 
 
0.119
**
 0.056 
 
0.004 0.101 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -0.119
**
 0.060 
 
-0.079 0.074 
 
0.040 0.095 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.012 0.071 
 
0.097
*
 0.051 
 
0.109 0.088 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.024 0.060 
 
-0.097
*
 0.051 
 
-0.121 0.079 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.003 0.086 
 
-0.185
***
 0.056 
 
-0.182
*
 0.103 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.229
***
 0.063 
 
0.097 0.063 
 
-0.132 0.087 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 0.023 0.035 
 
0.011 0.037 
 
-0.012 0.051 
Ln(Sales) 0.056
***
 0.018 
 
0.019 0.019 
 
-0.037 0.026 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.053 0.062 
 
0.240
***
 0.056 
 
0.187
**
 0.083 
Partnership Organizational Form -0.160
*
 0.083 
 
0.053 0.069 
 
0.213
**
 0.108 
Manufacturing Industry -0.251
***
 0.076 
 
-0.081 0.095 
 
0.170 0.121 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.201
***
 0.073 
 
-0.153 0.100 
 
0.049 0.122 
Retail Trade Industry -0.228
***
 0.080 
 
-0.037 0.098 
 
0.191 0.126 
Business Services Industry 0.019 0.075 
 
-0.153
*
 0.087 
 
-0.172 0.115 
Other Industries -0.317
***
 0.077 
 
-0.306
***
 0.106 
 
0.011 0.129 
Education <= High School 0.087 0.086 
 
-0.008 0.078 
 
-0.095 0.117 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree -0.053 0.071 
 
0.094 0.070 
 
0.147 0.099 
Education = College Degree -0.055 0.076   0.081 0.063   0.136 0.099 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.19 Cont.: Surv. Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Prob (Y>0) 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
  dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Leverage Ratio -0.004 0.003 
 
0.001 0.004 
 
0.005 0.005 
Profitability Ratio 0.001 0.005 
 
-0.024 0.018 
 
-0.025 0.019 
Current Assets Ratio -0.273
***
 0.078 
 
0.148
*
 0.088 
 
0.421
***
 0.118 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.0005 0.0004 
 
0.0004 0.0006 
 
-0.00003 0.0007 
Credit Score = Average Risk -0.121
*
 0.064 
 
-0.158
**
 0.071 
 
-0.037 0.095 
Credit Score = Moderate Risk -0.311
***
 0.056 
 
-0.292
***
 0.077 
 
0.019 0.092 
Credit Score = Low Risk -0.396
***
 0.058 
 
-0.230
***
 0.081 
 
0.165
*
 0.097 
Whether LOC is secured 0.069 0.071 
 
0.139
**
 0.060 
 
0.070 0.093 
Ratio of LOC to sales -0.112 0.085 
 
-0.047 0.076 
 
0.065 0.114 
Number of observations 422               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
       
Table 3.20: Survey Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Censored Expected Value Y 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
  dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -1.450 1.011 
 
0.812 1.252 
 
2.263 1.610 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.548 1.039 
 
0.893 1.354 
 
0.344 1.709 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 8.059 5.660 
 
-2.272 7.516 
 
-10.331 9.445 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -13.836
***
 2.985 
 
-2.915 6.121 
 
10.920 6.730 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account -7.580
**
 3.759 
 
-3.712 8.146 
 
3.868 8.977 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 9.683
**
 4.024 
 
3.983 5.192 
 
-5.700 6.572 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -1.788 3.310 
 
5.799 4.779 
 
7.587 5.784 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 2.326 3.433 
 
-3.614 6.135 
 
-5.940 7.047 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 7.434 6.030 
 
11.976
**
 5.112 
 
4.543 7.947 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -6.458
**
 3.187 
 
-6.334 5.356 
 
0.123 6.223 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.707 4.104   7.750
*
 4.088   8.457 5.805 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.20 Cont.: Surv. Tobit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg. Marginal Effects for Censored Expected Value Y 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two period 
coefficients=0 
  dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 1.398 3.442 
 
-8.083
*
 4.384 
 
-9.481
*
 5.572 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.157 4.962 
 
-21.771
***
 6.976 
 
-21.614
**
 8.577 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 17.493
**
 7.582 
 
10.692 8.699 
 
-6.801 11.533 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 1.296 2.038 
 
0.950 3.162 
 
-0.346 3.784 
Ln(Sales) 3.228
***
 0.948 
 
1.630 1.559 
 
-1.598 1.823 
Proprietorship Organizational Form n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Partnership Organizational Form -8.068
**
 3.943 
 
5.083 6.987 
 
13.151 8.020 
Manufacturing Industry -11.940
***
 3.448 
 
-6.298 6.723 
 
5.641 7.573 
Wholesale Trade Industry -10.120
***
 3.396 
 
-11.043
*
 6.128 
 
-0.923 7.050 
Retail Trade Industry -11.060
***
 3.744 
 
-3.133 8.076 
 
7.926 8.914 
Business Services Industry 1.113 4.343 
 
-12.182
*
 6.363 
 
-13.294
*
 7.692 
Other Industries n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Education <= High School 5.438 6.093 
 
-0.649 6.602 
 
-6.088 8.979 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree -2.966 3.884 
 
8.819 7.871 
 
11.786 8.737 
Education = College Degree -3.069 4.024 
 
7.535 6.596 
 
10.604 7.748 
Leverage Ratio -0.236 0.182 
 
0.113 0.315 
 
0.350 0.365 
Profitability Ratio 0.058 0.288 
 
-2.030 1.388 
 
-2.089 1.418 
Current Assets Ratio -15.639
***
 4.650 
 
12.725
*
 7.560 
 
28.365
***
 8.885 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.027 0.025 
 
0.038 0.047 
 
0.011 0.053 
Credit Score = Average Risk -6.624
*
 3.413 
 
-11.630
**
 4.614 
 
-5.005 5.737 
Credit Score = Moderate Risk n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Credit Score = Low Risk -15.987
***
 2.555 
 
-14.687
***
 4.216 
 
1.300 4.920 
Whether LOC is secured 3.790 3.654 
 
10.835
**
 4.488 
 
7.045 5.795 
Ratio of LOC to sales -6.419 5.003 
 
-4.069 6.650 
 
2.350 8.322 
Number of observations 422               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
       The variables where the marginal effects cannot be calculated are represented by n/a. 
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Table 3.21: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
    
 
2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 0.101
*
 0.054 
 
-0.083 0.062 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Distance) -0.183
**
 0.082 
   
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.002 0.052 
 
-0.079 0.055 
Interaction for 2003- Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.081 0.075 
   
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -0.156 0.251 
 
-0.191 0.281 
Interaction for 2003 -Checking Account -0.035 0.377 
   
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.183 0.283 
 
0.010 0.265 
Interaction for 2003 -Savings Account 0.193 0.387 
   
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.047 0.197 
 
0.783
**
 0.326 
Interaction for 2003 - Previous Loan 0.735
*
 0.381 
   
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.229 0.198 
 
-0.237 0.181 
Interaction for 2003 -Financ. Management Services -0.465
*
 0.268 
   
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. 0.353
*
 0.188 
 
0.404
**
 0.206 
Interaction for 2003 -Single Source 0.051 0.279 
   
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.337 0.217 
 
-0.194 0.216 
Interaction for 2003 -Records -0.532
*
 0.306 
   
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview -0.094 0.312 
 
0.407 0.254 
Interaction for 2003 -Financial Records 0.502 0.403 
   
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.038 0.191 
 
-0.056 0.225 
Interaction for 2003 -Tax Return -0.094 0.295 
   
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.050 0.234 
 
0.182 0.196 
Interaction for 2003 -Conducting Bus. 0.232 0.305 
   
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.045 0.197 
 
-0.125 0.201 
Interaction for 2003-Herfindahl Index -0.170 0.281 
   
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.026 0.294 
 
-0.423 0.294 
Interaction for 2003 -Metropolitan -0.449 0.416 
   
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.769
***
 0.292 
 
0.584
*
 0.305 
Interaction for 2003 -Non-Depository or Non-Financial  1.353
***
 0.422 
   
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.537
***
 0.134 
 
-0.096 0.177 
Interaction for 2003 -Ln(1+ Age) 0.441
**
 0.222 
   
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.738
***
 0.205 
 
0.593
***
 0.212 
Interaction for 2003 -Proprietorship -0.145 0.295 
   
Partnership Organizational Form -0.136 0.271 
 
-0.020 0.382 
Interaction for 2003 -Partnership 0.117 0.469 
   
Manufacturing Industry -0.242 0.288 
 
-0.089 0.317 
Interaction for 2003 -Manufacturing 0.152 0.428 
   
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.425 0.340 
 
-0.513 0.399 
Interaction for 2003 -Wholesale Trade -0.088 0.524 
   
Retail Trade Industry -0.689
**
 0.302 
 
-0.934
***
 0.347 
Interaction for 2003 -Retail Trade -0.245 0.460 
   
Business Services Industry -0.296 0.277 
 
-0.389 0.285 
Interaction for 2003 -Business Services -0.093 0.397       
This regression compares year 1998 to year 2003. 
     ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.21 Cont.: Survey Linear Regression Results for Ln (Ratio of Amount of LOC Granted) 
 
    
 
2003 
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Err.   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 
Other Industries -0.174 0.452 
 
-0.264 0.393 
Interaction for 2003 -Other Industries -0.090 0.599 
   
Education <= High School -0.731
**
 0.309 
 
-0.160 0.285 
Interaction for 2003 -High School 0.571 0.420 
   
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree -0.412 0.262 
 
-0.327 0.295 
Interaction for 2003 -Assoc, Trade.. 0.085 0.394 
   
Education = College Degree -0.344 0.227 
 
-0.221 0.230 
Interaction for 2003 -College Degree 0.122 0.323 
   
Leverage Ratio -0.012 0.011 
 
-0.002 0.013 
Interaction for 2003 -Leverage 0.010 0.017 
   
Profitability Ratio -0.045
**
 0.022 
 
-0.038
**
 0.017 
Interaction for 2003 -Profitability 0.007 0.028 
   
Current Assets Ratio -0.089 0.303 
 
-0.025 0.327 
Interaction for 2003 -Current Assets Ratio 0.064 0.446 
   
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.003
**
 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.002 
Interaction for 2003 -Accts Receivable -0.004
*
 0.002 
   
Credit Score = Average Risk -0.490
**
 0.219 
 
-0.226 0.244 
Interaction for 2003 -Average Risk 0.264 0.328 
   
Credit Score = Moderate Risk -0.623
***
 0.221 
 
-0.254 0.219 
Interaction for 2003 -Moderate Risk 0.370 0.311 
   
Credit Score = Low Risk -0.207 0.307 
 
0.113 0.286 
Interaction for 2003 -Low Risk 0.320 0.420 
   
Whether LOC is secured 0.303 0.202 
 
0.788
***
 0.192 
Interaction for 2003 -Secured LOC 0.485
*
 0.279 
   
Whether Firm Has Trade Credit -0.298 0.265 
 
-0.283 0.289 
Interaction for 2003 -Trade Credit 0.014 0.392 
   
Whether Firm Pays Trade Credit Late -0.426
**
 0.206 
 
-0.588
**
 0.240 
Interaction for 2003 -Trade Credit Late -0.163 0.316 
   
Time Dummy for 2003 -0.838 1.107 
   
Constant -0.563 0.716 
   
Number of observation 515 
    R-Squared 0.345         
This regression compares year 1998 to year 2003. 
     ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE DRIVERS OF FARM CONSUMPTION AND RELATIONSHIP 
TO INCOME: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION FOR ILLINOIS 
FARM HOUSEHOLDS BASED ON THE LIFE CYCLE / 
PERMANENT INCOME HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Farmers’ income, unlike income for non-farm households, is often subject to great 
uncertainty from weather and fluctuations in commodity prices. Farm income variations caused by 
these uncertainties are expected to change farm household consumption patterns. The objective of 
this study is to empirically investigate how changes in farm household income affect farm household 
consumption patterns. Using Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) annual data for Illinois 
farmers from 1995 to 2009, this study tests the consistency of the life cycle / permanent income 
hypothesis for farm households and examines how U.S. commercial farmers decide their 
consumption patterns. In particular, do they base their consumption decisions on their transitory 
income or their expected lifetime income? 
According to the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis, farmers are expected to include 
possible income fluctuations into their lifetime income and plan consumption levels that will be 
consistent over their lifetime. In the case of temporary income decreases, farm households will still 
keep their previously determined lifetime consumption levels, through finding alternative sources of 
income such as consuming from saved income, borrowing, or working off the farm.89 Changes in 
income can produce significant changes in consumption when farmers do not possess sufficient 
collateral or experience seasonal difficulty in obtaining credit. This study seeks to analyze whether 
the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis is empirically consistent with the consumption behavior 
                                                          
89 
The life cycle / permanent income hypothesis developed by Modigliani and Friedman is one of the major 
constructs that has been used to explain consumption smoothing. The life cycle / permanent income hypothesis 
dictates that households make their consumption decisions based on their expectations of total lifetime income. 
Although a household’s income may vary, it does not affect consumption decisions of the household as long as 
income variability does not affect long-run average income or permanent income of the household.  
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of farm households. To answer the research question, this study applies an empirical model based on 
the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis.  
There have been contradictory conclusions in the previous literature about determinants of 
household consumption. Most consumption literature has concluded that consumers’ consumption 
levels are based on their transitory income resources. However, some of the literature has provided 
evidence that households consume out of their permanent income. This paper adds to the literature on 
farm household consumption by using a recent and rich dataset of farm consumption and income 
measures at micro-data level. One challenge for the consumption literature has been to find micro-
data with consumer living expenditure information. The FBFM is a rich dataset with consumer 
expenditure information for farmers. Hence, this paper uses the most recent farm level data, the 
FBFM data for Illinois farmers, to reach more accurate conclusions about recent farm household 
consumption behaviors. 
With the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, understanding economic growth is crucial to 
strengthening the economy and dealing with the consequences of the crisis. Farm consumption 
behavior has an important indirect role in determining the ability of farms to invest and grow and 
thus in determining economic growth. In the Midwestern part of the U.S., the bulk of farm 
investment is in land and machinery, and through these investments, farm households increase 
production. That is why it is important to analyze farm consumption behavior to better understand 
farm production and local economic growth. Additionally, farm production has effects on imports 
and exports. Policies on imports and exports can benefit from a better understanding of the relation 
between income and consumption.  
An understanding of the drivers of farm consumption and relationships to farm income will 
help government to have a better understanding of the likely impacts of future agricultural policies on 
farm households. For instance, with governmental payment programs to farm households such as 
those in the 2008 and 2002 farm bills, the government aims at stabilizing and supporting farm 
household income during volatile earning years which might result because of changes in commodity 
prices or changes in weather conditions. 90 If the findings from this study support the notion that farm 
                                                          
90
 Since it is harder for farmers compared to non-farmers to adjust their production to short-run market signals, 
markets do not efficiently equilibrate supply with demand. In the short-run when demand for farm products rises, 
farmers cannot increase their production immediately. They can only adjust their capacity in the long-run. To help 
farmers, federal support began in the 1930s (Hull, 2006). The 2002 Farm Bill was significant because it improved 
the financial position of farmers. Its purpose was to stabilize and support farm income through direct payments, 
counter-cyclical payments, and providing loans and loan deficiency payments. Direct payments are fixed amounts 
paid to farm households independent of current production or current market prices but linked to historical cropping 
patterns. Counter-cyclical payments are provided to farmers when market prices are below determined target prices. 
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consumption behavior is consistent with the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis, one might 
conclude that farm households are less liquidity constrained because they can better smooth their 
income compared to non-farm households due to counter-cyclical governmental support provided to 
farm households. If support is found for the hypothesis, any future policies that involve farm 
household income and consumption should focus on permanent, but not transitory, income changes 
because farm households will only adjust their consumption based on permanent income changes.  
 
4.2 Literature Review  
 
The relevant literature focuses on understanding the consistency of household consumption 
behavior for non-farm households with the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis. Most previous 
studies have rejected the hypothesis and concluded that current income significantly explains 
consumption for non-farm households. However, there have also been contradictory results regarding 
the validity of the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis for farm household consumption. The 
models and data used in the previous consumption literature are explained in more detail.  
Some studies use aggregate data to analyze the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis. For 
instance, Flavin (1981), by using National Income and Product Accounts data, finds that current 
income is significant in explaining consumption and rejects the life cycle / permanent income 
hypothesis. Campbell and Mankiw (1990) use aggregate postwar U.S. data and find that consumption 
tracks current income closely. Even if they adjust their model for the assumptions of non-constant 
real interest rates and non-separability of the utility function, they still find that current income is 
significant but real interest rates are not significant in consumption determination and that there is no 
evidence in favor of a non-separability feature in the utility function. The deviation from the life 
cycle / permanent income hypothesis cannot be due to the non-constant real interest rates or the non-
separability feature of the utility function. 
Wirjanto (1991) uses quarterly postwar Canadian data and, similar to Campbell and Mankiw 
(1990), he finds that consumption of Canadian consumers does not follow the life cycle / permanent 
income hypothesis even under the assumptions of non-constant real interest rates or the non-
separability feature of utility functions. Rao and Sharma (2007) apply the Campbell and Mankiw 
(1990) framework for a developing country, Fiji. They find that the proportion of consumers who 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The loans aimed to give farmers short-term funds so that they can pay their expenses until their commodities are 
sold (Monke, 2006).  
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consume out of their permanent income is 40 percent higher in Australia compared to in Fiji.91 A 
study by Shea (1995) looks at reasons for the failure of the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis, 
which are myopia and liquidity constraints. By using quarterly aggregate time series data from 1956 
to 1988, he finds that neither myopia nor liquidity constraints characterize the U.S. aggregate 
consumption behavior.92 On the contrary, unlike some of the findings in the literature noted above, 
Dejuan et al. (2004) apply the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis for the 48 contiguous U.S. 
states and find that state level consumption follows the permanent income hypothesis.  
Some of the literature, on the other hand, uses household level data and analyzes the 
consistency of the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis for households. Carroll (1994), using 
data both from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, finds 
that consumption is related to predicted current income but unrelated to expected lifetime income. 
However, future income uncertainty affects consumption, and consumers facing greater income 
uncertainty consume less. Likewise, Lusardi (1996), using data both from the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, finds that consumption is sensitive to predictable 
current income changes.  
Some studies focus on the effects of liquidity constraints on household consumption behavior 
to explain the failure of the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis. Hayashi (1985) finds that low 
saving households are unable to consume as much as they want due to their borrowing constraints.93 
Zeldes (1989) tests for the implications of consumption in the presence of borrowing constraints by 
using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and he finds that the inability to borrow against 
future income significantly affects consumption behavior for consumers. Research by Wilcox (1989) 
suggests that liquidity constraints which might be caused by higher nominal interest rates and a 
higher unemployment rate, affect the consumption patterns of consumers.94  
                                                          
91
 Due to limited inter-temporal substitution because of liquidity constraints in a developing country, Rao and 
Sharma (2007) expect the proportion of consumers who consume out of their permanent income to be lower in Fiji 
than in Australia.   
92 Under myopia, consumption is a direct function of current income and thus, myopia causes a symmetric relation 
between consumption and income. On the other hand, the liquidity constraint states that even if consumers cannot 
borrow, they can save and they can use the savings to smooth out the consumption when income decreases. Thus, 
under liquidity constraint there is an asymmetric relation between income and consumption, and consumption 
should be more strongly related to expected income increases than to expected income decreases.  
93
 Hayashi (1985) separates the sample into high saving households and low saving households and assumes high 
saving households are not liquidity constrained. He finds that Tobit estimates of the reduced form equation for the 
high saving households over-predict consumption for the whole sample.  
94
 According to Wilcox (1989), lenders extend financing to consumers whose payment-to-income ratios are below a 
specified level. Hence, unemployed consumers will face liquidity constraints. Since these lending parameters also 
adjust slowly for inflation, consumers will still face liquidity constraints once nominal interest rates increase.  
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In addition to these studies, some of the literature focuses specifically on consumption 
behavior of farm households. There are also mixed results about the validity of the life cycle / 
permanent income hypothesis for farm households. Langemeier and Patrick (1990) use four 
consumption models to examine the marginal propensity to consume for a sample of Illinois farms 
from 1979 to 1986. They find that changes in income have little effect on farm family consumption. 
Another study by Langemeier and Patrick (1993) investigates whether farm families are liquidity 
constrained and it uses data from 1976 to 1990 for Illinois and Kansas farms. Langemeier and Patrick 
(1993) observe that in contrast to wage earners or non-farm families, farm families’ consumption 
behaviors are not liquidity constrained and they state that farm families can use their land as 
collateral and thus, have easier access to other sources of funds; for instance, a farm family with good 
collateral or equity position may borrow in a low income year and repay debt in a high income year. 
Abdullahi and Langemeier (2000) uses the Kansas farm management database from 1989 to 1998 
and provide evidence that the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis is valid for modeling farm 
consumption. However, Phimister (1995), by using a sample of Dutch dairy farms, finds that farm 
households do not act in accordance with the life cycle model, which may be due to the fact that farm 
households can be liquidity constrained. He also supports the claim that there are binding borrowing 
constraints for farmers.  
Paxson (1993) investigates whether household consumption tracks seasonal income. By 
using Thailand farm data, she finds that seasonal variations in prices or preferences rather than 
income affect the seasonal household consumption variation.  Kwon et al. (2006), using Iowa farm 
household data, investigate how off-farm labor supply decisions are affected by changes in 
permanent and transitory income. They find that off-farm labor supply of both spouses declines with 
increases in permanent farm income, but only the off-farm labor supply of the wife decreases with 
increases in transitory farm income. They conclude off-farm income is one way for farm households 
to smooth their consumption, but they do not think that this necessarily implies farm households are 
not being liquidity constrained unless leisure consumption is also smoothed.  
As seen above, the literature has mixed results regarding the validity of the life cycle / 
permanent income hypothesis. Additionally, the literature on farm households uses observations from 
past years to analyze the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis. Most of the studies on farm 
consumption use data that, at most, goes through the late 1990s. Furthermore, the literature does not 
have a large variety of datasets that have information about household living expenses. This study 
uses the FBFM dataset from 1995 to 2009. The year 2009 is a relatively recent year for the analysis 
of farm household consumption behavior. The FBFM dataset is also rich in micro-level consumption 
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information for farm households. Thus, this study is expected to provide recent information regarding 
farm household consumption behavior in Illinois.    
 
4.3 Model 
 
This study applies a model based on the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis. The life 
cycle / permanent income hypothesis states that household consumption is initially determined by 
lifetime income, which is current and future levels of income. Any temporary variation in income is 
offset by appropriate asset transfers between periods such as borrowing funds when extra funds are 
needed and paying back once income is higher so that a household can continue to afford previously 
determined consumption levels. When income changes permanently, in a way that was not 
previously anticipated, household’s current and future levels of consumption will adapt to these 
permanent changes. Deaton (1992) defines these unanticipated changes in income, the innovation uit, 
as the changes in household’s expectations about its income and refers to these changes as permanent 
income changes, for household i in time period t. As new information becomes available, the 
household revises previously held expectations about its current and future income.  Based on these 
new expectations, the household will adjust its consumption. Changes in consumption are explained 
by the changes in permanent income that are accounted for with this new information. 
Previous literature on the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis analyzes consumption 
behavior through excess sensitivity parameters, which requires looking at the significance of the β 
parameter on the consumption change in the following equation.  
(4.1) it it it itc y u         
where Δcit = cit-cit-1 is the change in consumption for household i in time period t, Δyit = yit-yit-1 is the 
change in current income,  is the constant, β is the coefficient of the variable Δyit , uit is the 
innovation, and εit is the error term.  
Δyit is the change in the current income, but not the change in permanent income. It is hard to 
measure permanent income in empirical work, hence, the effects of the permanent income, the 
innovation uit, is captured in the error term, εit, the error associated with the prediction of 
consumption change, as in equation (4.1). The life cycle / permanent income hypothesis implies that 
β=0. Deaton (1992) states that if β is positive, then, according to the excess sensitivity hypothesis, 
consumption responds to predictable changes in income and this contradicts the life cycle / 
permanent income hypothesis.  
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Following Campbell and Mankiw (1990), this study hypothetically assumes there are two 
groups of agents within the population, the first group (N1) consuming current income, c1t = y1t, and 
the second group (N2) consuming permanent income, c2t = y
p
2t, where cit is the consumption for group 
i in time period t, yit is the current income, and y
p
it is the permanent income.
95 This study defines the 
first difference for the first group’s consumption levels as Δc1t = Δy1t and the second group’s as Δc2t 
= Δyp2t. For the first group, β>0 (for accuracy refer to this β as β1) and for the second group β=0 (for 
accuracy refer to this β as β2) in equation (4.1). Hence, for a population where there are two groups of 
agents, the coefficient β in equation (4.1) represents the weighted average of the first group’s β who 
consume from their current income, which is β = 
  
(     )
  .
96  
This study is interested in the significance of the β in equation (4.1) and tests for the 
hypothesis β=0. The assumption is that if there are some farmers who consume out of their current 
income, for each seasonal predictable fluctuation, their consumption will be sensitive to predictable 
income changes and the hypothesis β=0 will be rejected. However, if farmers do not face liquidity 
constraints and they can borrow or transfer assets between periods during seasonal fluctuations in 
their income to smooth their consumption, then it will only be through changes in permanent income 
that they will revise their consumption habits and adopt new consumption levels. In this case, the 
hypothesis β=0 will not be rejected.  
The data for this study is unbalanced panel data and it is important to also include time fixed 
effects within equation (4.1). The time fixed effects can be attributed to factors that are common 
across farm households but change over time. An example is changes in farm legislation or policies. 
These legislation or policy changes may determine the changes in farm consumption levels and all 
farm households are affected in similar ways from these changes but those effects might differ over 
the years. On the other hand, household fixed effects may determine consumption levels but not the 
changes in consumption. By taking the differences, the household fixed effects are dropped from the 
equation and are excluded from equation (4.1). Moreover, consumption changes may also be 
                                                          
95
 Campbell and Mankiw (1990) assume that the first group is liquidity constrained. 
96
 This study assumes there are two populations of size N1 and N2 and the standard errors are the same for every 
member of these two populations. For the first population the coefficient is β>0 and for the second population β=0 
in equation (4.1). Let's call the beta for the first group β1 and for the second group β2for accuracy, so we have β1>0 
and β2=0. To measure anything which is linear in the population, the effective (or average) coefficient should be the 
average of the two coefficients β1 and β2.  Notice that there are N1 people with β1 and N2 people with β2, and 
N1+N2 total people.  Therefore the average coefficient should be   
         
(     )
. Since β2=0, then   
  
(     )
  . 
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dependent on farm household characteristics and compositions such as age and number of people 
living in the household. The changes in consumption can be written as   
(4.2) 
1 1
n r
it it k itk t t it it
k t
c y H T u    
 
         ,  
where the dependent variable is the year to year change in consumption level for household i from 
year t-1 to t. The explanatory variables are Δyit for the year to year change in current income levels, 
Hitk for the household characteristics and composition with k standing for household head’s age, 
whether farm household has children, number of members living in the household (size), region in 
which farm is located, farm type, and owned land ratio, and Tt for the year fixed effects. α is the 
constant, ϕ, ξ ,and χ are the coefficients of variables, uit is the innovation, and εit is the error term. 
Since uit is not observed, it is considered along with the error term in equation (4.2).  
The consumption literature treats Δyit as endogenous since it is correlated with the uit in the 
error term. This study uses the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation method and instruments 
for the Δyit. The final model used for this study is  
(4.3) 
1
1 1
s
it m itm it
m
n r
it it k itk t t it
k t
y Z
c y H T
 
    



 
    
      

 
 
In equation (4.3), Zitm are the instrumental variables with m representing lagged values of 
changes in current income, changes in consumption, and savings that are excluded from the second 
stage regression and time dummies and household characteristics such as age, whether household has 
children or not, size, region, farm type, and owned land ratio that are the independent variables in the 
second stage regression. ς and τ are the constants, Ω, ω, δ, and κ are the coefficients for the variables, 
and γit and πit are the error terms. Instrumenting current income changes with lagged values of 
income provides information regarding transitory income changes. This study uses the model in (4.3) 
and tests for the significance of ω. Rejecting the null, ω=0, states that there are some farm 
households that do not smooth their consumption, but instead adjust their consumption levels based 
on changes in their current income.  
As previously mentioned, the consumption literature including Campbell and Mankiw 
(1990), uses instrumental variables for Δy.97 It is indicative that one year lagged values for current 
income changes may still be correlated with the innovation due to the previous year’s expectations 
                                                          
97
 Campbell and Mankiw (1990) state that since ut is an innovation, it is orthogonal to any variable that is in the 
consumer’s information set at t-1, but not necessarily to Δy. 
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about income. That is why in the literature, generally, at least two year lagged values of Δy as well as 
two year lagged values of Δc are used as instruments for Δy. According to Campbell (1987), the 
history of c is also a good instrument for Δy since it summarizes the agent’s information about the 
future of the y process. So, this study uses the two to four year lagged values for change in current 
income levels (Δyit-2 = yit-2  - yit-3, Δyit-3 = yit-3  - yit-4, and Δyit-4 = yit-4  - yit-5) , two to four year lagged 
values for changes in consumption levels (Δcit-2 = cit-2  - cit-3, Δcit-3 = cit-3  - cit-4, and Δcit-4 = cit-4  - cit-5), 
and two to four year lagged values for savings amount (sit-2 = yit-2 – cit-2, sit-3 = yit-3 – cit-3, and sit-4 = yit-
4 – cit-4) as instruments for Δyit.
98 Table 4.1 contains the variable definitions. All variables with dollar 
values are inflation adjusted based on 2009, by using the inflation calculator from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  
 
4.4 Data and Variables  
 
This empirical analysis uses unbalanced panel data from the Illinois FBFM Association from 
1995 to 2009. The FBFM dataset is composed of commercial farmers from Illinois and these farmers 
are larger than average farmers in the U.S. Furthermore, all the accounting measures used from this 
dataset are on an accrual basis and represent the calendar years from January 1st throughout 
December 31st. Since the study uses two to four year lagged values for some of the variables, the 
model requires at least six years of data for each household. In this study, there is no severe 
multicollinearity problem among the variables.99  
For the dependent variable, consumption levels are measured by family living expenses 
reported in the FBFM data. Family living expenses include tax deductible contributions, medical 
expenses, taxes and interest on residence, child care, and expenses on food, laundry and cleaning 
supplies, furnishings, insurance premiums, house repairs, clothing, entertainment, education, and 
transportation. 
                                                          
98
 Even though income may show a log functional form, this study couldn’t take the log values for income because 
of negative income values within the sample. Also, negative savings within the sample might imply that a farm 
household uses debt or liquidates previously obtained assets to meet their consumption needs.  
99
 The only two variables that are highly correlated are the size of household and the dummy whether household has 
dependent children. Even though the correlation matrix shows a correlation coefficient of 0.75 between these two 
variables, they both are included in the model because the correlation was concluded not to be severe. This 
correlation is not major because the sample size is large. Also, the Variation of Inflation Factor between these two 
variables is 2.32 which is less than 5 and the Condition Number is 7.39 which is less than 15, verifying that the 
multicollinearity between these two variables is not severe. Moreover, the correlation between the coefficients of 
these two variables obtained from 2SLS is only 0.62. Also, dropping one of these variables interchangeably did not 
produce significant shifts or changes in the coefficient values, significances, and signs for the other variables within 
the model. Since both of these variables are important to include for the consumption model and there is not a severe 
multicollinearity problem, it is better to include both of these variables in the model.  
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Current income (y) is measured by net farm income and net non-farm income. To get net 
non-farm income, non-farm business expenses are subtracted from gross non-farm income. For the 
calculation of net farm income, the FBMF subtracts operating expenses from gross farm returns and 
additionally adjusts for tax, depreciation and amortization depending on gains and losses on 
machinery and building sales. The gross farm returns are calculated from crop and livestock sales, 
government payments to the farmer, other farm receipts and settlements, and adjustments for 
accounts receivable. The operating expenses include cash from operating expenses and adjustments 
for prepaid expenses, accounts payable, and interest expense. Due to endogeneity issues, changes in 
current income are instrumented with two to four year lagged values for savings, changes in current 
income, and changes in consumption.  
Different than for non-farm households, farm household income is not really realized until 
the farmers can sell their harvest. For instance, farm household income from 2009 is not known until 
January to March 2010 because farmers cannot really sell their harvest from October 2009 before 
January through March 2010. Even though theoretically, income in 2009 is associated with 
consumption in 2009, for farm households consumption in 2009 is only realized through income in 
2008. However, this is not expected to cause any effect on the model because this study uses two to 
four year lagged values of current income changes, consumption changes, and savings to instrument 
for current income changes and the delay of income changes is smoothed out by these lagged values.  
Savings (s) is calculated by subtracting consumption from current income values. The 
savings behavior for farm households is different than that of non-farm households. A farm 
household generally uses any funds left after consumption to invest in land or machinery and uses 
these resources to increase their production whereas a non-farm household invests in financial 
markets as a saving behavior.  
The age variable, measured by “date of operator’s birth subtracted from the year the data 
corresponds to”, captures the changes in consumption habits of the head of household. As the 
household head ages, his changes in consumption will be high because of increased expenses due to 
acquiring a spouse and children. Another explanation is that the household head obtains a more 
steady position in his job and can afford more relaxed spending over time. Age squared is also 
included to capture a possible non-linear relationship. After increasing up to a point, the change in 
consumption of the household is expected to decrease. A possible period for the decrease in 
consumption changes is when the household head retires, a time period when cash inflow is 
decreased.  
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When a household has children, its living expenses increase due to additional money spent on 
feeding children, their education, and social needs, and changes in consumption levels are expected 
to be higher. However, it is also probable that once a household has children, they plan ahead for the 
needs of children, start saving, and therefore keep their consumption steady or slightly lower. Hence, 
this results in a smaller change of consumption. The FBFM dataset includes age of the oldest 
dependent child variable with this variable being zero for a childless household. This variable is used 
to create a dummy that equals 1 for a household that has children.100  
As household size increases, its demand for goods and services increases. Size of the 
household is measured by the “number of household members” variable in the FBFM dataset.  
 Cost of living varies between each of the different regions of Illinois, i.e. Northern, Central, 
and Southern and is highest in Northern Illinois (Illinois Association of Realtors, 2005 market 
statistics). A dummy variable is defined for households that are located in Northern Illinois and 
compared to households in Southern and Central Illinois, which are categorized under other regions 
of Illinois.101  
Farm types within the FBFM data include hog, grain, part-time grain, dairy grain, dairy, beef, 
and irrigated sand. 102 Grain farms have more fluctuation in their incomes because their production is 
more likely to be affected by weather changes. Hence, they may be more cautious about their 
consumption behavior compared to other farm types whose production depends on livestock. Farms 
that are part-time grain or dairy grain have a certain percentage of production from either off farm 
activities or dairy production. That is why the dataset considers these farms separate from the grain 
farms. A dummy is created for grain farms and the rest of the farms are categorized under other farm 
types.  
If the household leases the majority of tillable acres, the household is more credit constrained 
because it will have harder time showing the land as collateral and thus, the household will adjust its 
consumption behavior with fluctuations in its income. If the household owns most of its farmland, 
the household is more flexible in keeping its predetermined consumption behavior because a land 
                                                          
100
 To prevent collinearity between the dummy representing whether a household has children or not and age of the 
oldest dependent child, the variable “age of the oldest dependent child” is omitted.  
101
I do not create a dummy variable for Southern Illinois because only 1.8 percent of the sample is in Southern 
Illinois, hence there is not too much variation. Instead, I only focus on households in Northern Illinois and compare 
these to households in other regions of Illinois, which are Central and Southern Illinois.  
102
 The farm types are determined through how much percentage of return is obtained through raising hog, dairy, 
beef, and so on. If a certain percentage of return comes from raising grain, then the farm is considered grain. 
However, a grain farm can also raise hogs, beef, and so on. The farm type referred to as part-time grain, includes a 
certain percentage of hours off-the farm, which is why they are considered part-time grain.  
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owner can easily borrow when he faces declines in his income since he can use land as collateral. 
Farmland tenure is defined by “owned amount of acres/total acres put into production”.103  
 Since this study uses households that have at least six consecutive years of data in the FBFM 
dataset, the time dummies that represent time fixed effects range only from 2001 to 2009. The year 
2000 is the reference year. 
 
4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.2 reports the mean and standard deviation statistics for the variables in this paper.104 
The table includes the mean statistics for each year and also reports the average for the overall years 
for each variable. The farm operators are on average 53.44 years old with a standard deviation of 
9.28. Also, 57 percent of the households have dependent children living with them and there are on 
average 3.18 people living within the household. The mean values for each of these variables, the 
age, households having dependent children, and the number of people living within the household, 
are relatively stable over time. The percent of households that are located in Northern Illinois have 
increased over time and it is 19 percent on average with a standard deviation of 40 percent, and the 
rest of the households are mostly located in Central Illinois. Moreover, 91 percent of the farms are on 
average grain farms and farm households own on average 19 percent of the acres put into production.  
There is a little variation in the mean values for the variables, grain farms and tenure ratio, over time.  
On average, households have annual income levels of $151,756 with a standard deviation of 
$129,336. However, Table 4.2 indicates that income for farm households varied through time. The 
average income levels ranged as low as $69,304 in 2001 and as high as $261,936 in 2007 and 
$256,560 in 2008. The increases in average income in 2007 and in 2008 are most probably due to 
high commodity prices during those periods. Also, income changes are the highest in 2007 and 2009. 
The descriptive statistics for two to four year lagged changes in income are also provided in Table 
4.2. These descriptive statistics validate that farm households have more volatile income compared to 
non-farm households, which might be explained by changes in weather and fluctuations in 
commodity prices.  
                                                          
103
 Due to data limitations, the effect of whether land owners with and without mortgages have different attitudes 
cannot be examined.  
104
 The descriptive statistics for the sample of 2,812 is described in the paper since that is the sample that is mostly 
used. However, one of the categories of instrumental variables in the paper includes only the lagged values of 
savings and only five years of data is needed for a farm household to be included in the sample. Hence, the dataset 
includes an additional year, 1999. The descriptive statistics based on this sample is available upon request but it is 
worth noting that on average the descriptive values are similar to the ones in Table 4.2. 
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The farm households in the sample on average consume $69,438 with a standard deviation of 
$30.055. Over the years, the consumption for farm households is not as volatile as their income, 
ranging on average from $60,000 to $75,000 from 2000 to 2009. When changes in household 
consumption are compared with changes in income over the years, a direct relation cannot be 
concluded. For instance, even though income on average decreased in 2008 by $6,391 compared to 
2007, the consumption on average increased by $6,376 in 2008. Also, on average when farm 
household income increased by $4,937 in 2002 and by $39,857 in 2006 compared to previous years, 
the household consumption decreased by $1,440 in 2002 and by $519 in 2006. Hence, the hypothesis 
of whether consumption changes are explained by changes in current income is worth analyzing 
further. Moreover, the mean values for two to four year lagged changes in consumption are available 
in Table 4.2. Farm households on average save $82,319 per year, with standard deviations of 
$124,773 respectively. Over the years, there are changes in the mean value for savings amount, 
which is explained by the volatile income but relatively more stable consumption levels. 
Additionally, the mean values for two to four year lagged savings amounts are provided in Table 4.2. 
 
4.6 Results 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section reports the instrument 
validity tests for the instrumental variables and the second sub-section provides the 2SLS regression 
results.  
 
4.6.1 Instrument Validity Tests 
 
Table 4.3 reports the tests for the instrument validity, that the instruments are relevant and 
exogenous. Column one of Table 4.3 reports the row numbers. These row numbers help to name each 
set of instruments and make it easy to refer to when test results are described. Column two shows the 
sets of excluded instruments used to predict for changes in current income, which are lagged current 
income changes, consumption changes, and savings. Column three reports the adjusted R square, 
partial F, and partial p-values from the first stage regression of changes in current income on the total 
set of instruments, which are lagged current income changes, consumption changes, and savings, as 
well as age, size, region, dummy for dependent children, owned land ratio, farm type, and the time 
dummies. The partial F statistics and p-values test the joint significance of the excluded instruments 
on current income changes, with the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments have a coefficient 
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value of zero. Column four reports the Hansen-J overidentification test statistics and the p-values 
from the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are exogenous and not related to the error 
term.  
Lagged current income changes and lagged savings have significant forecasting power for 
current income changes. For the sets of instruments, lagged current income changes and lagged 
savings from rows one and two, the F statistics on the excluded instruments from the first stage 
regression are 10.85 and 13.01, respectively. The null hypothesis that the instruments have a 
coefficient value of zero is rejected. It can be concluded that the instruments are relevant to the 
current income changes. Additionally, the Hansen-J statistics for both instrument sets from rows one 
and two are 1.528 and 2.225 with p-values of 0.4658 and 0.3287, respectively. These results show 
that lagged current income changes and lagged savings are exogenous and not related to the error 
term. Hence, lagged current income changes and savings are good instruments for predicting current 
income changes. This study also uses the lagged current income changes and savings together, as in 
row three, as an instrument set for the current income changes. The F-statistic from that set of 
instruments is 6.55 with a p-value of 0.0000 and the Hansen-J statistic is 5.825 with a p-value of 
0.3236. The F-statistic of 6.55 is lower than the previous F-statistics found which are 10.85 and 
13.01. However, the combination of lagged changes in current income and savings are still valid 
instruments for current income changes. 
Lagged values of changes in consumption are also added in the sets of instruments but the 
test results show that these are not valid instruments by themselves. Instead, I include lagged values 
of consumption changes as instrumental variables along with lagged values of income changes and 
savings. Different combinations of lagged current income changes, savings, and consumption 
changes as sets of instruments as in rows four, five, six, and seven show that the F-statistics from 
those combinations are 6.54, 5.54, or 5.63 with p-values of 0.0000, and that the Hansen-J statistics 
are 6.004, 6.025, or 6.085, with p-values of 0.3059, 0.3038, or 0.4137, respectively. The adjusted R 
squares from the first stage regression for all sets of instruments range around 35 percent. This study 
shows that even though lagged changes in current income and savings have better forecasting power, 
different combinations of lagged current income changes, consumption changes, and savings still 
have significant forecasting power and can be used to instrument for current income changes.  
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4.6.2 Regression Results 
 
Table 4.4 reports the parameter estimates from the 2SLS regression, under different scenarios 
of instruments for changes in current income. Unlike the findings of Campbell and Mankiw (1990) 
and other related consumption literature for non-farm households, this study finds that for farm 
households, changes in current income have no significant explanatory power for changes in 
consumption and this is true for all the scenarios of instruments. This result is also consistent with the 
findings of Langemeier and Patrick (1993) and Abdullahi and Langemeier (2000) for farm 
households and supports the validity of the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis for farm 
households. This result suggests that farm households base their consumption decisions on their 
lifetime income. Even if farm households face transitory income changes, they still keep their 
predetermined consumption levels.  
One explanation for households to keep their predetermined consumption levels during 
transitory income changes is that farm households are less liquidity constrained because the U.S. 
government provides additional funding sources, for instance through federal farm support programs, 
to farmers to help them in their low income years. For instance, the 2002 farm bill helps to stabilize 
and support farm income through direct payments, loan programs, and counter cyclical programs. 
Following the 2002 farm bill, the 2008 farm bill provides farmers protection against revenue 
shortfalls under Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) payments. These additional programs 
stabilize farm household income during transitory income changes and allow farm households to 
keep their previously determined lifetime consumption levels. Additionally, farm families can use 
their land as collateral and have easier access to loans. Furthermore, farm families can work off the 
farm to make additional income during low income years. By having access to all these additional 
sources of income, compared to non-farm households, it appears to be easier for farm households to 
afford the same consumption levels even if they experience seasons with lower crop yields or when 
the commodity prices are lower.  
Changes in farm household consumption are best explained by two variables, whether the 
household has dependent children and the number of people within the household. These findings are 
consistent when changes in current income are instrumented with only the lagged values of changes 
in current income or any combination of lagged values of current income changes, consumption 
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changes, or savings as featured in Table 4.4.105 Consumption changes for farm households with 
dependent children are approximately $3,500 lower compared to households with no dependent 
children. Even though household expenses may increase when households transition from having no 
children to having children, it is also possible that having a child pushes the household to better 
planning for their future compared to one that does not have a dependent child. Under the assumption 
that households plan ahead for the needs of children and save for the future, they will have a lower 
change of consumption.  
For each additional household member, consumption changes are approximately $760 more. 
Note that when interpreting the coefficient for the household size variable, the number of dependent 
children is held constant within the household. One way to increase the size of the household is to 
include a relative such as a grandparent who starts to live with the household. The additional increase 
in consumption expenses may be explained by the fact that having already planned for their 
children’s future, having additional people in the family increases the household living expenses due 
to increased demand for goods and services. The 2SLS regression results also show that time 
dummies for 2005 and 2002 are consistently significant. 
When only the lagged values of savings is used to instrument for current income changes, the 
above results in regards to variables, size of household and whether household has children, can no 
longer be supported. I only find time dummies for 2008, 2004, 2003 and 2000 to be significant.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis is 
consistent with the consumption behavior of farm households. The consumption literature for non-
farm households in general finds that the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis does not hold, and 
households respond to transitory changes in income by adjusting their consumption levels. One 
possible explanation for the failure of the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis is that non-farm 
households are liquidity constrained. However, there are a few studies that find support for the 
hypothesis. Literature on farm household consumption does not provide consistent results, either. 
Some studies such as Langemeier and Patrick (1990 and 1993) and Abdullahi and Langemeier 
(2000) find that the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis is valid for farmers whereas some other 
                                                          
105
 This study uses all the instruments, lagged values of current income changes, consumption changes, and savings 
at the same time but due to collinearity between the lags of consumption changes, income changes, and savings, 
only one lagged period has to be included either for savings or consumption changes.  
138 
 
studies such as Phimister (1995) find that farm households are as well liquidity constrained and they 
may still adjust their consumption levels based on their transitory income changes.  
This study uses a rich dataset of farm consumption and income measures in micro-data level, 
the FBFM data for Illinois farms from 1995 to 2009, to reach more accurate conclusions for recent 
farm household consumption behavior. Using a 2SLS model, this study finds evidence that current 
income changes are not significant in explaining consumption changes of farm households, thus 
confirming the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis for farm households. This result indicates 
that even if farm households face transitory income changes which might result either from changes 
in commodity prices or changes in production levels due to uncertainty in weather conditions, farm 
households do not adjust their consumption behavior but still continue consuming their 
predetermined consumption levels.  
One possible explanation is that farm households are less liquidity constrained because farm 
households can use their land as collateral to obtain credit during income fluctuations and farmers 
can also work off the farm to make additional income during low income years. Moreover, additional 
funding sources provided to farmers by the U.S. government through farm bills help farmers to 
smooth their income during low income years. Thus, farm households have easier access to 
additional sources of funds to smooth their income during transitory income changes.  In the future, it 
may also be worth analyzing the individual components of farm household income and how farm 
consumption behavior changes in the absence of government payments to farmers. This would also 
provide explicit information regarding the extent of success farm bills have in smoothing farm 
household income during income fluctuations.  
Farm consumption helps to determine the ability of farms to invest and grow, with effects on 
production levels. Understanding the relationship between farm income and consumption will also 
help government to better evaluate the effects of its policies on imports, exports, and local economic 
growth. Moreover, policies on farm households should account for the possibility that farm 
consumption behavior is determined by permanent income changes because farm households do not 
have as much liquidity constraint as non-farm households due to additional sources of funds provided 
to farm households during volatile income periods. Policies that involve farmer income should focus 
on permanent but not transitory income changes because farm households can easily smooth their 
income and will only adjust their consumption based on permanent income changes.  
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4.9 Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Variable Definitions 
  Variables  Definitions 
  Dependent Variable:  
   Changes in Consumption  (Family Living Expenses t)-(Family Living Expenses t-1)
a
 
  Explanatory Variables: 
   Changes in Income (Net Farm Income + Net Non-Farm Income t)-(Net Farm Income + Net Non-Farm Income t-1)
b
 
  Age of Household Head Year the data corresponds to-Operator's Birth Year 
  Household Has Children Dummy for Household Having Dependent Children 
c
 
  Size of Household Number of Household Members 
  Region in Which Household is Located Dummy for Northern Illinois 
d
 
  Farm Type Dummy for Grain Farm Type 
e
 
  Tenure Ratio (Owned Acres/Total Acres Put into Production) 
  Instruments for Changes in Income 
   Lagged Changes in Income 2, 3, and 4 year lagged; (Income t-2-Income t-3),  (Income t-3-Income t-4), (Income t-4-Income t-5) 
  Lagged Changes in Consumption 2, 3, and 4 year lagged; (Cons. t-2-Cons. t-3), (Cons. t-3-Cons. t-4), (Cons. t-4-Cons. t-5) 
  Lagged Savings 2, 3, and 4 year lagged; (Income t-2-Cons. t-2), (Income t-3-Cons. t-3), (Income t-4-Cons. t-4) 
  a t refers to year t. Family Living Expenses include tax deductible contributions, medical expenses, taxes and interest on residence, child care and education,  
  and expenses on food, laundry & cleaning supplies, furnishings, insurance premiums, house repairs, clothing, entertainment, education, and transportation. 
  b Net Non-Farm Income=Gross Non-Farm Income - Non-Farm Business Expenses. 
  Net Farm Income=Gross Farm Returns-Operating Expenses +/- Depreciation and Amortization depending on gains/losses from machinery and building sales. 
  Gross Farm Returns are calculated from crop and livestock sales, government payments to the farmer, other farm receipts and settlements, and adjust. for accounts  
receivables. 
Operating Expenses include cash from operating expenses and adjustments for pre-paid expenses, accounts payable, and interest expense. 
  c Households who do not have children are the reference point. 
  d Southern Illinois and Central Illinois are both categorized under other regions and other region is the reference point.  
  e Other farm types include hog farm, part-time grain farm, dairy grain farm, dairy farm, beef farm and irrigated sand farm. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
Year 
Operator's 
age 
  
Whether 
household has 
children 
  
Number of 
household 
members 
  
Whether Farm is 
in Northern 
Illinois 
  
Whether 
Farm is a 
Grain farm 
  
Tenure 
ratio 
Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd. 
2000 50.14 8.99 
 
0.66 0.48 
 
3.52 1.54 
 
0.04 0.19 
 
0.90 0.30 
 
0.18 0.21 
2001 50.89 8.81 
 
0.67 0.47 
 
3.45 1.43 
 
0.08 0.27 
 
0.85 0.35 
 
0.17 0.22 
2002 51.57 9.23 
 
0.62 0.49 
 
3.30 1.52 
 
0.15 0.36 
 
0.89 0.31 
 
0.17 0.22 
2003 52.35 9.23 
 
0.61 0.49 
 
3.24 1.59 
 
0.17 0.38 
 
0.87 0.33 
 
0.19 0.23 
2004 52.97 9.42 
 
0.57 0.50 
 
3.19 1.60 
 
0.20 0.40 
 
0.89 0.32 
 
0.20 0.23 
2005 53.37 9.37 
 
0.57 0.50 
 
3.15 1.52 
 
0.21 0.41 
 
0.91 0.29 
 
0.20 0.23 
2006 53.89 9.29 
 
0.56 0.50 
 
3.15 1.52 
 
0.22 0.41 
 
0.91 0.29 
 
0.20 0.24 
2007 54.31 8.91 
 
0.56 0.50 
 
3.14 1.49 
 
0.22 0.42 
 
0.93 0.25 
 
0.19 0.22 
2008 55.16 9.02 
 
0.53 0.50 
 
3.08 1.46 
 
0.24 0.43 
 
0.93 0.26 
 
0.20 0.22 
2009 55.15 9.24 
 
0.52 0.50 
 
3.03 1.45 
 
0.23 0.42 
 
0.93 0.25 
 
0.20 0.23 
Overall 53.44 9.28   0.57 0.49   3.18 1.51   0.19 0.40   0.91 0.29   0.19 0.22 
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Table 4.2 Continued: Descriptive Statistics 
         
Year 
Consumption 
Levels t 
  
Changes in 
Consumption 
Levels t 
  
Changes in 
Consumption Levelst-2 
  
Changes in 
Consumption Levelst-3 
  
Changes in 
Consumption Levelst-4 
Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd. 
2000 68,380 33,098 
 
4,191 33,997 
 
-1,505 23,360 
 
3,123 18,818 
 
1,987 18,400 
2001 65,308 25,275 
 
-983 23,541 
 
-2,909 18,362 
 
-2,772 23,257 
 
2,370 20,339 
2002 61,535 22,885 
 
-1,440 20,215 
 
5,383 21,910 
 
-2,033 17,335 
 
-3,637 22,259 
2003 65,695 33,020 
 
3,683 30,642 
 
-922 21,954 
 
4,974 22,256 
 
-1,680 18,488 
2004 69,397 29,140 
 
5,006 27,018 
 
-1,609 22,150 
 
404 20,369 
 
3,045 24,939 
2005 66,126 29,159 
 
-4,621 25,009 
 
3,974 27,803 
 
-873 21,246 
 
-353 19,414 
2006 66,977 31,344 
 
-519 27,416 
 
6,197 29,668 
 
4,330 29,215 
 
300 25,087 
2007 71,222 27,553 
 
4,266 20,917 
 
-3,875 24,429 
 
5,616 29,247 
 
3,882 29,945 
2008 76,880 32,096 
 
6,376 26,554 
 
-1,156 24,495 
 
-3,802 24,309 
 
5,918 27,369 
2009 74,774 31,242 
 
-1,704 25,499 
 
3,972 20,469 
 
-938 25,714 
 
-3,088 27,244 
Overall 69,438 30,055   1,403 26,070   1,014 24,200   720 24,369   945 24,729 
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Table 4.2 Continued: Descriptive Statistics 
         
Year 
Income Levels t   
Changes in Income 
Levels t 
  
Changes in Income 
Levelst-2 
  
Changes in Income 
Levelst-3 
  
Changes in Income 
Levelst-4 
Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd. 
2000 105,560 55,408 
 
23,284 52,343 
 
-47,137 59,264 
 
-42,799 63,345 
 
37,988 61,874 
2001 69,304 72,751 
 
-33,315 81,697 
 
37,338 62,687 
 
-58,594 64,069 
 
-41,971 72,268 
2002 79,692 53,502 
 
4,937 55,897 
 
15,258 49,886 
 
39,277 64,410 
 
-61,691 66,596 
2003 114,641 67,049 
 
37,986 62,380 
 
-26,060 54,722 
 
17,917 53,212 
 
40,549 74,731 
2004 144,652 77,356 
 
29,561 68,311 
 
4,806 57,630 
 
-28,121 52,981 
 
19,105 55,090 
2005 104,043 77,946 
 
-42,208 71,675 
 
39,107 59,910 
 
5,042 56,479 
 
-28,496 57,721 
2006 147,676 95,508 
 
39,857 95,286 
 
34,445 69,530 
 
39,675 61,711 
 
3,493 61,749 
2007 261,936 152,716 
 
119,615 119,426 
 
-42,506 67,498 
 
30,625 69,035 
 
40,179 62,332 
2008 256,560 167,316 
 
-6,391 109,520 
 
35,242 81,825 
 
-45,103 62,651 
 
31,207 69,430 
2009 119,106 127,207 
 
-131,416 162,327 
 
125,410 111,114 
 
32,875 81,286 
 
-44,162 62,766 
Overall 151,756 129,336   1,421 122,870   24,765 88,601   3,663 73,425   -593 74,123 
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Table 4.2 Continued: Descriptive Statistics 
        
Year 
Savings t   Savingst-2   Savingst-3   Savingst-4   Number of 
observations Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   Mean Sd.   
2000 37,180 58,760 
 
-11,611 62,705 
 
34,022 61,821 
 
79,943 74,345 
 
134 
2001 3,996 75,249 
 
21,908 52,944 
 
-18,340 73,283 
 
37,482 70,674 
 
186 
2002 18,156 53,488 
 
34,421 55,244 
 
24,547 48,046 
 
-16,764 69,315 
 
240 
2003 48,946 67,217 
 
10,653 51,462 
 
35,791 60,799 
 
22,848 52,236 
 
231 
2004 75,254 73,361 
 
15,517 53,203 
 
9,102 51,521 
 
37,627 59,279 
 
281 
2005 37,917 75,996 
 
50,648 62,310 
 
15,516 52,704 
 
9,601 51,736 
 
300 
2006 80,699 94,351 
 
79,198 79,991 
 
50,950 66,632 
 
15,606 53,828 
 
326 
2007 190,714 145,490 
 
36,977 74,799 
 
75,608 75,935 
 
50,599 63,920 
 
352 
2008 179,680 161,211 
 
72,074 82,349 
 
35,675 70,665 
 
76,976 75,182 
 
372 
2009 44,332 122,567 
 
188,942 140,014 
 
67,504 79,967 
 
33,690 67,829 
 
390 
Overall 82,319 124,773   61,212 99,122   37,461 71,077   34,518 69,275   2,812 
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Table 4.3: First Stage Regression and Hansen J-Test Results 
  
Predicted Change in Y   
Hansen-J-
Overidentification 
Statistic 
  
 
F Value 
 
Test statistics 
Row Number Sets of Instruments Adj. R2 (p-value)   (p-value) 
1 
 
0.3579 10.85   1.528 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.4658) 
2 
  0.3503 13.01   2.225 
st-2…..st-4   (0.0000)   (0.3287) 
3 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 0.3587 6.55   5.825 
st-2…..st-4   (0.0000)   (0.3236) 
4 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 0.3586 6.54   6.004 
Δct-2…..Δct-4   (0.0000)   (0.3059) 
5 
st-2…..st-4 0.3570 5.54   6.025 
Δct-2…..Δct-4   (0.0000)   (0.3038) 
6 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 0.3588 5.63   6.085 
st-2…..st-4 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.4137) 
Δct-4         
7 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 0.3588 5.63   6.085 
Δct-2…..Δct-4 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.4137) 
st-2         
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Table 4.4: 2SLS Regression Results 
  Sets of Instruments 
 
        
 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 
 
st-2…..st-4 
 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 
       
st-2…..st-4 
  Coef. Values Std. Errors   Coef. Values Std. Errors   Coef. Values Std. Errors 
Changes in income levels 0.012 0.022 
 
0.005 0.025 
 
0.007 0.022 
Operator's age -146.469 430.021 
 
-110.891 343.863 
 
-151.183 429.365 
Operator's age squared 0.547 3.831 
 
0.387 3.077 
 
0.585 3.824 
Whether household has children -3,569.676
**
 1,450.462 
 
-2,054.389 1,254.457 
 
-3,589.670
**
 1,449.407 
Number of household members 759.162
*
 430.965 
 
491.837 367.228 
 
766.381
*
 430.376 
Farm is in Northern Illinois 275.208 1,196.875 
 
-686.509 1,086.763 
 
211.423 1,198.934 
Grain farm 594.884 1,551.468 
 
326.618 1,336.288 
 
675.180 1,548.169 
Tenure ratio -259.538 2,132.631 
 
112.176 1,823.700 
 
-250.974 2,133.416 
Year 2009 -3,814.551 4,863.071 
 
641.372 4,520.784 
 
-4,579.668 4,788.883 
Year 2008 2,807.866 3,379.173 
 
7,120.579
***
 2,532.052 
 
2,673.612 3,360.166 
Year 2007 -799.266 3,568.972 
 
4,555.106 3,158.757 
 
-300.229 3,625.300 
Year 2006 -4,681.416 3,263.815 
 
942.878 2,394.554 
 
-4,583.778 3,271.316 
Year 2005 -7,822.330
**
 3,669.999 
 
-2,323.903 2,928.198 
 
-8,138.533
**
 3,629.467 
Year 2004 916.116 3,325.498 
 
7,400.561
***
 2,495.644 
 
961.693 3,334.651 
Year 2003 -436.325 3,533.395 
 
4,247.926
*
 2,571.683 
 
-348.568 3,538.828 
Year 2002 -5,289.941 3,266.085 
 
-1,625.051 2,567.321 
 
-5,372.441
*
 3,257.159 
Year 2001 -4,328.188 3,734.080 
 
-131.622 2,810.027 
 
-4,605.204 3,703.975 
Year 2000 n/a n/a 
 
6,085.718
**
 2,858.710 
 
n/a n/a 
Constant 9,009.673 12,993.370 
 
2,839.439 10,349.630 
 
9,181.487 12,975.500 
Number of observations 2,812     3,753     2,812   
Centered R squared 0.023 
  
0.021 
  
0.023 
 Uncentered R squared 0.026 
  
0.023 
  
0.026 
 Prob>F 0.000     0.000     0.000   
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
    Standard errors are robust standard errors 
       
148 
 
Table 4.4 Continued: 2SLS Regression Results 
  Sets of Instruments 
 
      
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 
 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 
 
st-2…..st-4 
 
st-2…..st-4 
 
Δct-2…..Δct-4 
 
Δct-2…..Δct-4 
 
Δct-4 
  Coef. Values Std. Errors   Coef. Values Std. Errors   Coef. Values Std. Errors 
Changes in income levels 0.004 0.022 
 
0.006 0.022 
 
0.005 0.022 
Operator's age -153.364 428.916 
 
-152.000 429.652 
 
-153.219 429.001 
Operator's age squared 0.602 3.819 
 
0.592 3.827 
 
0.601 3.820 
Whether household has children -3,598.924
**
 1,449.863 
 
-3,593.138
**
 1,450.793 
 
-3,598.310
**
 1,449.369 
Number of household members 769.722
*
 430.173 
 
767.633
*
 430.559 
 
769.500
*
 430.190 
Farm is in Northern Illinois 181.903 1,194.189 
 
200.359 1,196.170 
 
183.860 1,196.982 
Grain farm 712.342 1,549.709 
 
689.108 1,554.675 
 
709.878 1,549.574 
Tenure ratio -247.011 2,133.974 
 
-249.489 2,132.924 
 
-247.274 2,134.060 
Year 2009 -4,933.776 4,805.643 
 
-4,712.391 4,851.429 
 
-4,910.302 4,789.078 
Year 2008 2,611.477 3,364.877 
 
2,650.323 3,361.735 
 
2,615.596 3,360.220 
Year 2007 -69.267 3,617.755 
 
-213.662 3,675.681 
 
-84.577 3,639.297 
Year 2006 -4,538.590 3,267.588 
 
-4,566.841 3,270.194 
 
-4,541.585 3,271.045 
Year 2005 -8,284.876
**
 3,638.653 
 
-8,193.384
**
 3,650.197 
 
-8,275.175
**
 3,626.538 
Year 2004 982.786 3,334.039 
 
969.599 3,337.839 
 
981.388 3,336.503 
Year 2003 -307.953 3,537.383 
 
-333.345 3,556.770 
 
-310.645 3,540.337 
Year 2002 -5,410.623
*
 3,259.657 
 
-5,386.752
*
 3,256.879 
 
-5,408.092
*
 3,256.171 
Year 2001 -4,733.412 3,707.018 
 
-4,653.258 3,708.673 
 
-4,724.913 3,700.836 
Year 2000 n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
Constant 9,261.005 12,965.270 
 
9,211.291 12,981.220 
 
9,255.733 12,966.030 
Number of observations 2,812     2,812     2,812   
Centered R squared 0.023 
  
0.023 
  
0.023 
 Uncentered R squared 0.025 
  
0.026 
  
0.025 
 Prob>F 0.000     0.000     0.000   
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
    Standard errors are robust standard errors. 
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Table 4.4 Continued: 2SLS Regression Results 
    Sets of Instruments 
  
 
Δyt-2…..Δyt-4 
  
 
Δct-2…..Δct-4 
  
 
st-2 
  
  Coef. Values Std. Errors 
  
Changes in income levels 0.005 0.022 
  Operator's age -153.219 429.001 
  Operator's age squared 0.601 3.820 
  Whether household has children -3,598.310
**
 1,449.369 
  Number of household members 769.500
*
 430.190 
  Farm is in Northern Illinois 183.860 1,196.982 
  Grain farm 709.878 1,549.574 
  Tenure ratio -247.274 2,134.060 
  Year 2009 -4,910.301 4,789.078 
  Year 2008 2,615.596 3,360.220 
  Year 2007 -84.577 3,639.297 
  Year 2006 -4,541.585 3,271.045 
  Year 2005 -8,275.175
**
 3,626.538 
  Year 2004 981.388 3,336.503 
  Year 2003 -310.645 3,540.337 
  Year 2002 -5,408.092
*
 3,256.171 
  Year 2001 -4,724.913 3,700.836 
  Year 2000 n/a n/a 
  Constant 9,255.733 12,966.030 
  Number of observations 2,812   
  Centered R squared 0.023 
   Uncentered R squared 0.025 
   Prob>F 0.000   
  ***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Standard errors are robust standard errors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 Summary and Principal Findings 
 
 This dissertation is composed of three papers (chapters) and derives its motivation 
specifically from financial intermediation and small business financing. Two of the papers are based 
on small businesses and relationship-based lending. The third paper specifically analyzes farm 
households that generate income from farm operations, as a representation of small businesses, and 
focuses on consumption behavior of farm households.   
The two papers on relationship-based lending analyze the changing small business lending 
structure and specifically answer the question of whether the importance of relationships in small 
business lending weakened in 2003. The first paper on relationship based lending is presented in 
chapter 2 and this paper specifically analyzes whether the significance of borrower-lender 
relationships on loan contract terms declined. For loan contract terms, this paper focuses on interest 
rate premiums and collateral and guarantor requirements. This paper finds that none of the 
relationship variables explained either interest rate premiums or collateral and guarantor 
requirements in 2003, even though the relationship variables, such as checking account, distance, 
length of relationship, savings account, and previous loan accounts were significant variables that 
explained loan contract terms before the mid-1990s. In addition, this study also finds that some of the 
hard-information based variables such as corporate organizational form, profitability, accounts 
receivable collection period, age, metropolitan area, Herfindahl index, industry variables, and 
leverage ratio gained significance in explaining loan contract terms in 2003 even though they were 
not significant before the mid-1990s.  
The second paper on relationship-based lending is presented in chapter 3. Since lenders might 
be more interested in knowing the effects of changes in relationships on credit availability and credit 
amounts rather than on loan contract terms, the second paper analyzes changes in effects of 
relationship variables on credit availability and dollar amounts of lines of credits granted to small 
businesses. Additionally, this study applies PCA for borrower-lender relationship variables. The 
purpose of using PCA is to analyze whether borrower-lender relationships can be explained in 
smaller dimensions. The PCA results show that the nature of relationship variables is such that they 
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are independent from each other and hence it is hard to categorize the relationship variables. 
Furthermore, the regression findings overall support a decline in the importance of borrower-lender 
relationships on small business credit availability and the dollar amounts of LOCs granted to small 
businesses.  
The third paper on farm consumption is presented in chapter 4. The purpose of this paper is 
to test whether the life cycle / permanent income hypothesis is consistent with the consumption 
behavior of farm households. This study finds evidence that current income changes are not 
significant in explaining consumption changes of farm households, thus confirming the life cycle / 
permanent income hypothesis for farm households.  
 
5.2 Implications 
 
The results regarding the two papers on relationship-based lending in chapters 2 and 3 overall 
support the hypothesis that borrower-lender relationships were not as important in determining the 
loan contract terms and the credit availability in 2003 as they previously were. The results from the 
two papers on relationship-based lending favor the notion that lending structure for small businesses 
has changed over time and that the importance of relationships in small business lending weakened in 
2003. It is possible that with technological improvements and use of SBCS models after the mid and 
late 1990s, lenders starting using hard-information in their lending decisions. There has also been 
more competition for lending to small businesses by larger banks and non-depository financial 
institutions that specialize in the use of hard information based lending models. Moreover, during the 
1980s and 1990s, with the consolidation of the banking sector, larger banks dominated the banking 
sector and started lending to small businesses.  
Due to the competitiveness of the small business market and the increased use of hard 
information in small business lending, lenders, specifically small banks, might want to reconsider 
their lending procedures. For instance, SBCS can put increased competitive pressures on small banks 
in the long run since SBCS can be used by lenders of any size and at any distance from borrowers. 
Since small banks are facing competition from larger banks and non-depository financial institutions, 
small banks might consider improving their hard-information based models to better compete with 
these larger banks and non-depository financial institutions, even though it may be initially costly. 
For instance, they may consider purchasing scores from external vendors or might develop their own 
scores.  
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Furthermore, the small businesses that meet the criteria of SBCS models will have a larger 
pool of lenders to choose from (for example, small banks, larger banks, and non-depository financial 
institutions) and small businesses will have greater bargaining power when borrowing. These small 
businesses will also benefit from lower costs resulting from more favorable loan contract terms.  For 
instance, with SBCS, lenders lower their cost of lending due to lower cost of screening. The lender 
can then reflect these lower costs in more favorable loan contracts with borrowers.  
Another implication will be on governmental policies for antitrust purposes. Since distance 
between borrowers and lenders are increasing due to technological improvements and the use of 
SBCS, in the longer run, a local presence by banks may not be required to lend to small businesses. 
Hence antitrust policy makers may consider redefining the appropriate geographic market definition 
for antitrust purposes (Berger et al., 2005-a).  
Additionally, understanding changes in the small business lending structure might help to 
better comprehend small businesses' financing sources for possible investment opportunities. 
Understanding the changes in small business lending structure will also help to improve efficiency in 
the small business lending system. However, it is also worth noting that there will always be small 
businesses that will not be able to afford to provide public information and that will still depend on 
relationship-based lending.  
The results regarding the consumption paper in chapter 4 validate that farm households 
follow the life cycle/ permanent income hypothesis. This result indicates that even if farm households 
face transitory income changes which might result either from changes in commodity prices or 
changes in production levels due to uncertainty in weather conditions, farm households do not adjust 
their consumption behavior but still continue consuming their predetermined consumption levels. 
One possible explanation is that farm households are less liquidity constrained because farm 
households can use their land as collateral to obtain credit during income fluctuations and farmers 
can also work off the farm to make additional income during low income years. Moreover, additional 
funding sources provided to farmers by the U.S. government through farm bills have helped farmers 
to smooth their income during low income years. Thus, farm households have easier access to 
additional sources of funds to smooth their income during transitory income changes.   
Understanding the relationship between farm income and consumption will help government 
to better evaluate the effects of its policies on imports, exports, and local economic growth. 
Moreover, policies on farm households should account for the possibility that farm consumption 
behavior is determined by permanent income changes because farm households do not have as much 
liquidity constraint as non-farm households due to additional sources of funds provided to farm 
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households during volatile income periods. Policies that involve farmer income should focus on 
permanent, but not transitory, income changes because farm households can smooth their income and 
will only adjust their consumption based on permanent income changes.  
 
5.3 Future Research 
 
This dissertation is not without its caveats. The dissertation would have benefited from a 
dataset that has more recent information regarding small businesses and their relationship based 
lending. Unfortunately, the SSBF dataset is limited with the 2003 year as the most recent year. 
Moreover, an extension to paper one on relationship-based lending in chapter 2, might include in the 
model small business credit scores for firms as additional explanatory variables. This might help to 
better understand the reasons behind changes in the small business lending sector. Even though the 
credit score information is not available for the 1987 and 1993 SSBF datasets, it is available for the 
1998 and 2003 datasets. By using the 1998 and 2003 datasets, a credit score model can be 
constructed and the small business credit scoring information can be estimated for the years 1987 and 
1993. 
For paper two on relationship-based lending in chapter 3, the initial thought was to use bank 
type information in the models to differentiate between small and large banks. Because the publicly 
available SSBF datasets do not provide this information, the study could not measure the effects of 
bank types on credit availability and LOC amount granted. A future extension to paper two can use 
another dataset that has bank type information and include bank types as additional explanatory 
variables in its models. This would directly help to understand whether there is a distinction between 
small and large banks in terms of providing credit to small businesses.  
As an extension to paper three on consumption in chapter 4, one may analyze the individual 
components of farm household income and how farm consumption behavior changes in the absence 
of government payments to farmers. This would also provide explicit information regarding the 
extent of success farm bills have in smoothing farm household income during income fluctuations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 ACCURACY OF THE PROXY FOR GUARANTOR 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
Appendix A corresponds to chapter 2 and provides information regarding the accuracy of the 
proxy for guarantor requirements. The assumption is that if the LOC provider has previously asked 
the firm to provide guarantors for its previous LOCs, most likely it will re-ask for guarantors for the 
recent LOC. To confirm the accuracy of the proxy, the same proxy process is applied for the 
guarantor information that is available in the 1993 and 2003 datasets. Then, the proxied guarantor 
information is used along with the already available collateral information to define the variable 
“whether LOC is secured through collateral or guarantors”. The variable “whether LOC is secured 
through collateral or guarantors” is then redefined with the actual guarantor and collateral 
information, and then this actual value is compared to the proxied value. When the actual values are 
compared to the proxied values for the first case (interest rate premium case) in the 1993 and 2003 
datasets, it is found that among the firms that have previous LOC information, 0.44 percent and 5.50 
percent of the data, sequentially, is predicted incorrectly. Similarly, the actual values are compared to 
the proxied values for the second case (collateral and guarantor requirements case) in the 1993 and 
2003 datasets and it is found that among the firms that have previous LOC information, 0.94 percent 
and 6.60 percent of the data, sequentially, is predicted incorrectly. It can be seen that the proxied 
values are quite good approximations to the actual values, considering that firms have previously 
obtained LOCs from their recent LOC providers. Note that all the firms in the 1987 dataset have 
already obtained previous LOCs from their recent LOC providers, and hence this study applies 
proxies for the guarantor information in the 1987 dataset and uses these proxies for defining the 
variable “whether LOC is secured through collateral or guarantors”.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 IMPUTATION METHODS AND WEIGHT CALCULATIONS 
 
 
Appendix B corresponds to chapter 2 and is divided into two sections. Section B.1 provides 
information regarding imputation methods used in the SSBF datasets. Section B.2 provides 
information regarding weight calculations in the SSBF datasets.  
 
B.1 Imputation Methods used for the SSBF dataset 
 
The SSBF data uses different methods to impute data. One method is computing missing 
values based on respondents’ information. If one element from a financial statement is missing, then 
the missing value is calculated by taking the difference between the reported total sum and the sum 
of the reported components. Another method is the “hot deck” approach especially for the categorical 
questions.106 To achieve certain convergence properties, the SSBF uses multiple or single imputation 
while imputing the missing information, especially for variables that contain continuous data. Dataset 
2003 uses multiple imputations whereas the 1987 and 1993 SSBF datasets use a single imputation.  
 For multiple imputations, missing information is iterated three times. Each of the iterations is 
based on prior iterations. In the first iteration, the variance-covariance matrix is filled in by imputing 
missing values. In the second iteration, the initial dataset with missing values is replicated three 
times, and the missing values are replaced based on the variance-covariance matrix from the original 
data and the imputed values from the first iteration. In the third iteration, the covariance matrix is 
pooled over the three implicates from the second round of iteration to create five final implicates. 
The five imputed datasets in the 2003 SSBF refer to those five implicates from this third iteration 
(The 2003 SSBF Codebook). The single imputation procedure is similar to the multiple imputations 
procedure, except that for the third iteration, single imputation produces only one implicate whereas 
multiple imputations produce five implicates.107 
                                                          
106
 In the hot-deck approach, missing data is matched with another observation within the sample that carries similar 
features. 
107 
Unlike single imputation, multiple imputations evaluate the extra variability due to missing information and allow 
for a better approximation to the real sampling distribution of the data with more valid inference and tests of 
significance. The point estimates obtained from multiple imputations (the 5 implicates) are averaged so that the best 
estimates are produced. The variances of the estimates are also adjusted for the uncertainty due to missing values 
(Montalto and Sung, 1996).  
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B.2 Weight Calculations for the SSBF dataset 
 
For the 1987, 1993, and 2003 datasets, the SSBF first selects an initial sample for each 
stratum. To account for the selection bias under the initial sample, the SSBF applies the reciprocal of 
the probability of being selected into the initial sample for each stratum. From this initial sample, 
batches are selected and the weight is adjusted for batch selection. The SSBF uses three to five 
replicates within each batch for the imputations. Since the SSBF releases sample by replicates within 
these batches, weight is adjusted for the bias of releasing sample to different replicates within the 
same batch. 
This weight is then adjusted for screener non-response sub-sampling, screener eligibility, 
screener non-response, main interview non-response sub-sampling, main interview eligibility, and 
main interview non-response.108 Since the weights are highly variable due to different non-response 
sub-sampling, eligibility, and non-response adjustments, there is extreme variation in the weights. 
This might cause large variances. In order to reduce this variance, final weights are adjusted for the 
outlier weights.
                                                          
108 The purpose of the screening interview is to decide whether a firm is eligible or ineligible for the main interview. 
The screening stage is done in two phases. In the first phase, firms are screened. In the second phase, the screener 
non-respondents eligible for sub-sampling are identified. These sub-sampled firms are further analyzed to see 
whether they are eligible for the main interview or whether their eligibility is still unknown. For firms that complete 
the screening stage in the first phase, the weight is equal to the initial sampling weight. For firms that are sub-
sampled for the second phase of the screening interview, a non-response sub-sampling adjustment factor is added for 
the weight. The weighting is also adjusted for the eligibility of the firm for the main interview. The firms that pass 
the screening interview stage may still not respond. The ones that do not respond to the screening stage are adjusted 
by a screener non-response weight.  
    The firms that pass the screening stage are given the main interview. Just like the screening stage, there are firms 
that do not respond to the main interview. Hence, main interview is also adjusted for main interview non-response 
sub-sampling, main interview eligibility, and main interview non-response. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Appendix C provides information for outcomes 1, 2, 4, and 5 from survey ordered logit regression in chapter 3. 
 
Table C.1: Survey Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 1) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Outcome = 1 (Zero Percent) dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) 0.009 0.016  
-0.037
**
 0.018 
 
-0.046
*
 0.025 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) 0.077
*
 0.039 
 
0.017 0.017 
 
-0.060 0.043 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account -0.212
**
 0.088 
 
-0.183
**
 0.080 
 
0.029 0.118 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account 0.036 0.058 
 
0.085 0.069 
 
0.049 0.090 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account -0.039 0.088  
0.135
*
 0.076 
 
0.174 0.116 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services 0.060 0.055 
 
0.012 0.054 
 
-0.048 0.077 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. 0.013 0.046 
 
0.035 0.051 
 
0.022 0.068 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview -0.079 0.066 
 
0.061 0.058 
 
0.139 0.088 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview 0.024 0.067 
 
0.031 0.054 
 
0.007 0.086 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview 0.112
*
 0.062 
 
-0.102
*
 0.058 
 
-0.214
**
 0.085 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person -0.019 0.060 
 
-0.083 0.052 
 
-0.064 0.079 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 0.055 0.052  
-0.098
**
 0.049 
 
-0.154
**
 0.072 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area 0.010 0.070 
 
-0.002 0.061 
 
-0.012 0.093 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.316
***
 0.057 
 
-0.037 0.122 
 
0.279
**
 0.135 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) -0.021 0.036 
 
0.017 0.036 
 
0.038 0.051 
Ln(Sales) -0.012 0.017 
 
0.003 0.017 
 
0.016 0.024 
Proprietorship Organizational Form 0.058 0.070  
-0.213
***
 0.062 
 
-0.271
***
 0.093 
Partnership Organizational Form -0.079 0.074   -0.156
*
 0.087   -0.077 0.114 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.1 Cont.: Surv. Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 1) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
Outcome = 1 (Zero Percent) dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry -0.061 0.077 
 
0.059 0.095 
 
0.120 0.122 
Wholesale Trade Industry 0.152
*
 0.088 
 
0.088 0.097 
 
-0.064 0.131 
Retail Trade Industry 0.172
**
 0.086 
 
0.168
*
 0.090 
 
-0.004 0.124 
Business Services Industry 0.061 0.080 
 
0.140 0.092 
 
0.079 0.121 
Other Industries 0.173 0.105 
 
0.315
***
 0.082 
 
0.142 0.133 
Education <= High School 0.002 0.077 
 
-0.035 0.073 
 
-0.037 0.107 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree -0.029 0.071 
 
-0.063 0.069 
 
-0.034 0.099 
Education = College Degree -0.023 0.061 
 
0.008 0.060 
 
0.031 0.085 
Leverage Ratio -0.002 0.004 
 
0.001 0.004 
 
0.003 0.006 
Profitability Ratio 0.010 0.010  
0.014
*
 0.008 
 
0.004 0.013 
Current Assets Ratio 0.032 0.095 
 
0.004 0.080 
 
-0.028 0.124 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period 0.001 0.0005  
-0.001
***
 0.000 
 
-0.002
***
 0.001 
Whether LOC is secured -0.002 0.059  
-0.182
***
 0.052 
 
-0.180
**
 0.079 
Ratio of LOC to sales -0.0004
***
 0.0001 
 
0.167
***
 0.065 
 
0.168
***
 0.065 
Number of observations 1,563               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.2: Survey Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 2) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
Outcome = 2 (Less than Half) dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.003 0.006  
0.017
**
 0.008 
 
0.021
**
 0.010 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.029
**
 0.015 
 
-0.008 0.008 
 
0.021 0.016 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.106
**
 0.052 
 
0.101
**
 0.050 
 
-0.005 0.071 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.014 0.024 
 
-0.043 0.039 
 
-0.030 0.045 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.016 0.038  
-0.049
**
 0.022 
 
-0.064 0.044 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.023 0.022 
 
-0.006 0.025 
 
0.018 0.033 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.005 0.017 
 
-0.016 0.024 
 
-0.011 0.029 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.030 0.025 
 
-0.028 0.027 
 
-0.058 0.037 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview -0.009 0.026 
 
-0.015 0.027 
 
-0.006 0.038 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -0.047 0.028  
0.043
*
 0.023 
 
0.089
**
 0.037 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.007 0.023 
 
0.041 0.027 
 
0.034 0.036 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.021 0.021  
0.045
**
 0.023 
 
0.066
**
 0.031 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.004 0.025 
 
0.001 0.028 
 
0.005 0.038 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. -0.048 0.067 
 
0.016 0.050 
 
0.064 0.084 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 0.008 0.013 
 
-0.008 0.017 
 
-0.016 0.022 
Ln(Sales) 0.005 0.007 
 
-0.002 0.008 
 
-0.006 0.010 
Proprietorship Organizational Form -0.024 0.030  
0.078
***
 0.019 
 
0.102
***
 0.036 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.023 0.017   0.052
***
 0.019   0.029 0.025 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.2 Cont.: Surv. Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 2) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Outcome = 2 (Less than Half) dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.020 0.022 
 
-0.029 0.049 
 
-0.049 0.053 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.069 0.048 
 
-0.045 0.052 
 
0.024 0.071 
Retail Trade Industry -0.079
*
 0.047 
 
-0.089
*
 0.051 
 
-0.010 0.069 
Business Services Industry -0.024 0.033 
 
-0.069 0.045 
 
-0.045 0.056 
Other Industries -0.086 0.063 
 
-0.195
***
 0.055 
 
-0.108 0.083 
Education <= High School -0.001 0.029 
 
0.016 0.033 
 
0.017 0.044 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree 0.010 0.024 
 
0.028 0.028 
 
0.018 0.037 
Education = College Degree 0.008 0.022 
 
-0.004 0.028 
 
-0.012 0.036 
Leverage Ratio 0.001 0.002 
 
-0.0003 0.002 
 
-0.001 0.003 
Profitability Ratio -0.004 0.004 
 
-0.006
*
 0.004 
 
-0.003 0.005 
Current Assets Ratio -0.012 0.035 
 
-0.002 0.037 
 
0.010 0.051 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.0003 0.0002 
 
0.001
**
 0.0002 
 
0.001
***
 0.0003 
Whether LOC is secured 0.001 0.022  
0.098
***
 0.030 
 
0.097
***
 0.037 
Ratio of LOC to sales 0.0001
***
 0.00004 
 
-0.078
***
 0.030 
 
-0.078
***
 0.030 
Number of observations 1,563               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.3: Survey Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 4) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
Outcome = 4 (More than Half) dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.002 0.003 
 
0.006
*
 0.004 
 
0.008 0.005 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.016
*
 0.009 
 
-0.003 0.003 
 
0.013 0.009 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.034
**
 0.013 
 
0.027
**
 0.012 
 
-0.007 0.016 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.007 0.011 
 
-0.014 0.010 
 
-0.006 0.015 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.008 0.016 
 
-0.028 0.019 
 
-0.036 0.025 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.012 0.011 
 
-0.002 0.010 
 
0.010 0.014 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.003 0.009 
 
-0.006 0.009 
 
-0.003 0.013 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.016 0.014 
 
-0.011 0.011 
 
-0.027 0.018 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview -0.005 0.014 
 
-0.005 0.009 
 
0.000 0.016 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -0.021
*
 0.012 
 
0.019 0.012 
 
0.041
**
 0.018 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.004 0.012 
 
0.014 0.009 
 
0.010 0.015 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.011 0.011 
 
0.017
*
 0.009 
 
0.029
**
 0.014 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.002 0.015 
 
0.000 0.011 
 
0.003 0.018 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.113
***
 0.038 
 
0.007 0.024 
 
-0.106
**
 0.043 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 0.004 0.008 
 
-0.003 0.006 
 
-0.007 0.010 
Ln(Sales) 0.003 0.004 
 
-0.001 0.003 
 
-0.003 0.005 
Proprietorship Organizational Form -0.011 0.013 
 
0.044
**
 0.019 
 
0.056
**
 0.024 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.018 0.020   0.034 0.024   0.015 0.030 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.3 Cont.: Surv. Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 4) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Outcome = 4 (More than Half) dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.013 0.019 
 
-0.010 0.015 
 
-0.023 0.024 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.027
**
 0.014 
 
-0.014 0.015 
 
0.013 0.020 
Retail Trade Industry -0.030
**
 0.014 
 
-0.026
*
 0.014 
 
0.005 0.019 
Business Services Industry -0.012 0.016 
 
-0.023 0.017 
 
-0.011 0.022 
Other Industries -0.028
*
 0.015 
 
-0.039
***
 0.013 
 
-0.011 0.018 
Education <= High School -0.0004 0.016 
 
0.006 0.014 
 
0.007 0.021 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree 0.006 0.016 
 
0.012 0.013 
 
0.005 0.020 
Education = College Degree 0.005 0.013 
 
-0.001 0.010 
 
-0.006 0.017 
Leverage Ratio 0.0004 0.001 
 
-0.0001 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
Profitability Ratio -0.002 0.002 
 
-0.002 0.001 
 
-0.0004 0.003 
Current Assets Ratio -0.007 0.020 
 
-0.001 0.014 
 
0.006 0.024 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.0002 0.0001  
0.0002
**
 0.0001 
 
0.0003
**
 0.0001 
Whether LOC is secured 0.0004 0.012  
0.027
***
 0.010 
 
0.027
*
 0.015 
Ratio of LOC to sales 0.0001
***
 0.00002 
 
-0.029
**
 0.013 
 
-0.029
**
 0.013 
Number of observations 1,563               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.4: Survey Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 5) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw 
two period 
coefficients=0 
Outcome = 5 (Almost All or All) dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Ln(1+ Distance between Firm and Institution) -0.002 0.003  
0.006
*
 0.004 
 
0.008 0.005 
Ln(1+ Length of Relationship) -0.016
*
 0.009 
 
-0.003 0.003 
 
0.013 0.010 
Whether Firm Has Checking Account 0.035
**
 0.015 
 
0.025
**
 0.010 
 
-0.010 0.017 
Whether Firm Has Savings Account -0.007 0.011 
 
-0.013 0.010 
 
-0.006 0.015 
Whether Firm Has Previous Loan Account 0.008 0.016 
 
-0.031 0.023 
 
-0.038 0.028 
Whether Firm Obtains Financ. Management Services -0.012 0.011 
 
-0.002 0.009 
 
0.010 0.015 
Whether Firm Uses Single Source to Conduct Fin. Rel. -0.003 0.009 
 
-0.006 0.009 
 
-0.003 0.013 
Whether Firm Uses Any Records for Interview 0.016 0.014 
 
-0.010 0.010 
 
-0.027 0.018 
Whether Firm Uses  Financial Records for Interview -0.005 0.013 
 
-0.005 0.009 
 
0.000 0.016 
Whether Firm Uses Tax Return Records for Interview -0.021
*
 0.011 
 
0.020 0.014 
 
0.041
**
 0.019 
Whether Firm's Method of Conducting Bus. is In Person 0.004 0.012 
 
0.013 0.009 
 
0.009 0.015 
Herfindahl Index >= 1,800 -0.011 0.011  
0.017
*
 0.010 
 
0.029
*
 0.015 
Firm is Located in Metropolitan Area -0.002 0.015 
 
0.000 0.010 
 
0.003 0.018 
LOC Provider: Non-Depository or Non-Financial Supp. 0.175
**
 0.086 
 
0.007 0.024 
 
-0.168
*
 0.089 
Ln(1+ Age of Firm) 0.004 0.008 
 
-0.003 0.006 
 
-0.007 0.010 
Ln(Sales) 0.003 0.004 
 
-0.001 0.003 
 
-0.003 0.005 
Proprietorship Organizational Form -0.011 0.013  
0.047
**
 0.023 
 
0.058
**
 0.027 
Partnership Organizational Form 0.019 0.021   0.037 0.030   0.018 0.037 
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table C.4 Cont.: Surv. Ordered Logit Results for Percentage of Trade Credit Paid Late - Avg Marginal Effects (Outcome = 5) 
 
1993 
 
2003 
 
Ho: Difference btw two 
period coefficients=0 
Outcome = 5 (Almost All or All) dy/dx Std. Err.   dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.   
Difference 
Value 
Std. Err. 
Manufacturing Industry 0.014 0.019 
 
-0.009 0.015 
 
-0.023 0.024 
Wholesale Trade Industry -0.026
*
 0.013 
 
-0.013 0.014 
 
0.013 0.019 
Retail Trade Industry -0.029
**
 0.013 
 
-0.024
*
 0.014 
 
0.004 0.018 
Business Services Industry -0.012 0.015 
 
-0.023 0.016 
 
-0.010 0.022 
Other Industries -0.026
**
 0.013 
 
-0.035
***
 0.013 
 
-0.008 0.017 
Education <= High School -0.0004 0.016 
 
0.006 0.013 
 
0.007 0.021 
Education = Associate, Trade, No College Degree 0.006 0.016 
 
0.012 0.014 
 
0.005 0.021 
Education = College Degree 0.005 0.013 
 
-0.001 0.010 
 
-0.006 0.016 
Leverage Ratio 0.0004 0.001 
 
-0.0001 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 
Profitability Ratio -0.002 0.002 
 
-0.002 0.001 
 
-0.0003 0.003 
Current Assets Ratio -0.007 0.020 
 
-0.001 0.014 
 
0.006 0.024 
Accounts Receivable Collection Period -0.0002 0.0001 
 
0.0002
**
 0.0001 
 
0.0003
***
 0.0001 
Whether LOC is secured 0.0004 0.012 
 
0.025
***
 0.010 
 
0.025 0.016 
Ratio of LOC to sales 0.0001
***
 0.00002 
 
-0.029
**
 0.014 
 
-0.029
**
 0.014 
Number of observations 1,563               
***, **,* refer to significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
        
